Fragments of the empire: nuclear storage near Ruzhany. Fragments of an empire: nuclear storage facilities near Ruzhany The collapse of the union and the fate of the Strategic Missile Forces

Attention! This article was written a long time ago and may contain inaccuracies. The history of the 60th Missile Regiment of the 43rd Missile Army is described in detail at the link:.

We continue to restore the history of the 60th missile regiment of the 43rd missile army. With the help of LiveJournal razum managed to clarify the structure of the regiment: one silo launch division and two ground launch divisions. It is written about the missile silos of the same regiment.

Each ground-launch division consisted of four batteries of two missiles each. Thus, 24 missiles with nuclear warheads of at least a megaton each were deployed around Vinnitsa. Or even more: other, more powerful warheads were also provided for these missiles. Who cares - translate into the number of Hiroshima and sigh about the former power. We'll go look at its remains.

Today we will talk on ground launchers of R-12 missiles of one of the divisions. Dislocation - a forest near the village of Pultovtsy, south of the city of Vinnitsa. What is the R-12 missile and the ground launch division of these missiles, you can read and. This post uses photos from the autumn and summer 2010 editions. Comments on the photo are made largely with the help of razum who served in a similar military unit.

So division. Four batteries, eight missiles, four launch positions. This means that the division will first launch the first four missiles, and then four more. If he has time. And the probability of being in time every year became lower and lower, as the enemy’s nuclear missile and reconnaissance means improved. However, there were options, but about them another time.

1. Schematic of various possible unit plans from the R-12. Source - Ruzhany strategic. Our object is made according to the scheme "A", in the figure on the left. Long rectangles are missile hangars. Circles are starting positions. We enter from below, from the auxiliary premises.

2. Boxes for equipment. For a large number of large equipment.

3. Oval room next to the boxes. On the territory of part of the premises of this kind, there are several dozen.

4. There is such a reminder on the wall inside.

5. Another similar room. Inside, everything is carved into metal, so I don’t post photos of the interiors: as a rule, there are bare walls.

6. Word razum : "The picture shows part of the missile guidance system. The missile was aimed by turning on the table along the axis of the 1st and 3rd stabilizers. On the right in the" battalion commander's house "was such an obelisk with a Karl Zeis theodolite screwed on, which looked at the missile, more precisely, the so-called. collimation mirror (platinum, by the way) in one of its open hatches. Through this mirror, the gunner saw the marks installed on the monuments behind the house. The rocket was twisted by hand at first roughly, then precisely (with a microscrew) at the gunner's commands (first compartment)."

The R-12 missile was aimed at the target by the "azimuth-range" method. The range was set according to the time the engine was running, after it was turned off, the warhead was immediately separated, which flew longer by inertia. Roughly speaking, the rocket was turned towards the target and the engine was set to work. It's that simple.

7. Installing place of theodolite.

8. We are approaching the nearest storage of missiles, the so-called missile hangar.

9. Hangar doors. They open easily, with one left, without any quotes.

10. The hangar is very long. The photo is not a UFO, but comrades with lanterns, they are standing in the middle of the hangar, I photograph the entrance from the far wall. No lights and flashes help.

11. Drawing on the rear wall of the hangar.

12. And its continuation. Brick wall - remake. The territory of the unit was used by pontoons for some time after the departure of the rocketmen.

13. The room inside the missile hangar.

14. In the side wall of each hangar there is such a passage through the embankment.

15. And brings this move to such a box. It looks like it's designed for a car.

16. Lyrical digression. Concrete roads of the sleeping part and autumn nature.

17. Starting position. This is the base for the starting table. A rocket was placed here and it was supposed to fly away from here. In the background is a rocket hangar.

18. It looked something like this. Photo from the Arms Museum in Kiev.

19. Base close-up. We will meet with this contraption in the following posts.

20. Starting positions bunded. The height of the shaft is visible in the photo. From the outside of each shaft there is an entrance to an underground structure, where compressed air cylinders were located.

21. Near the extreme starting position. It seems that this is the "Combat House" mentioned above.

22. Room for compressed air cylinders in the bunding of the starting position.

23. Starting positions are combined into pairs by large two-story rooms with the possibility of a through passage from one position to another. The photo is a side view.

24. Traces of being inside pontoons.

25. Several, more than a dozen, underground shelters are scattered around the unit, where personnel hid during the launch.

26. Inside is a little uncomfortable.

27. Security fortification: firing point at the crossroads between pairs of starting positions.

28. There is also such a firing point.

29. Overlap. So cozy, like home. By the way, this building covers ...

30. Hangar, on the roof of which there is a separate shooting point on both sides.

31. Shooting point on the roof close-up.

32. The same building in the summer. Is it really beautiful? The design, location, and device of the security perimeter give grounds to assert that it was here that the warheads of the missiles were stored. Eight pieces. A total of at least eight megatons of TNT.

33. Finally, a pit with dumped auxiliary equipment cabins. The cars were cut into metal, and the fiberglass cabins were left, nobody needs them. This is to create an atmosphere of abandonment and autumn despondency.

So the visit to the second of three divisions of the 60th missile regiment of the 19th division of the 43rd missile army (later the 60th separate regiment of the 43rd army) ended. If anyone has any information about this regiment - I will be glad to help.

RVSN (Strategic Missile Forces) are a separate branch of the military Armed Forces Russian Federation. They represent the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces - the Strategic Nuclear Forces, or the so-called "nuclear triad", which includes, in addition to the Strategic Missile Forces, strategic aviation and naval strategic forces. Designed for nuclear deterrence of possible aggression and destruction by group or massive nuclear missile strikes of enemy strategic targets, which form the basis of its military and economic potential. They can be used independently or in conjunction with other components of the strategic nuclear forces.

The Strategic Missile Forces are troops of constant combat readiness. The basis of their weapons are ground-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) ground-based, equipped with warheads with nuclear warheads. According to the method of basing, ICBMs are divided into:

• mine;
• mobile (ground) based.

Currently, only three countries in the world (Russia, the United States and China) have a full-fledged nuclear triad, that is, land, air and sea components of strategic nuclear forces. At the same time, only Russia has such a unique structure as the Strategic Missile Forces as part of its armed forces.

In the United States, unlike the Russian Federation, ICBM formations are part of the air force. The ground and air components of the American nuclear triad are subordinate to a single structure - the Global Strike Command as part of the US Air Force. The American analogue of the Strategic Missile Forces is the 20th Air Army of the Global Strike Command, consisting of three missile wings armed with Minuteman-3 silo-based ICBMs. Unlike the Strategic Missile Forces, there are no mobile-based ICBMs in service with the American ground strategic forces. The air component of the US strategic nuclear forces includes the 8th Air Force of the Global Strike Command, armed with B-52H strategic bombers Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit.

Before considering state of the art Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, let's turn to the history of this type of troops and briefly consider the main milestones in the creation and development of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces.

Strategic Missile Forces of the USSR: HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND WEAPONS

The development of strategic missile weapons in the USSR began in the first post-war years. Captured German V-2 missiles served as the basis for the creation of the first Soviet ballistic missiles.

In 1947, the construction of the 4th Central State Training Ground Kapustin Yar began, where a special-purpose brigade of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (bron RVGK) arrived under the command of Major General of Artillery A.F. Tveretsky with elements of V-2 rockets. In the same year, test launches of German missiles began, and a year later, on October 10, 1948, the first Soviet ballistic missile R-1 was launched - a copy of the FAU-2, assembled from units already of Soviet production.

Between 1950 and 1955 as part of the artillery of the RVGK, six more armors were formed (since 1953 - engineering brigades of the RVGK), armed with missiles R-1 and R-2. These missiles had a range of 270 and 600 km, respectively, and were equipped with conventional (non-nuclear) warheads. Special-purpose brigades armed with missiles were theoretically intended to destroy large military, military-industrial and administrative facilities of great strategic or operational importance, but their real combat value was low due to the low characteristics of missile weapons. It took 6 hours to prepare the rocket for launch, the refueled rocket could not be stored - it had to be launched within 15 minutes or the fuel was drained and then the rocket was prepared for re-launch for at least a day. For knocks, the brigade could fire 24-36 missiles. The accuracy of the R-1 and R-2 missiles was extremely low: the CEP (circular probabilistic deviation) was 1.25 km, as a result of which it was possible to fire at objects with an area of ​​at least 8 square meters. km. However, a missile with a non-nuclear warhead ensured the complete destruction of urban buildings within a radius of only 25 m, which made the use of the R-1 and R-2 ineffective in real combat conditions. In addition, numerous starting battery equipment was very vulnerable to artillery fire and air attack weapons. In view of all of the above, the first Soviet missile brigades had minimal combat value, being more of a training and testing center for training specialists and testing missile technologies. To turn them into a real fighting force, much more advanced missile weapons were required.

