Central Control Commission of the CPSU. Central Control Commission of the CPSU Committee for Control of Conscience

Committee for Monitoring Conscience Recently, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child dedicated an entire report to the Catholic Church. The tone of this report reminded Europeans of the verdicts of the revolutionary tribunal of the time of Robespierre, and to us - the political campaigns of the era of the “cult of personality.” Committee

"JEWISH ANTI-FASCIST COMMITTEE"

In May-July 1952, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR considered the case of a group of people associated with the work of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. 15 people were involved in this case:

1. Lozovsky Solomon Abramovich, born in 1878, member of the CPSU since 1901, previously worked as deputy head and head of the Sovinformburo, before his arrest - head of the department of international relations of the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks;

2. Fefer Isaac Solomonovich, born in 1900, member of the CPSU since 1919, poet, secretary of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee;

3. Yuzefovich Joseph Sigismundovich, born in 1890, member of the CPSU since 1917, junior researcher at the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences;

4. Shimeliovich Boris Abramovich, born in 1892, member of the CPSU since 1920, chief physician of the Central Clinical Hospital named after. Botkin;

5. Kvitko Leiba Moiseevich, born in 1890, member of the CPSU since 1941, poet;

6. Markish Perets Davidovich, born in 1895, member of the CPSU since 1942, poet, secretary of the audit commission of the Union of Writers of the USSR;

7. Bergelson David Rafailovich, born in 1884, poet;

8. Gofstein David Naumovich, born in 1889, member of the CPSU since 1940, poet;

9. Zuskin Veniamin Lvovich, born in 1889, artistic director of the Moscow State Jewish Theater;

10.Talmi Leon Yakovlevich, born in 1893, journalist-translator of the Sovinformburo;

11.Watenberg Ilya Semenovich, born in 1887, senior control editor of the State Publishing House of Fiction in Foreign Languages;

12.Theumin Emilia Isaakovna, born in 1905, member of the CPSU since 1927 i., editor of the international department of the Sovinformburo;

13.Vatenberg-Ostrovskaya Chaika Semyonovna, born in 1901, translator of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee;

14.Stern Lina Solomonovna, born in 1878, member of the CPSU since 1938, academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, director of the Institute

physiology of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and head of the department of physiology of the 2nd Moscow Medical Institute;

15.Bregman Solomon Leontievich, born in 1895, member of the CPSU since 1912, Deputy Minister of State Control of the RSFSR.

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was created during the Great Patriotic War in order to mobilize Soviet and world public opinion against the atrocities of fascism. The beginning of the activities of the JAC dates back to February-April 1942.

The chairman of the JAC was People's Artist of the USSR S. M. Mikhoels, the executive secretary was Sh. Epstein, and then I. S. Fefer. The Committee had its own printed organ - the newspaper "Einikait", which was distributed both in the USSR and abroad.

On October 12, 1946, the USSR Ministry of State Security sent a note “On the nationalistic manifestations of some workers of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee” to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. At the same time, the Foreign Policy Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks organized an audit of the activities of the JAC. The note on the results of the inspection, addressed to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, said that members of the JAC, forgetting about the class approach, carry out international contacts with bourgeois figures and organizations on a nationalist basis, and when talking about the life of Soviet Jews in bourgeois publications, they exaggerate their contribution to the achievements of the USSR, which should be regarded as a manifestation of nationalism. It was emphasized that the committee was actively developing its activities within the country, assuming the functions of the chief commissioner for the affairs of the Jewish population and an intermediary between this population and the party-Soviet bodies. As a result, it was concluded that the committee’s activities had gone beyond its competence, acquired functions unusual for it, and was therefore politically harmful and intolerable. In this regard, a proposal was made to liquidate the JAC. A note of similar content was sent by M. A. Suslov on November 26, 1946 to I. V. Stalin.

The immediate pretext for initiating a criminal case against the leaders of the JAC was, as it was later established, the falsified and obtained as a result of illegal investigative methods testimony of a senior researcher at the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, I. I. Goldstein, arrested on December 19, 1947, and a senior researcher at the Institute World Literature of the USSR Academy of Sciences 3. G. Grinberg, arrested on December 28, 1947. In their testimony, they alleged anti-Soviet nationalist activities allegedly carried out by S. A. Lozovsky, I. S. Fefer and other members of the JAC. The interrogation protocols of I. I. Goldstein and Z. G. Grinberg, exposing these persons, on January 10 and March 1, 1948 were sent by the Minister of State Security V. S. Abakumov to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

On March 26, 1948, the USSR MGB sent another note “On the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee” to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which indicated that the leaders of the JAC

are active nationalists and carry out anti-Soviet nationalist work, especially evident after the trip of S. M. Mikhoels and I. S. Fefer in 1943 to the USA, where they came into contact with persons allegedly associated with American intelligence.