In the second half of the 50s. The R-5 and R-12 IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) with ranges of 1,200 and 2,080 km, respectively, as well as the R-7 and R-7A ICBMs, are being put into service.

Single stage tactical ballistic missile R-5 became the first truly combat Soviet missile. An increase in the firing range led to its extremely low accuracy: the KVO was 5 km, which made the use of this missile with a conventional warhead meaningless. Therefore, a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 80 kilotons was created for it. Its modification - R-5M carried a nuclear warhead with a capacity of already 1 megaton. The R-5M missiles were in service with six RVGK engineering brigades and significantly increased the firepower of the Soviet Army. However, their range of 1200 km was clearly insufficient for a strategic confrontation with the United States. In order to “cover” the territory controlled by NATO as much as possible, two divisions of the 72nd engineering brigade with four R-5M missiles were moved to the territory of the GDR in strict secrecy, after which the southeastern part of Great Britain was within their reach.

Here we should make a small digression in order to understand the further development of Soviet ballistic missiles. The fact is that a split arose among Soviet designers. Outstanding designer of rocket technology S.P. Korolev was a supporter of liquid rockets, where liquid oxygen was used as an oxidizer. The disadvantage of such missiles was discussed above: they could not be stored in a refueled state for any long period of time. At the same time, M.K. Yangel, Korolev's deputy, advocated the use of nitric acid as an oxidizing agent, which made it possible to keep the rocket refueled and ready for launch for a long time.

Ultimately, this dispute led to the creation of two independent design bureaus. Yangel and his team founded the Special Design Bureau No. 584 at the rocket-building plant under construction in Dnepropetrovsk (Yuzhmash). Here he develops MRBM R-12, which was put into service in 1959. This missile had a CEP of 5 km and was equipped with a nuclear warhead with a capacity of 2.3 Mt. With a relatively short range of the R-12, its indisputable advantage was the use of stored fuel components and the ability to store in the required degree of combat readiness - from No. 4 to No. 1. At the same time, the launch preparation time ranged from 3 hours 25 minutes to 30 minutes. Looking ahead, let's say that the R-12 rocket became the "long-liver" of the Soviet missile forces. In 1986, 112 R-12 launchers were still in service. Their complete removal of weapons took place only at the end of the 80s in the framework of the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of medium and short-range missiles.

While Yangel was creating the R-12, Korolev was developing the R-7 rocket. Introduced into service in 1960, this ICBM with a range of 8,000 km was the first Soviet ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States. However, a serious drawback of the R-7 was long time refueling - 12 hours. This required 400 tons of liquid oxygen, and a fueled rocket could be stored for no more than 8 hours. Thus, the R-7 was well suited for a pre-emptive strike on the enemy, but did not make it possible to carry out a retaliatory launch. For this reason, the maximum number of deployed R-7 launchers never exceeded four, and by 1968 all R-7s were withdrawn from service, giving way to new generation missiles.

In 1958, the missile forces were divided in accordance with their tasks: the RVGK engineering teams armed with the R-11 and R-11M operational-tactical missiles were transferred to the Ground Forces, and the R-7 intercontinental ballistic missiles were part of the first ICBM formation under conditional the name "Object" Angara ".

Creation of the Strategic Missile Forces

Thus, by the end of the 1950s in the USSR, samples of missiles with sufficient combat effectiveness were created and put into mass production. There is a need to create a centralized command of all strategic missile forces.

On December 17, 1959, No. 1384-615, by a top-secret decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the establishment of the post of commander-in-chief of the missile forces in the Armed Forces of the USSR", an independent branch of the Armed Forces was created - the Strategic Missile Forces. December 17 is currently celebrated as Strategic Missile Forces Day .

Decree No. 1384-615 ordered the Strategic Missile Forces to have missile brigades (medium-range) of three to four regiments and missile divisions of five to six regiments, as well as ICBM brigades consisting of six to eight launches.

The formation of directorates and services of the Strategic Missile Forces begins. On December 31, 1959, the following were formed: the Main Headquarters of the Missile Forces, the Central Command Post with a communications center and a computer center, the Main Directorate of Missile Weapons, the Combat Training Directorate, and other services. The first commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of the USSR was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense - Chief Marshal of Artillery Nedelin M.I.

Within a short time after the official creation of the Strategic Missile Forces, numerous missile regiments and divisions began to appear on the territory of the USSR. Tank, artillery and aviation units were hastily transferred to the staff of the missile troops. They handed over their old weapons and mastered new rocket technology in the shortest possible time. So, two directorates of the air armies of Long-Range Aviation were transferred to the Strategic Missile Forces, which served as the base for the deployment of missile armies, three directorates of air divisions, 17 engineering regiments of the RGC (they were reorganized into missile divisions and brigades) and many other units and formations.

By 1960, 10 missile divisions were deployed as part of the Strategic Missile Forces, based in the western part of the Union and the Far East:

1) 19th Missile Zaporozhye Red Banner Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov Division, headquarters in the city of Khmelnitsky (Ukrainian SSR);

2) 23rd Guards Rocket Orel-Berlin Red Banner Division - headquarters in the city of Valga;

3) 24th Guards Missile Gomel Order of Lenin Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky Division - Gvardeysk in the Kaliningrad region;

4) 29th Guards Rocket Vitebsk Order of Lenin Red Banner Division - Siauliai (Lithuanian SSR);

5) 31st Guards Rocket Bryansk-Berlin Red Banner Division - Pruzhany (BSSR);

6) 32nd Rocket Kherson Red Banner Division - Postavy (BSSR);

7) 33rd Guards Rocket Svirskaya Red Banner Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Alexander Nevsky Division - Mozyr (BSSR);

8) Guards Rocket Sevastopol Division - Lutsk (Ukrainian SSR);

9) missile division - Kolomyia (Ukrainian SSR);

10) missile division - Ussuriysk.

All these divisions were armed with R-12 missiles, the total number of which in 1960 was 172 units, but a year later there were 373 of them. Now all of Western Europe and Japan were under the gunpoint of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces.

The only division armed with R-7 and R-7A intercontinental missiles was based in Plesetsk.

In the formations of the IRBM, the main combat unit was the missile division (rdn), in the formations of the ICBM - the missile regiment (rp).

By 1966, the number of R-12 MRBMs in service with the Soviet missile forces reached 572 - this was the maximum, after which a gradual decline began. However, the range of the R-12 was still not very large. The task of creating a mass rocket capable of "reaching out" to US territory has still not been solved.

By 1958, Soviet chemists had developed a promising new fuel - heptyl. This substance was extremely toxic, but at the same time it was effective as a fuel, and most importantly, it was long-lasting. Heptyl missiles could be kept in combat condition for years.

In 1958, Yangel began designing a rocket R-14, which was adopted in 1961. The flight range of the new missile, equipped with a 2 Mt warhead, was 4,500 km. Now the Strategic Missile Forces of the USSR could freely keep the whole of Western Europe at gunpoint.

However, the R-14, like the R-12, was extremely vulnerable in an open launch position. It was urgently necessary to increase the survivability of missiles. The way out was found simple, albeit labor-intensive - to place strategic missiles in mines. This is how launchers for silo-based missiles R-12U "Dvina" and R-14U "Chusovaya" appeared. The starting position of Dvina was a rectangle measuring 70 by 80 m, in the corners of which there were launch mines, and underground - a command post. "Chusovaya" had the shape of a right triangle with legs 70 and 80 m, with launch shafts at the tops.

Despite the tremendous progress in the development of rocket technology, achieved in the 50s - the first half of the 60s, the Soviet Union was still unable to launch a full-fledged nuclear missile attack on the territory of America. An attempt in 1962 to place Soviet R-12 and R-14 missiles in Cuba, closer to the US borders, ended in a sharp confrontation known as the Caribbean Crisis. There was a real threat of the Third World War. The USSR was forced to retreat and remove its strategic missiles from Cuba.

At the same time, by 1962, the United States was armed with three hundred (!) Atlas, Titan-1 and Minuteman-1 intercontinental ballistic missiles with a maximum deviation from the target of 3 kilometers, equipped with nuclear warheads with a capacity of 3 Mt. And the Titan-2 missile, adopted in 1962, was equipped with a thermonuclear warhead with a capacity of 10 megatons, and had a maximum deviation of only 2.5 km. And this is not counting the huge fleet of strategic bombers (1,700 vehicles) and 160 Polaris SLBMs on 10 George Washington-class submarines. The superiority of the United States over the USSR in the field of strategic weapons was simply overwhelming!

It was urgent to close the gap. Since 1959, the development of a two-stage ICBM R-16. Unfortunately, the haste had tragic consequences in the form of a series of accidents and disasters. The largest of them was the fire at Baikonur on October 24, 1960, which arose as a result of a gross violation of safety regulations (engineers and rocket scientists tried to troubleshoot the electrical circuit on a fueled R-16 rocket). As a result, the rocket exploded, propellant and Nitric acid spilled over the launch pad. 126 people were killed, including the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Marshal Nedelin. Yangel miraculously survived, because a few minutes before the disaster he went behind the bunker to smoke.

Nevertheless, work on the R-16 continued, and by the end of 1961 the first three missile regiments were ready for combat duty. In parallel with the development of R-16 missiles, silo launchers for them were created. launch complex, which received the Sheksna-V index, consisted of three silos placed in one line at a distance of several tens of meters, an underground command post and fuel and oxidizer storage facilities (the missiles were refueled immediately before launch).

In 1962, there were 50 R-16 missiles in service, and by 1965 their number in the Strategic Missile Forces reached its maximum - 202 launchers of silo-based R-16U missiles in several base areas.

The R-16 became the first mass-produced Soviet missile with a flight range (11,500-13,000 km) that made it possible to hit targets in the United States. It became the base missile for creating a group of intercontinental missiles of the Strategic Missile Forces. True, its accuracy was not high - the maximum deviation was 10 km, but it was compensated by a powerful warhead - 3-10 Mt.

Around the same time, Korolev was developing a new oxygen ICBM R-9. Its tests dragged on until 1964 (although the first combat systems were deployed in 1963). Despite the fact that Korolev himself considered his missile to be significantly superior to the R-16 (the R-9 was much more accurate, had a range of 12500-16000 km and a powerful warhead of 5-10 Mt at half the weight), it did not entrust wide distribution. The Strategic Missile Forces received only 29 R-9A missiles, which served until the mid-1970s. After the R-9, oxygen rockets were not created in the Soviet Union.

Despite the fact that the R-16 missiles were adopted and built in significant numbers, they were too large and expensive to become truly massive. Rocket designer academician V.N. Chelomey proposed his solution - a light "universal" rocket UR-100. It could be used both as an ICBM and in the Taran missile defense system. The UR-100 was put into service in 1966, and in 1972 its modifications with improved performance characteristics were adopted - UR-100M and UR-100UTTH.

UR-100 (according to NATO classification - SS-11) became the most massive missile ever adopted by the USSR Strategic Missile Forces. From 1966 to 1972 990 UR-100 and UR-100M missiles were put on combat duty. The launch range of a missile with a light warhead with a capacity of 0.5 Mt was 10600 km, and with a heavy warhead with a capacity of 1.1 Mt - 5000 km. The great advantage of the UR-100 was that it could be stored in a refueled state for the entire period of its stay on combat duty - 10 years. The time from receiving the command to launch was about three minutes, which was required to spin up the rocket's gyroscopes. The mass deployment of relatively cheap UR-100 missiles was the Soviet response to the American Minutemen.

In 1963, a decision was made that determined the appearance of the Strategic Missile Forces for many years to come: to start building single-launch mine launchers (silos). Throughout the USSR, from the Carpathians to Far East, a grandiose construction of new position areas for basing ICBMs was launched, in which 350 thousand people were involved. The construction of a single-launch silo was a labor-intensive and expensive process, but such a launcher was much more resistant to nuclear strikes. Mine launchers were tested by real nuclear explosions and showed high stability: all systems and fortifications remained intact and capable of combat work.

In parallel with the development of the light ICBM UR-100, the Yangel Design Bureau began developing the complex R-36 with heavy ICBMs. Its main task was considered to be the defeat of highly protected small targets in the United States, such as ICBM launchers, command posts, bases of nuclear submarine missile carriers, etc. Just like the rest of the Soviet ICBMs of that time, the R-36 was not very accurate, which they tried to compensate for with a 10 Mt warhead. In 1967, the R-36 heavy ICBM was adopted by the Strategic Missile Forces, by which time 72 missiles had already been deployed, and by 1970 - 258.

The R-36 launcher was a huge structure: depth - 41 m, diameter - 8 m. Therefore, they were placed in deserted areas: Krasnoyarsk Territory, Orenburg and Chelyabinsk regions, Kazakhstan. Formations armed with R-36s became part of the Orenburg missile corps, later transformed into a missile army.

Strategic Missile Forces in the 60s - 70s

The rapid growth of the grouping of Soviet ballistic missiles was accompanied by numerous changes in the structure of the Strategic Missile Forces. The deployment of an increasing number of launchers of ICBMs and medium-range missiles required reliable control, warning and communication systems. In a potential nuclear conflict, time was counted by seconds - the missiles had to leave the mines before they were destroyed by the enemy. In addition, silo launchers needed complex maintenance and reliable protection. Positional areas of ICBMs occupied vast uninhabited spaces. The launchers were located at a considerable distance from each other in order to make it more difficult to destroy them with one blow. Missile maintenance required a large number of personnel and a powerful infrastructure.

The Strategic Missile Forces became, in fact, a closed "state within a state." For rocket men, secret cities were built that were not on the maps. Their existence, like everything connected with the Strategic Missile Forces, was a state secret, and only railway lines that went to supposedly deserted places could indicate the location of secret objects. The Strategic Missile Forces had not only military facilities, but also their own factories, state farms, forestries, railways and roads.

The organizational structure of the Strategic Missile Forces began to take shape with the transfer to their structure of two air armies of Long-Range Aviation, on the basis of which two missile armies armed with R-12 and R-14 medium-range missiles were formed. They were placed in the western regions of the USSR.

The 43rd Rocket Army was headquartered in Vinnitsa (Ukrainian SSR). Initially, it consisted of three missile divisions and two brigades, later - 10 divisions stationed on the territory of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The headquarters of the 50th Army was in Smolensk.

The deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles required the creation of a large number of new missile formations. In 1961, the Strategic Missile Forces (in addition to the two above-mentioned armies) included five separate missile corps with headquarters in Vladimir, Kirov, Omsk, Khabarovsk and Chita. In 1965, two more separate missile corps were formed with headquarters in Orenburg and Dzhambul, and the Orenburg corps was armed with heavy R-36 ICBMs, which were the main striking force of the Strategic Missile Forces of that time.

In the future, the number of newly created missile divisions went to dozens, which required an increase in the number of administrative structures of the Strategic Missile Forces.

By 1970, 26 ICBM divisions and 11 RSD divisions were deployed on the territory of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. By this time, a need arose for a large-scale reorganization of the Strategic Missile Forces, which was done in the first half of 1970. Three separate missile corps, Khabarovsk, Dzhambul and Kirov, were disbanded, and the remaining four were deployed into missile armies.

• 27th Guards Rocket Vitebsk Red Banner Army (headquarters in Vladimir);
• 31st Rocket Army (headquarters in Orenburg);
• 33rd Guards Rocket Berislav-Khingan Twice Red Banner Army (headquarters in Omsk);
• 43rd Rocket Red Banner Army (headquarters in Vinnitsa);
• 50th Rocket Red Banner Army (headquarters in Smolensk);
• 53rd Rocket Army (headquarters in Chita).

Heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles R-16U were in service with missile divisions stationed in Bershet (52nd missile division), Bologom (7th Guards RD), Nizhny Tagil (42nd RD), Yoshkar-Ola (14th RD ), Novosibirsk, Shadrinsk and Yurie (RD 8).

The Royal R-9A missiles were in the mines in the vicinity of Omsk and Tyumen.

The most massive light ICBM UR-100 was deployed throughout the Soviet Union. It was adopted by the divisions whose headquarters were located in Bershet (52nd RD), Bologom (7th RD), Gladkaya, Krasnoyarsk Territory, Drovyanaya (4th RD) and Yasnaya, Chita Region, Kozelsk (28th RD), Kostroma and Svobodny (RD 27) of the Amur Region, Tatishchev (RD 60), Teikovo (RD 54), Pervomaisky (RD 46) and Khmelnitsky (RD 19).