“To approve the following decision of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR:

The Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR instructs the Ministry of State Security of the USSR to immediately dissolve the “Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee”, since, as facts show, this committee is the center anti-Soviet propaganda and regularly supplies anti-Soviet information to foreign intelligence agencies.

In accordance with this, the press organs of this committee are closed and the committee’s affairs are taken away. Don't arrest anyone yet."

It has been established that G. M. Malenkov, who was directly related to the investigation and trial, bears direct responsibility for the illegal repression of persons involved in the “case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee”. On January 13, 1949, he summoned S. A. Lozovsky and, during a long conversation, which was attended by the Chairman of the CPC under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, M. F. Shkiryatov, sought from S. A. Lozovsky a confession of his criminal activities. . For these purposes, G. M. Malenkov used what was sent to I. V. Stalin 5 years ago - February 15, 1944 - signed by S. M. Mikhoels, Sh. Epstein, I. S. Fefer (members of the JAC) and edited by S. A letter to A. Lozovsky with a proposal to create a Jewish Socialist Republic on the territory of Crimea.

After the conversation, G. M. Malenkov and M. F. Shkiryatov wrote a note addressed to I. V. Stalin with a proposal to remove S. A. Lozovsky from the membership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with the following wording: “for politically unreliable connections and unworthy of a member of the Central Committee behavior".

By the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 18, 1949 (by poll), S. A. Lozovsky was removed from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and expelled from the party, and on January 26, 1949 he was arrested. In January, members of the JAC B. A. Shimeliovich, I. S. Yuzefovich, L. M. Kvitko, P. D. Markish, D. R. Bergelson, I. S. Vatenberg, Ch. S. Vatenberg-Ostrovskaya were also arrested , E.I. Teumin. Earlier, in 1948, I. S. Fefer, V. L. Zuskin and D. N. Gofshtein, who were involved in this case, had already been arrested.

Using the fact of the dissolution of the JAC, as well as the political accusations and falsified interrogation materials contained in the above notes, V. S. Abakumov and his entourage accused the committee members of state, counter-revolutionary crimes.

It was established that the investigation was conducted with gross violations of the law and the use of unauthorized methods to obtain “privilege”

significant testimony." Despite this, during the first interrogations S. A. Lozovsky, I. S. Fefer and others denied their hostile activities. Then everyone, except B. A. Shimeliovich, was forced to “admit” themselves guilty and testify about espionage and anti-Soviet activities carried out by members of the JAC.

S. D. Ignatiev, appointed Minister of State Security of the USSR, after familiarizing himself with the materials of the investigation, in a letter dated August 24, 1951 addressed to G. M. Malenkov and L. P. Beria, reported that “there are almost completely no documents confirming the testimony of those arrested about the investigation carried out by them.” espionage and nationalist activities under the guise of the JAC,” and also informed about the planned expansion of activities in the case.

On April 3, 1952, S. D. Ignatiev sent an indictment to I. V. Stalin, copies of which were sent to G. M. Malenkov and L. P. Beria. The accompanying letter suggested a punishment - execution for all the accused, with the exception of L. S. Stern.

The case was sent on April 7, 1952 to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, where it was considered from May 8 to July 18, 1952 under the chairmanship of the Chairman of the Military Collegium A. A. Cheptsov, without the participation of representatives of the state prosecution and defense. The Military Collegium sentenced S. A. Lozovsky, I. S. Fefer and others - a total of 13 people - to death, and L. S. Stern - to imprisonment for 3 and a half years and subsequent exile for 5 years.

There are explanations from A. A. Cheptsov about the circumstances surrounding this verdict. Their essence boils down to the fact that the accusation of innocent people and the signing of an unjust verdict for them was predetermined in advance by the higher management.

As A. A. Cheptsov states in an explanation sent on August 15, 1957 to member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee G. K. Zhukov and - in a copy - to other members of the Presidium of the Central Committee: N. S. Khrushchev, N. A. Bulganin, M. A Suslov, L. I. Brezhnev, K. E. Voroshilov, N. M. Shvernik and A. I. Mikoyan - even before the start of the trial, S. D. Ignatiev and his deputy M. D. Ryumin informed him that according to Their report to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made a decision to shoot all the accused except L. S. Stern.