Heavy R-36 ICBMs were adopted by five divisions of the 31st Orenburg Missile Army - the 13th Missile Division in Dombarovskoye (Yasnaya), the 38th in Zhangiz-Tobe, the 57th in Derzhavinsk, the 59th in Kartaly, the 62nd I am in Uzhur.

After the death in 1972 of Marshal N.I. Krylov, the Strategic Missile Forces was headed by Chief Marshal of Artillery V.F. Tolubko, who since 1960 was the first deputy commander of the missile forces. He remained in this position for 13 years, until 1985.

Despite the strict secrecy that surrounded the Strategic Missile Forces, it was hardly possible to hide the location of the launchers and garrisons of the Soviet missile forces from the Americans. The means of space, air and electronic intelligence allowed them to track and establish the exact coordinates of all strategic objects of interest. Western intelligence sought to obtain information about Soviet missiles and undercover. In the early 1960s GRU Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, working undercover in England, passed on to the American and British intelligence services a huge amount of information about Soviet strategic missiles, in particular, those then deployed in Cuba.

SALT-1 agreement

In the early 70s. both sides of the nuclear-missile confrontation - the USSR and the USA - owned such large nuclear arsenals that their further quantitative build-up lost its meaning. Why be able to destroy your opponent twenty times when once is enough?

On May 26, 1972, in Moscow, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Brezhnev and US President Nixon signed two important documents: the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Missile Defense Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures in the Field of Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, as well as a number of annexes to them.

For the first time in history, rivals in the largest geopolitical confrontation were able to agree on limiting their nuclear missile arsenals. The interim agreement, which later became known as the SALT-1 Treaty, provided for a mutual renunciation of the construction of new silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as the replacement of light and obsolete ICBMs with heavy modern ones. It was allowed to complete the construction of stationary launchers that were already under active construction. At the time of signing the SALT-1 Treaty, the number of Soviet silos was 1,526 units (the United States had 1,054). In 1974, after the completion of the mines, the number of deployed Soviet ICBMs increased to 1582, reaching a historical maximum.

At the same time, the number of sea-based nuclear missiles was limited. The USSR was allowed to have no more than 950 SLBM launchers and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines, the USA - no more than 710 SLBM launchers and 44 submarines, respectively.

Third generation of strategic missiles

The conclusion of the SALT-1 Treaty was only a short respite in the nuclear missile race. Formally, the Soviet Union now surpassed the United States in the number of ICBMs by almost one and a half times. But the Americans negated this advantage with their new technologies.

In the early 70s. The Minuteman ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles are being put into service. One such missile could hit three targets. By 1975, there were already 550 Minutemen in service, equipped with multiple warheads.

The USSR began to urgently develop an adequate response to the new American missiles. Back in 1971, the USSR adopted ICBM UR-100K, which could carry three scattering-type warheads of 350 Kt each. In 1974, another modification of the UR-100 was adopted - UR-100U, which also carried three 350 Kt dispersal warheads. They did not yet have individual warhead guidance on targets, and therefore could not be considered an adequate response to the Minutemen.

Less than a year later, the USSR Strategic Missile Forces received a rocket UR-100N(developed by the Chelomey design bureau), equipped with six individually targetable multiple warheads with a capacity of 750 kt each. By 1984, the UR-100N ICBMs were in service with four divisions located in Pervomaisk (90 silos), Tatishchevo (110 silos), Kozelsk (70 silos), Khmelnitsky (90 silos) - a total of 360 units.

In the same 1975, the Strategic Missile Forces received two more new ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads: MR-UR-100(designed by Yangel Design Bureau) and the famous "Satan" - R-36M(aka RS-20A, and according to NATO classification - SS-18Mod 1,2,3 Satan).

This ICBM for a long time was the main striking force of the Strategic Missile Forces. The Americans did not have missiles with such combat power. The R-36M missiles were equipped with a multiple warhead with 10 individual targeting units of 750 Kt each. They were located in huge mines with a diameter of 6 m and a depth of 40 m. In subsequent years, the Satan missiles were repeatedly modernized: its variants were adopted: R-36MU and R-36 UTTKh.

Fourth generation missiles

Missile complex R-36M2 "Voevoda"(according to NATO classification - SS-18 Mod.5 / Mod.6) became a further development of "Satan". It was put into service in 1988 and, compared to its predecessors, got the ability to overcome the missile defense system of a potential enemy and deliver a guaranteed retaliatory strike against the enemy even under conditions of repeated nuclear impact on the positional area. This was achieved by increasing the survivability of missiles to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion both while in the silo and in flight. Each 15A18M missile could technically carry up to 36 warheads, however, under the SALT-2 treaty, no more than 10 warheads were allowed on one missile. Nevertheless, a strike with just eight to ten Voyevoda missiles ensured the destruction of 80% of the US industrial potential.

Other performance characteristics were also significantly improved: the accuracy of the rocket increased by 1.3 times, the preparation time for launch was reduced by 2 times, the duration of autonomy was increased by 3 times, etc.

The R-36M2 is the most powerful strategic missile system in service with the USSR Strategic Missile Forces. Currently, "Voevoda" continues to serve in the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Federation. According to the statement of the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General S. Karakaev, made in 2010, this complex is planned to remain in service until 2026, until a new promising ICBM is put into service.

Ever since the 60s. in the USSR, attempts were made to create mobile ground missile systems, the invulnerability of which would be ensured by constantly changing location. This is how the Temp-2S mobile missile system appeared. In 1976, the first two missile regiments, each of which had six launchers, took up combat duty. Later, on the basis of the Temp-2S complex, Nadiradze Design Bureau created the Pioneer medium-range ballistic missile, known as the SS-20.

For a long time, RSD remained "in the shadow" of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but since the 70s. their importance has increased due to the restrictions imposed by the Soviet-American treaties on the development of ICBMs. Complex development "Pioneer" began in 1971, and in 1974 the first launch of this rocket was made from the Kapustin Yar test site.

Self-propelled units for the complex were created on the basis of the MAZ-547A six-axle chassis, manufactured by the Barrikady plant in Volgograd. The mass of the self-propelled unit with the transport and launch container was 83 tons.

The 15Zh45 rocket of the Pioneer complex was a two-stage solid propellant. Its flight range was 4500 km, KVO - 1.3 km, readiness for launch - up to 2 minutes. The missile was equipped with three individually targetable warheads of 150 Kt each.

The deployment of Pioneer complexes proceeded quickly. In 1976, the Strategic Missile Forces received the first 18 mobile launchers, a year later 51 installations were already in service, and in 1981 already 297 complexes were on combat duty. Three Pioneer divisions were deployed in Ukraine and Belarus each, and four more in the Asian part of the USSR. Pioneer complexes were armed with units that previously had R-12 and R-14 RSDs.

At that time, the USSR was preparing not only for a confrontation with NATO - there were tense relations with China as well. Therefore, in the late 1970s. regiments of "Pioneers" appeared at the Chinese border - in Siberia and Transbaikalia.

The active deployment of the Pioneer missile systems caused serious concern among the leadership of the NATO countries. At the same time, the Soviet leadership stated that the Pioneers did not affect the balance of power in Europe, as they were adopted instead of the R-12 and R-14 missiles. The Americans also deployed their Pershing-2 medium-range missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles in Europe. All this marked a new stage in the nuclear missile race. The nervousness on both sides about medium-range missiles was understandable. After all, their danger lay in their proximity to potential targets: the flight time was only 5-10 minutes, which did not give a chance to react in case of a sudden impact.

In 1983, the USSR deployed missile systems in Czechoslovakia and the GDR "Temp-S". The number of Pioneer complexes continued to grow and by 1985 reached its maximum - 405 units, and the total number of 15Zh45 missiles on combat duty and in the arsenals of the Strategic Missile Forces amounted to 650 units.

With the coming to power of M.S. Gorbachev, the situation in the field of nuclear missile confrontation between the USSR and the USA has changed radically. Unexpectedly for everyone, in 1987 Gorbachev and Reagan signed an agreement on the elimination of short and medium-range missiles. This was an unprecedented step: if the previous treaties only limited the buildup of ICBMs, here it was about the elimination of a whole class of weapons on both sides.

Subsequently, many high-ranking Soviet military figures announced the unfavorable terms of this treaty for the USSR, calling Gorbachev's actions a betrayal. Indeed, the USSR had to destroy more than twice as many missiles as the United States. In addition to the Pioneers, the Temp-S operational-tactical missile systems (135 installations, 726 missiles), Oka (102 installations, 239 missiles) and the latest RK-55 cruise missile installations (not yet deployed) were also eliminated. By June 12, 1991, the process of destroying these missile systems was completely completed. Some of the missiles were destroyed by launching into the Pacific Ocean, the rest were blown up after the dismantling of nuclear warheads.

Part of the missile formations that were armed with medium-range missiles had to be disbanded, and the rest received Topol mobile ICBMs.

SALT-2 agreement

The signing of the SALT-1 treaty gave hope that the nuclear missile confrontation between the USSR and the USA would finally end. From 1974 to 1979, negotiations took place with varying success on further limiting the sides' strategic nuclear arsenals. The final version of the treaty, agreed in 1979, provided for each of the parties the opportunity to have no more than 2250 strategic carriers (ICBMs and strategic bombers with cruise missiles), of which no more than 1320 carriers with multiple warheads. Strategic bombers were equated with intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRVs. It was allowed to have no more than 1200 units of land-based and sea-based missiles with MIRVs, of which land-based ICBMs - no more than 820 units each.

Interestingly, during the negotiations, all domestic missiles came up with "pseudonyms". The true names of the missiles were a military secret, but still they had to be identified somehow. Later, the pseudonyms of the ICBM, along with the original names, began to appear in domestic sources. This creates some confusion, so let's be clear:

• UR-100K - RS-10;
• RT-2P - RS-12;
• "Topol" - RS-12M;
• "Temp-2S" - RS-14;
• MR-UR-100 - RS-16;
• UR-100N - RS-18;
• R-36 - RS-20.

A new aggravation of Soviet-American relations in the late 1970s - early 1980s. dealt a blow to the RSD-2 treaty. There were enough reasons for escalation: the establishment of a pro-communist regime in Angola with the direct assistance of the USSR, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, and an increase in the number of medium-range missiles in Europe. Therefore, the SALT-2 agreement, signed by J. Carter and L.I. Brezhnev in 1979, was never ratified by the US Congress. With the coming to power of Reagan, who took a course of confrontation with the USSR, the SALT-2 treaty was forgotten. However, in the 1980s, the parties generally complied with the main provisions of the SALT-2 treaty, and even sometimes accused each other of violating its articles.

Mobile ICBMs "Topol"

In 1975, Nadiradze Design Bureau began the development of a new self-propelled missile system based on the RT-2P solid-propellant ICBM. Learning about the development "Poplars”, the Americans accused the Soviet side of violating the SALT-2 treaty, according to which each of the parties could develop one new ICBM in addition to existing models (and at that time the RT-23 missile was already being developed in the USSR, mine and rail-based). It turned out that the USSR was developing not one, but two ICBMs. To these accusations, the Soviet leadership replied that the Topol was not a new missile, but just a modification of the RT-2P ICBM. Therefore, the new missile system received the RT-2PM index. Of course, this was a trick - "Poplar" was a new development. The Americans, although they did not agree with the Soviet arguments, considering them a trick, could not interfere with anything, and in 1984 the deployment of RT-2PM ICBMs in positional areas began.

In 1985, the first two regiments armed with Topols took up combat duty. In total, by that time, 72 RT-2PM complexes were part of the Strategic Missile Forces. In subsequent years, the number of Topol ICBMs in the USSR Strategic Missile Forces increased rapidly, reaching a maximum in 1993 - 369 units, and in 1994-2001. remained at the level of 360 units, which ranged from 37 to 48% of the entire Russian grouping of strategic missile systems.

The Topol ICBM launcher is mounted on the MAZ-7912 seven-axle chassis. The maximum flight range of the RT-2PM missile is 10,000 km, the KVO is 900 m. The warhead is monoblock, with a capacity of 550 Kt.

The mass deployment of Topol missile systems meant a new command approach to ensuring the survivability of the Strategic Missile Forces in the face of an enemy nuclear strike. If earlier the focus was on the powerful protection of underground silos and their dispersal over large areas, now the main factor of protection was the mobility of launchers, which could not be kept at gunpoint - because their location was constantly changing. In the event of a sudden nuclear strike by the enemy, due to its survivability, the Topol PGRK should have provided 60% of the combat potential necessary for a retaliatory strike. The launch of the RT-2PM missile could be carried out in the shortest possible time from anywhere on the combat patrol route, or directly from the place of permanent deployment - from a special structure (shelter) with a retractable roof.

Until the collapse of the Topol Union, 13 divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces were put into service. Ten of them were based in Russia, three - in Belarus. Each Topol missile regiment consisted (and still does) of nine mobile launchers.

The deployment of a large number of mobile ICBM launchers caused serious concern to American strategists, as it significantly changed the balance of power in the nuclear missile confrontation. Measures were developed to neutralize the Topol launchers on combat patrol. Single installations were really vulnerable, for example, when meeting with an enemy sabotage group. But the destruction of one installation does not solve anything, and organizing the identification and coordinated destruction of hundreds of mobile launchers by saboteurs, and even on Soviet territory, is an unrealistic task. As another means of combating the Topols, the B-2 "stealth aircraft" was considered, which, according to its developers, could detect and destroy mobile launchers, while remaining invisible and invulnerable to Soviet air defense. In practice, American "stealth" would hardly have coped with this task. Firstly, their “invisibility” is largely a myth, it can be a maximum of reducing radar visibility, but in the optical range, “stealth” is visible in the same way as an ordinary aircraft. Secondly, as in the previous case, the destruction of individual launchers does not solve anything, and it is hardly possible to detect and simultaneously destroy hundreds of installations while in enemy airspace.

In addition to the Topols, the Soviet command presented the Americans with another unpleasant surprise in the form of "nuclear trains" - combat railway missile systems (BZHRK) P-450. Each missile train carried three R-23UTTH ICBMs with a multiple reentry vehicle. The first BZHRK took up combat duty in 1987, and by the time of the collapse of the USSR, there were already 12 trains, consolidated into three missile divisions.

The collapse of the Union and the fate of the Strategic Missile Forces

In the process of the collapse of the USSR, the strategic missile forces managed to maintain their combat effectiveness to a greater extent than other branches of the military. While the reduction of conventional weapons was proceeding at an enormous pace, the Strategic Missile Forces were not touched, except for the elimination of medium-range missiles. However, it was their turn. The Americans, who considered themselves victorious in the Cold War, began to dictate their terms.

On July 31, 1991, the START-1 treaty was signed in Moscow. Unlike the SALT-1 and 2 treaties, it provided not for the limitation, but for a significant reduction in strategic weapons. The number of deployed strategic missiles for each side was set at 1,600 units, and 6,000 warheads for them. However, a number of restrictions were set for the USSR, which greatly weakened the Strategic Missile Forces and, in fact, they were under the control of the Americans.

The number of the most powerful Soviet R-36 ICBMs was halved - to 154 units. It was forbidden to adopt new types of ICBMs.

The mobility of rocket trains, which the Americans were very afraid of, was maximally limited. They were allowed to stay only at stations, no more than 7 in total, for the convenience of observing them from space. It was forbidden to mask the trains.

Mobile Topol launchers were allowed to be deployed in strictly limited areas, each of which could contain no more than 10 installations (that is, approximately a regiment). Strictly limited deployment areas were also established for missile divisions. Thus, the Americans deprived the formations of mobile-based Soviet ICBMs of the main factor in their survivability - the ability to constantly and covertly move.

As a result, the gigantic resources spent on the creation of the Strategic Missile Forces were thrown to the wind. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear missile carriers, giant ICBM silos - everything that was created over decades was destroyed within a few years. Interestingly, the process of eliminating weapons and infrastructure of the Strategic Missile Forces took place with the direct financial support of a potential adversary - the United States. The long-term nuclear missile race ended with the collapse of the Soviet state and the degradation of its armed forces.

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ON THE RUINS OF THE EMPIRE

In 1992, after the collapse of the Union, the Strategic Missile Forces were formed "anew" as a branch of the armed forces as part of the RF Armed Forces. The main task for them at that time was to bring the organizational structure and weapons of the missile forces in line with the new realities. It's no secret that in the 1990s The combat effectiveness of the general-purpose forces of the RF Armed Forces was seriously undermined, therefore the Strategic Missile Forces and Strategic Nuclear Forces were the main factor in ensuring Russia's security from external encroachments. Despite all the upheavals, the command of the Strategic Missile Forces tried with all its might to preserve the combat effectiveness of the missile forces, their weapons, infrastructure and human potential.