In this and subsequent explanations to the CPC under the Central Committee of the CPSU, A. A. Cheptsov indicates that the court had doubts about the completeness and objectivity of the investigation of the case, and therefore it was subject to referral for further investigation, but this was not done.

According to the explanations of A. A. Cheptsov, he reported on the need for an additional investigation to the Prosecutor General of the USSR G. N. Safonov, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR A. A. Volin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR N. M. Shvernik, Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ) P.K. Ponomarenko, Chairman of the CPC under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) M.F. Shkiryatov,

however, I did not receive any support from them. They all recommended that he contact G.M. Malenkov on this issue.

As A. A. Cheptsov further points out, in the presence of S. D. Ignatiev and M. D. Ryumin, he was received by G. M. Malenkov and expressed thoughts about the need to send the case for additional investigation. However, G.M. Malenkov replied: “The Politburo of the Central Committee has dealt with this matter 3 times, follow the decision of the PB.”

A. A. Cheptsov’s explanations are confirmed. Thus, on July 24, 1953, M. D. Ryumin, who took part in the investigation of the case of S. A. Lozovsky and others, being interrogated as an accused, admitted: “When the court tried to return this case for further investigation, I insisted that a verdict was made based on the materials available in the case.”

The former assistant of M.D. Ryumin, I.I. Grishaev, testified during interrogation in the case of M.D. Ryumin: “From the words of Ryumin, I know that during the investigation of the JAC case, Comrade Cheptsov appealed to the authority, where he spoke about shortcomings and violations admitted in the case, however, as Ryumin told me, Comrade Cheptsov criticized this case not because it was generally doubtful, but because those arrested were not exposed and the roots of the crimes were not revealed.”

In 1948-1952, in connection with the so-called “case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee,” many other people of Jewish nationality, including party and Soviet workers, scientists, writers, poets, journalists, artists, employees of government agencies and industrial enterprises - 110 people in total. Of those repressed, 10 people were sentenced to capital punishment, 20 to 25 years in forced labor camps, 3 to 20 years, 11 to 15 years, 50 to 10 years, 2 to 8 years, 7 years -1, to 5 years - 2, to 10 years of exile - 1, died during the investigation - 5, cases against 5 people were closed after arrest. All of them have now been rehabilitated.

In 1955, an additional audit of the criminal case of S. A. Lozovsky, I. S. Fefer and others was organized. During it, documentary materials stored in party and state archives were studied, many people involved in the events of those years were interviewed, and criminal cases against former investigators who investigated this criminal case and convicted in 1952-1954 were studied. for falsifying investigative materials.

As a result of an additional investigation, it was established that the case against S. A. Lozovsky, I. S. Fefer and others was fabricated, and the confessions of the accused during the investigation were obtained illegally.

By the decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on November 22, 1955, the verdict against S. A. Lozovsky, I. S. Fefer and others, convicted on July 18, 1952 in the so-called “case

Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee”, due to newly discovered circumstances, was canceled and the criminal case was dismissed for lack of corpus delicti.

By decisions of the CPC under the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1955, S. A. Lozovsky, I. S. Fefer, I. S. Yuzefovich, L. M. Kvitko, P. D. Markish, E. I. Teumin, S. L. Bregman, L. S. Stern, and in 1988 - B. A. Shimeliovich and D. N. Gofshtein.

Central Control Commission(abbreviated Central Control Commission) RCP(b), All-Union Communist Party (b), CPSU - the highest control body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1920-1934. and in 1990-1991. In 1920-1921 there was a single Control Commission, which in 1921 was divided into the Central Control Commission (responsible for financial control) and the Central Control Commission (responsible for monitoring party discipline). According to the Charter, the composition of the Central Control Commission was elected by the Party Congress; members of the Central Control Commission could not simultaneously be members of the Central Committee. The local control bodies of the RCP(b) (from 1925 - the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks) were regional control commissions, district control commissions, district control commissions, city control commissions, etc.

In 1934-1952 instead of the Central Control Commission there was Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in 1952-1990 - Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee. In 1962-1965. the unification of the CPC under the Central Committee of the CPSU and the State Control Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR took place in Committee of Party and State Control Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. During this period she was directly involved in the affairs of the CPSU Party Commission under the CPSU Central Committee. Unlike the previous Central Control Commission, the composition of the CPC was not elected at the congress, but was approved by the CPSU Central Committee (in fact, by the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee).