Everything that could be taken out of the territory of the former Soviet republics was taken out. Topol units were withdrawn from the territory of Belarus. Missile mines in Ukraine and Kazakhstan had to be liquidated.

Launch of R-36M2 "Voevoda" rocket

In the 1990s the main trend in the development of the Strategic Missile Forces has been outlined - a bet on solid-propellant mobile missile systems. Silo-based liquid rockets have not completely disappeared, but their share in the ICBM group is steadily declining.

In 1993, G. Bush and B. Yeltsin signed the START-2 treaty, which prohibited the use of ballistic missiles with multiple warheads. The logic of the MIRV ban was as follows: with an approximately equal number of nuclear missiles on the sides preemptive strike loses its meaning, since in order to destroy one nuclear missile of the defending side, the attacker must spend at least one of his missiles, but without a 100% guarantee of success. Some part of the defending side's nuclear missile arsenal will remain, while the attacker will completely deplete his arsenal in the first strike. But the use of missiles with MIRVs, on the contrary, gives an advantage to the attacking side, since it can destroy all the launchers of enemy nuclear missiles with a relatively small number of its missiles.

Although Russia later refused to ratify the START-2 treaty, it had a great influence on the development of the Strategic Missile Forces. The BZHRK, missile trains that the Americans were so afraid of, came under attack, because they carried ICBMs with multiple warheads. They were removed from service and disposed of (the last train was removed from combat duty in 2005). While the fate of the START-2 treaty remained unclear, Russia did not develop ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles. The basis of the nuclear missile group was monoblock missiles.

Even in the most difficult conditions of the 90s. in Russia was developed and adopted ICBM fifth generation RT-2PM2 - "Topol-M". This missile, unified for mine and mobile basing, appeared as a response to the active creation of an anti-missile defense system by the Americans. The three-stage solid-fuel missile RT-2PM2 has a range of 11,000 km and has enhanced capabilities to overcome a potential enemy's missile defense system. It is equipped with a detachable warhead with a capacity of 550 kt. The head part is able to maneuver on end section trajectory after separation from the missile, and is equipped with a system of active and passive decoys, as well as means of distorting the characteristics of the warhead. The missile's sustainer turbojet engine allows it to pick up speed much faster than previous types of missiles of this class, which also makes it difficult to intercept it in the active phase of the flight.

In 1997, the first two Topol-M ICBMs in the mine version took up combat duty. In subsequent years, silo-based RT-2PM2 complexes continued to be transferred to the troops in small batches of 4-8 units, and as of 2015 their number reached 60. RT-2PM2 in the version of a mobile ground-based missile system (PGRK) entered service in 2006- 2009, and today their number is 18 units.

After Russia withdrew from the START-2 treaty in 2002 and replaced it with the softer SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), the question arose again of equipping the Strategic Missile Forces with multiple-warhead ballistic missiles. Significant US efforts to create a global missile defense system made the prospect of "nullification" of the Russian nuclear missile potential real, which could not be allowed. It was necessary to provide guaranteed retaliation in the event of a preventive nuclear missile strike by a potential adversary, which means that the Strategic Missile Forces needed missiles capable of overcoming all existing and future missile defense systems.

In 2009, the first unit of new mobile missile systems was transferred to the troops RS-24 "Yars". In 2011, the first regiment of the Yars PGRK was brought to full strength (9 launchers).

The RS-24 missile is a modification of the Topol-M, equipped with MIRVs with four individually targetable warheads with a capacity of 150 (according to other sources - 300) Kt. These ICBMs, unified for mine and ground-based, in the future should form the basis of the Strategic Missile Forces, replacing the RS-18 and RS-20 missiles.

In 2001, by decree of the President, the Strategic Missile Forces were transformed from a branch of the armed forces into a separate branch of the military, and the Space Forces were separated from them.

In general, the nineties - "zero" became a difficult time for the Strategic Missile Forces. As a result of the aging of the nuclear missile arsenal, as well as political pressure from the West, the number of Russian ICBMs and nuclear warheads has steadily declined during this period. Nevertheless, it was possible to maintain the combat effectiveness of the Strategic Missile Forces, and, most importantly, the scientific, technical and human potential of the country in the nuclear missile sphere. Promising types of mobile, silo and sea-based ICBMs have been developed and put into service, which in the foreseeable future will allow Russia to maintain parity with the United States and other nuclear powers.

RVSN RUSSIA TODAY: STATUS AND PROSPECTS

START-3 Treaty

Before considering the structure and armament of modern Russian Strategic Missile Forces, we should dwell on the document that today determines the nuclear-missile balance between Russia and the United States - the SALT-3 treaty. This document was signed in 2010 by Presidents D. Medvedev and B. Obama and entered into force on February 5, 2011.

Under the terms of the treaty, each party can have no more than 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and no more than 700 carriers: ICBMs, submarines and strategic missile-carrying bombers. An additional 100 media can be stored unfolded.

START-3 does not impose restrictions on the development of the American missile defense system. However, when developing the terms of the contract, its condition and development prospects were taken into account. In the event of an increase in the capabilities of the American missile defense system, which falls under the category of "exceptional circumstances", Russia reserved the right to withdraw from the START-3 treaty unilaterally.

As for missiles with multiple warheads, the START-3 treaty apparently does not contain a strict ban on them, like START-2. In any case, Russia is not going to abandon either the Yars ICBM or the Bulava SLBM equipped with MIRVs with individually targetable nuclear units. Moreover, it is planned to put into operation a new generation of combat railway missile systems equipped with ICBMs with MIRVs, created on the basis of Yars.

Armament of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia

As of the beginning of 2015, the Strategic Missile Forces had a total of 305 missile systems of five types, capable of carrying 1166 warheads:

• R-36M2/R-36MUTTKh - 46 (460 warheads);
• UR-100NUTTH - 60 (320 warheads);
• "Topol" - 72 (72 warheads);
• "Topol-M" (mobile and mine versions) - 78 (78 warheads);
• "Yars" - 49 (196 warheads).

Structure of the Strategic Missile Forces

Currently, the Strategic Missile Forces are a branch of the Russian Armed Forces, directly subordinate to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The structure of the Strategic Missile Forces includes:

• headquarters;
• three missile armies;
• units and subunits of special troops (engineering, communications, RKhBZ, rocket technical, electronic warfare, meteorological, geodetic, security and intelligence);
• units and subunits of the rear;
• educational institutions, including Military Academy Strategic Missile Forces them. Peter the Great and its branch - the Serpukhov Military Institute of Missile Forces;
• research institutions and missile ranges, including: the Kapustin Yar State Central Interspecific Range, the Kura range (Kamchatka) and the Sary-Shagan range (Kazakhstan);
• arsenals, central repair plants and a storage base for weapons and military equipment.

Until April 1, 2011, the Strategic Missile Forces had their own aviation, which has now been transferred to the Air Force.

The total number of personnel of the Strategic Missile Forces is 120 thousand people, of which 2/3 are military personnel, the rest are civilian personnel.

Rocket armies

The missile armies of the Strategic Missile Forces include 12 missile divisions (RD). Consider their composition and weapons.

27th Guards Rocket Army (Vladimir):

• 60th RD (Tatishchevo) - 40 UR-100NUTTH, 60 Topol-M (mine-based);
• 28 Guards RD (Kozelsk) - 20 UR-100NUTTH, 4 RS-24 "Yars" (mine-based);
• 7 Guards Rd (Vypolzovo) - 18 "Poplar".
• 54 Guards Rd (Teikovo) - 18 RS-24 "Yars" (mobile-based), 18 "Topol-M" (mobile-based);
• 14th rd (Yoshkar-Ola) - 18 "Poplar".

31st Rocket Army (Orenburg):

• 13th RD (Dombarovsky) - 18 R-36M2;
• 42 rd (Nizhny Tagil) - 18 RS-24 "Yars"
• 8th rd (Yurya) - "Poplar".

33rd Guards Rocket Army (Omsk):

• 62nd RD (Uzhur) - 28 R-36M2;
• 39 Guards Rd (Novosibirsk) - 9 RS-24 "Yars" (mobile-based);
• 29 Guards Rd (Irkutsk) - armed with Topol missile systems, currently disarmed; it is expected to be re-equipped with the promising RS-26 Rubezh ICBM.
• 35 rd (Barnaul) - 36 "Poplar".

Strategic Missile Forces control system

The combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces depend not only on the number and characteristics of the missiles in service, but also on the effectiveness of their control. After all, in a nuclear-missile confrontation, time is counted by seconds. In the course of daily service, and, moreover, in a combat situation, a quick and reliable exchange of information between all structural units of the Strategic Missile Forces, a clear communication of commands to all carriers and launchers of ballistic missiles is vital.

The first formations of ballistic missiles used the principles and experience of control developed in artillery, but with the creation of the Strategic Missile Forces as a branch of the Armed Forces of the USSR, they received their own centralized control system.

The governing bodies of the Strategic Missile Forces were created: the Main Headquarters of the Missile Forces; Main Directorate of Missile Weapons; Central command post of the Rocket Forces with a communication center and a computer center; Department of Combat Training and Military Educational Institutions; Rear of the Rocket Forces; as well as a number of special services and departments. Subsequently, the structure of the military command and control bodies of the Strategic Missile Forces changed several times.

At present, the central body of the military command of the Strategic Missile Forces is Command of the Strategic Missile Forces, which is part of the Central Office of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces - Colonel General Sergey Viktorovich Karakaev.

As part of the Strategic Missile Forces Command includes the Headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces, which reports directly to the commander of this type of troops. The functions of the Headquarters include organizing combat duty and combat use of the Strategic Missile Forces; maintaining combat readiness; development of the Strategic Missile Forces; management of operational and mobilization training; ensuring nuclear safety and some others. The headquarters is headed by a chief who is the first deputy commander of the Strategic Missile Forces.

Centralized combat control of the Strategic Missile Forces on duty is carried out The Central Command Post of the Strategic Missile Forces (TsKP RVSN). Combat duty is carried out by four identical shifts. The Central Command Center of the Strategic Missile Forces includes management and main units: shifts on duty; information preparation department; department of preparation and control of combat readiness, coordination of activities of central command posts; analytical group and others.

The Central Control Center of the Strategic Missile Forces is located in the village of Vlasikha near Moscow (since 2009 it has the status of ZATO) in an underground bunker at a depth of 30 meters. The equipment of the Central Command Center of the Strategic Missile Forces provides continuous communication with all combat posts of the Strategic Missile Forces, where a total of 6,000 missile officers are on duty.

The automated combat control system (ASBU) for strategic nuclear forces is called Kazbek. Its portable terminal "Cheget" is known as the "nuclear suitcase", which is continuously kept by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief - the President of the Russian Federation. Similar "suitcases" are available to the Minister of Defense and the head of the General Staff. Their main purpose is to transfer to the command posts of the Strategic Missile Forces a special code allowing the use of nuclear weapons. Unlocking will only happen if the code comes from two of the three terminals.

With the adoption of the Yars missile system, the Russian Strategic Missile Forces are introducing a fourth-generation combat control system and state tests of the fifth-generation ASBU are already underway. Its links are planned to be introduced into the troops as early as 2016. The fifth generation ASBU will be able to communicate combat orders directly to each launcher, bypassing intermediate links. The possibility of operational re-aiming of modern missiles (Topol-M, Yars, Bulava) in flight will be provided. But for missiles of obsolete types - R-36 and UR-100 - this possibility is no longer provided.

Perimeter system

Speaking about the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, it is worth noting one of their unique features - the ability to deliver a guaranteed nuclear missile strike against an aggressor even if all the command links and combat control systems of the Strategic Missile Forces are destroyed, and the personnel of the missile units are dead.

For a long time, there was no reliable information about the Perimeter system due to the strict secrecy surrounding it. Today it is known that the complex for automatic control of a massive retaliatory nuclear strike of the Strategic Missile Forces exists, and bears the index 15E601(in the Western media it was called - "Dead Hand"). According to the official website of the RF Ministry of Defense, the Perimeter system took up combat duty in 1986. The fact that she is on combat duty at the present time, in 2011, was confirmed by the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Lieutenant General S. Karakaev, in an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda.

"Perimeter" is a backup control system for all branches of the armed forces armed with nuclear warheads, and is designed to ensure the guaranteed launch of silo ICBMs and SLBMs in the event of the destruction of the Kazbek command system and the combat control systems of the Strategic Missile Forces, Navy and Air Force.

The principle of operation and the capabilities of the Perimeter complex are not reliably known. There is evidence that the main component of the system is an autonomous software-command complex based on artificial intelligence, which controls the situation in many ways using its own sensors. After the final decision is made on the fact of a nuclear missile attack and on a retaliatory strike, special 15A11 command missiles, created on the basis of the MR UR-100, are launched. Using powerful transmitters in flight, they broadcast launch commands to all surviving ICBMs and SLBMs.

According to other data (an interview allegedly by one of the developers of the system with Wired magazine), the complex is still activated manually by an authorized person. Then the monitoring of the network of sensors begins and, if the use of nuclear weapons did take place, the connection with the General Staff is checked. If there is no connection, the system automatically unlocks the nuclear weapon and, bypassing the standard complex procedure, transfers the right to decide on the launch of missiles to anyone who is in a special highly secure bunker.

Prospects for the development of the Strategic Missile Forces

At present, given the growing tension in the world, the factor of nuclear deterrence is as important as it was in the days of " cold war". Russia needs powerful Strategic Missile Forces - perhaps not as numerous as in the 70s and 80s. of the last century, but clearly and reliably controlled, with high survivability, armed with missile systems that have a significant modernization potential and are capable of overcoming any existing and future missile defense systems. In the foreseeable future, this guarantees the maintenance of the combat capability of the Strategic Missile Forces at a high level and the infliction of unacceptable damage to any aggressor.

As already mentioned, at present the development of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces is regulated by the START-3 treaty, which provides for the achievement of nuclear parity between Russia and the United States by 2018. The number of deployed carriers of nuclear warheads should be 700 each. At present, Russia has only 515 launchers, and therefore has the right to deploy another 185. At the same time, Russia will have to get rid of 90 non-deployed launchers and 32 deployed nuclear warheads.

PGRK RS-24 "Yars"

The plans for the development of the Strategic Missile Forces provide for the withdrawal of obsolete types of ICBMs from combat strength as their established periods of operation expire: UR-100NUTTKh - in 2019, Topol - in 2021, R-36M2 "Voevoda" - in 2022.

Gradually, they will be replaced by the RS-24 Yars ICBMs in mine, ground and, possibly, rail-based versions. Topol-M missile systems will no longer be purchased, but will remain on alert, presumably until 2040.

The Yars ICBM with 4 warheads, of course, cannot become a full-fledged replacement for the Voevoda, which carries 10 warheads. Therefore, the State Rocket Center. Makeev in the Urals, a new heavy liquid ICBM "Sarmat". Development work on it should be completed by 2018 - 2020. The Sarmat will be smaller and half as light as the Voevoda - its launch weight will be 100 tons, with a declared throw weight of 5 tons. Sarmat" in comparison with the R-36 will increase significantly. The weight and size characteristics of the ICBM "Sarmat" approximately correspond to the UR-100NUTTH, which will make it relatively easy to convert existing missile silos to accommodate new missiles.

In the current 2015, tests of an improved version of Yars were successfully completed - RS-26 "Frontier" developments of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT). It is expected to enter the troops as early as 2016. The first RS-26 will be received by the Irkutsk 29th Guards Missile Division.

The BZHRK is expected to return to service. The new rocket train will be called "Barguzin". By 2016, MIT should prepare design documentation for it, and by 2019 the first sample will appear. The new BZHRK will be armed with Yars missiles, which are twice as light as the R-23UTTKh (49 and 104 tons, respectively). Therefore, "Barguzin" will be able to carry six missiles. At the same time, its mobility will increase, so due to the lower weight of the wagons, the train will not wear out the railway tracks so much. Instead of three diesel locomotives, like the BZHRK Molodets, the Barguzin will be pulled by only one diesel locomotive. This will increase the secrecy of the train, because it will be difficult to distinguish it from ordinary freight trains. And more importantly, the Barguzin will be a completely Russian product - unlike the Molodets, most of the parts of which were produced at the Yuzhmash plant.

CONCLUSION

At present, the Strategic Missile Forces remain the main component of Russia's "nuclear triad", the main guarantor of its security and territorial integrity. Despite the collapse of the armed forces that followed the collapse of the USSR, the missile forces retained their combat capability. The main threat to the combat effectiveness of the Strategic Missile Forces was the moral and physical aging of missile weapons. Missiles that failed due to the expiration of the established service life were not replaced by a sufficient number of new ones.

At present, the Strategic Missile Forces are being actively re-equipped with new types of missiles. It is expected that by 2020 the share of new missile systems in the Strategic Missile Forces will be 98%. The troops also receive other equipment designed to ensure combat duty. The combat control system is being improved.

The process of training the personnel of the troops is ongoing. In accordance with the plan for the preparation of the Strategic Missile Forces, about a thousand different exercises are planned for the year. Thus, in January-February 2015, large-scale exercises were held in the Strategic Missile Forces aimed at working out the tasks of maneuvering PGRKs in order to take them out of attack, and change positional areas. An extensive list of tasks and introductory tasks was worked out, including bringing them to the highest levels of combat readiness, performing maneuver actions on combat patrol routes, countering sabotage formations and strikes by high-precision weapons of a mock enemy, performing combat missions in conditions of active electronic suppression and intensive enemy operations in troop deployment areas.

The Strategic Missile Forces are professionals who have undergone a serious selection and lengthy training, devoted to their work and the Motherland. All this gives confidence that Russia's nuclear shield is reliable, and combat orders will be carried out in any scenario.

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Rocket 15Zh58 (RT-2PM)

Rocket 15Zh58 made according to the scheme with three marching steps. To ensure high energy-mass perfection and increase the firing range in all marching stages, a new, developed at the Lyubertsy LNPO Soyuz, a more advanced mixed fuel of increased density with a specific impulse increased by several units was used compared to the fillers of previously created engines.

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All three steps have RDTT with one fixed nozzle. On the outer surface of the tail section of the first stage there were folding rotary lattice aerodynamic rudders (4 pcs.), Used for flight control in conjunction with gas-jet rudders and 4 lattice aerodynamic stabilizers. The second stage structurally consists of a connecting compartment and a mid-flight RDTT. The third stage has almost the same design, but it additionally includes a transition compartment, to which the head part is attached.

12. First step	13. Second stage	14. Third stage
15. Tail section		16. The combat stage of the RS-12M rocket

The shells of the upper stages were for the first time made by the method of continuous winding from organoplastic according to the “cocoon” scheme. The third stage was equipped with a transition compartment for attaching the warhead. Controlling the firing range was the most difficult technical task and was carried out by cutting off the third-stage propulsion engine, using a thrust cut-off unit, with eight reversible bells and "windows" cut through DUZ ami ( DUZ- detonating elongated charge) in the organoplastic power structure of the body. The thrust cut-off unit was located on the front bottom of the upper stage housing.

An autonomous, inertial control system was developed at the NPO Automation and Instrumentation under the guidance of Vladimir Lapygin. The aiming system was developed under the guidance of the chief designer of the Kiev plant "Arsenal" Serafima Parnyakova. The inertial control system has its own onboard computer, which made it possible to achieve high precision shooting. The control system provides missile flight control, routine maintenance on the missile and launcher, pre-launch preparation and missile launch. All operations of pre-launch preparation and launch, as well as preparatory and regulatory workfully automated.

The head part is monoblock, nuclear weighing about 1 ton. The head part includes a propulsion system and a control system that provides circular probable deviation ( QUO) 400 m (so our sources say, in the West the accuracy is estimated at 150-200 m). " Poplar"equipped with a set of means to overcome the missile defense of a potential enemy. nuclear warhead created at the All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics under the leadership of the chief designer Samvel Kocharyants. According to Western sources, the missile was tested at least once with four individually targetable warheads, but this option was not further developed.

The flight control of the rocket is carried out by rotary gas-jet and lattice aerodynamic rudders. New nozzle devices for solid propellant engines have been created. To ensure stealth, camouflage, false complexes, and camouflage have been developed. Like the previous mobile complexes of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering. Rocket 15Zh58 produced in Votkinsk.

The entire life of the rocket 15ZH58 (RT-2PM) conducts in a sealed transport and launch container 22 m long and 2 m in diameter.

Initially, the warranty period for the operation of the rocket was 10 years. Later the warranty period was extended to 15 years.

Launcher and equipment

During operation, the missile is located in a transport and launch container installed on a mobile launcher. It is mounted on the basis of a seven-axle chassis of a MAZ heavy truck. The rocket is launched from a vertical position using a powder pressure accumulator ( PAD), located in the transport and launch container ( TPK).

The launcher was developed at the Volgograd Central Design Bureau "Titan" under the leadership of Valeriana Soboleva and Viktor Shurygin.

As a chassis for the launcher of the mobile complex, a seven-axle MAZ-7912 (15U128.1) , later - MAZ-7917 (15U168) wheel arrangement 14x12 (factory "Barricades" in Volgograd). This car of the Minsk Automobile Plant is equipped with a 710 hp diesel engine. Yaroslavl Motor Plant. chief designer of a rocket launcher Vladimir Tsvyalev. The car was equipped with a sealed transport and launch container with a diameter of 2 m and a length of 22 m. The mass of the launcher with a rocket was about 100 tons. Despite this, the complex « Poplar"had good mobility and patency.

Solid propellant charges of engines were developed in the Lyubertsy NPO "Soyuz" under the guidance of Boris Zhukov(later the association was headed Zinovy Pack). Composite materials and the container were developed and manufactured at the Central Research Institute of Special Machine Building under the guidance of Victor Protasova. Rocket steering hydraulic drives and self-propelled launcher hydraulic drives were developed at the Moscow Central Research Institute of Automation and Hydraulics.

32. An example of the location of structures at the starting position 32.1. Starting position Novosibirsk-2 32.2. Starting position Novosibirsk-2 32.3. Starting position Novosibirsk-2

Some sources reported that the launch could have been made from any point on the patrol route, but according to more accurate information: “ Upon receipt of a launch order ASBU, payment APU is obliged to take the nearest waypoint suitable for launch and deploy APU» . In the field (i.e. on the field BSP and MBP shelves " Poplars"are on combat duty, as a rule, for 1.5 months in winter and the same amount in summer). Start RS-12M could also be produced directly from a special unit 15U135 « Crown" in which " Poplars» are on combat duty on stationary BSP . For this, the roof of the hangar is made sliding. Initially, the roof was retractable, and on the locking device, which did not allow cables with loads - concrete counterweights - at the end (like a weight on a chain on walkers) to fall were installed squibs.At the command to start (in the sequence diagram of the mode« Start”), a command was sent to trigger the squibs, and then the loads pulled the cables with their weight and the roof moved apart. In severe winter conditions, such a scheme proved to be negative (it is impossible to determine exactly the mass of the counterweight due to snowfall, the average reading led either to jamming or to a breakdown from the guides, besides this, it is not possible to determine the state of the squib without shooting). Therefore, the squibs were replaced with older and more reliable ones (compared to pioneer improved) electromechanical drives. [Ed.] Combat readiness (time to prepare for the launch) from the moment the order was received to the launch of the rocket was increased to two minutes. In order to be able to start PU hung on jacks and leveled. These operations enter deployment mode. The missile container is then lifted to a vertical position. For this in the "Start" mode, a powder pressure accumulator is activated ( PAD) located on the very APU. It is needed in order for the hydraulic system to lift the boom with TPK into the vertical. In other words, this is an ordinary gas generator. On the Pioneer, the boom was raised (i.e., the hydraulic pump engine was working) from the drive from the propulsion engine ( HD) chassis, which led to the need to have a system to maintain HD in the "hot state", duplicate the start system HD air balloons, etc. But such a scheme somewhat reduced reliability. Start type - artillery: after installation TPK to a vertical position and the shooting of its upper protective cap is triggered first by the first PAD TPK– for extending the movable bottom TPK to "rest" on the ground for more stability, and then the second PAD already pushes the rocket to a height of several meters, after which the main engine of the first stage is launched.

Control APU carried out PKP « Zenith"(divisional link) and" Granite"(regimental link).

For the Topol complex, a mobile command post of the regiment was developed ( PKP RP). Aggregates PKP RP placed on the chassis MAZ-543. Compound PKP RP:

Unit 15V168- command and control vehicle

Unit 15V179– communication machine 1

Unit 15V75– communication vehicle 2

Each unit was accompanied by a unit MOBD(combat support vehicle), also on the chassis MAZ-543. At first it was a unit 15V148, then (with 1989 g.) unit 15V231.

One MOBD included the functions of 4 units of the complex Pioneer: MDES, canteen, hostel, MDSO). Those. had diesel units, household compartment, BPU.

APU RK « Poplar» were equipped with a modernized system RBU, which made it possible to receive commands to start using the system " Perimeter» for 3 ranges.