Until 1934, one of the authoritative members of the Politburo was appointed to the post of Chairman of the Central Control Commission for a period of 2-3 years (since membership in the Central Control Commission could not be combined with membership in the Central Committee). In 1934-1946. The Chairman of the CPC was concurrently the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Literature

Yudin K. A. Internal party control in the USSR 1930 - early 1940s: ideological and institutional appearance. - Ivanovo, 2015. - 295 p. With. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/29057391/Yudin_K.A._Intraparty_control_in_the_USSR_1930_-_early_1940s_ideological-institutional_image._Intrapartycontrol_in_the_USSR_1930_-_early_1940-ies_._ideological_and_institutional_image. _Ivanovo_2015._-_295_s

Managers

In 1920-1923, the position of head of the Central Control Commission did not exist; its activities at the all-Russian level were supervised by the People's Commissar of the RKI (I.V. Stalin).

Chairman of the Central Control Commission of the RCP (b) - CPSU (b):

• Kuibyshev, Valerian Vladimirovich (1923-1926)
• Ordzhonikidze, Grigory Konstantinovich (1926-1930)
• Andreev, Andrey Andreevich (1930-1931)
• Rudzutak, Jan Ernestovich (1931-1934)

Chairman of the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks:

• Kaganovich, Lazar Moiseevich (1934-1935)
• Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich (1935-1939) (actually until 1938)
• Andreev, Andrey Andreevich (1939-1952)

Chairman of the Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee:

• Shkiryatov, Matvey Fedorovich (1952-1954)
• position is vacant, acting -

PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE

party control under the Central Committee of the CPSU (CPC), created in accordance with the Charter adopted by the 19th Congress of the CPSU in 1952, to replace the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The Central Committee of the party is organized. The CPC "a) will check the compliance of members and candidates for membership of the CPSU with party discipline, bring to justice communists guilty of violating the Party Program and Charter, party and state discipline, as well as violators of party morality (deception of the party, dishonesty and insincerity towards the party, slander, bureaucracy, everyday promiscuity, etc.); b) considers appeals against decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, regional and regional party committees on expulsion from the party and party penalties" (CPSU Charter, 1972, paragraph 34).

The November Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (1962) reorganized the entire control system in the USSR. The Committee of Party and State Control of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Party Commission under the CPSU Central Committee were created. The December plenum of the CPSU Central Committee (1965) transformed the bodies of party-state control into bodies of people's control, and the CPC was restored.

The CPC, strictly following the precepts of V.I. Lenin about the purity of party ranks, analyzes issues related to strengthening party discipline and increasing the responsibility of communists for implementing party policy. In its work, the CPC observes the highest principle of party leadership - collectivity, which creates reliable guarantees for making correct, comprehensively considered, well-founded decisions. The most important resolutions of the CPC on bringing to justice communists guilty of violating the Program and Charter of the CPSU, party and state discipline, are published in the central organs of the party press. The CPC is headed by a chairman; The committee consists of vice-chairmen and members of the CPC. Since April 1966, the chairman of the CPC has been member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee A. Ya. Pelshe.

L. K. Vinogradov.

Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB. 2012

See also interpretations, synonyms, meanings of the word and what the PARTY CONTROL COMMITTEE is in Russian in dictionaries, encyclopedias and reference books:

• COMMITTEE in the One-Volume Large Legal Dictionary:
  (French comite, from Latin committo - I instruct) 1) a government body formed to conduct special events "or manage any industry. in Russia ...
• CONTROL
  EXPORT SYSTEM - see EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM...
• CONTROL in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  CUSTOMS ZONE - see CUSTOMS CONTROL ZONE...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  TENDER - see TENDER COMMITTEE...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  INVESTIGATIVE - see INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  RING - see RING ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  AUDIT - see AUDIT COMMITTEE...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  ACCORDING TO TRADING ROOM PROCEDURES - the exchange committee, which, together with the administration, establishes the regime ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  FOR ADMISSION OF HOBBIX MEMBERS - a committee that considers applications for membership ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  ON HUMAN RIGHTS - a treaty body established in accordance with Part IV of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  ON NEW PRODUCTS - a committee studying the possibilities of trading new products on ...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  BY LISTING - the working body of the exchange that carries out...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  BUSINESS ETHICS - a committee that serves as a jury on internal disciplinary issues...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  SUPERVISORY - see SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  MINISTERS - the highest legislative body in Russian Empire, a meeting between the king and senior officials on all issues of government. Established in...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  CONTROL - see CONTROL COMMITTEE...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  EXECUTIVE. see EXECUTIVE...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  EXCHANGE - see EXCHANGE...
• COMMITTEE in the Dictionary of Economic Terms:
  ARBITRATION - see ARBITRATION COMMITTEE...
• COMMITTEE
  (French comite from Latin committo - I instruct), 1) a government body formed to conduct special events or manage any industry. In Russia …
• COMMITTEE in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Euphron.
• COMMITTEE
  COMMITTEE OF MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY (Komuch), a government body in the territory. Wed. Volga and Urals regions in June - September. 1918. Educated in...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  "COMMITTEE FOR THE SAVE OF THE MOTHERLAND AND THE REVOLUTION", organization of the Socialist Revolutionaries (Petrograd, Oct. - Nov. 1917, pred. - A.R. Gots). Organized the armed forces. the cadets' performance against the authorities...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  COMMITTEE OF RUSSIAN OFFICERS IN POLAND, rev. org-tion in parts of Russia. armies on the territory Kingdom of Poland in 1861-63. Leaders - A.A. ...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY (1792-95), one of the French committees. ...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SALVATION (1793-95), one of the French committees. Convention. During the period of the Jacobin dictatorship he played the role of pr-va. Head - M. Robespierre...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, supreme. consult on legislation organ of Russia empire (1802-1906), meeting of the emperor with ministers and other top. officials on issues affecting the interests of...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  COMMITTEE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION OF THE USSR, in 1990-91, a body elected by the People's Congress. deputies...
• COMMITTEE in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  COMMITTEE (French comite, from Latin committo - I instruct), state. body formed to carry out special events or leadership of k.-l. industry. IN …
• COMMITTEE in the Encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron.
• COMMITTEE in Ozhegov’s Dictionary of the Russian Language:
  ! a collegial body that directs some work; the Executive Committee of the Council of People's Deputies. Trade Union K. State Planning Committee of the USSR (Gosplan). K. by...
• COMMITTEE in Dahl's Dictionary:
  husband. , French a deliberative meeting, by appointment of any authority; Duma, council, circle, meeting, meeting, council. Committee of Zemstvo Duties in the province...
• COMMITTEE in the Modern Explanatory Dictionary, TSB:
  (French comite, from Latin committo - I instruct), 1) a government body formed to conduct special events or manage any industry. IN …
• COMMITTEE V Explanatory dictionary Russian language Ushakov:
  committee, m. (from Latin comitatus, lit. accompanying) (official). A collegial body of a more or less permanent type, formed to work in some. ...
• SOVIET CONTROL COMMISSION
  Soviet control under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (KSK), a state control body, created in 1934 instead of the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (RKI) for systematic inspection...
• PARTY CONTROL COMMISSION in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  party control under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (CPC), created by the 17th Party Congress (1934), which decided to transform the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) ...
• ESSER, GERMAN
  (Esser), (1900-1981), one of Hitler's closest associates in the early years of the Nazi movement. He was among the founders of the National Socialist Workers' Party of Germany. ...
• SPEER, ALBERT in the Encyclopedia of the Third Reich:
  (Speer), (1905-1981), court architect of Hitler. Born March 15, 1905 in Mannheim. He studied architecture and was an assistant at the Berlin Technical Institute. IN …
• TATARINOV VALERIAN ALEXEEVICH in the Brief Biographical Encyclopedia.
• PEREVERZEV in the Literary Encyclopedia:
  Valerian Fedorovich is a literary critic and historian of Russian literature. Studied at Kharkov University. 502 Since 1902 he participated in the social democrats. movement, adjacent...
• MERINGE. in the Literary Encyclopedia.
• KHRUSHCHEV NIKITA SERGEEVICH in the Big Encyclopedic Dictionary:
  (1894-1971) statesman, politician, Hero of the Soviet Union (1964), Hero of Socialist Labor (1954, 1957, 1961). From peasants. Since 1909, a mechanic at...
• SKIRYATOV MATVEY FYODOROVICH in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  Matvey Fedorovich, Soviet party leader. Member of the CPSU since 1906. From peasants. Worker. ...
• FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU(B) in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  The congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) took place on December 18 - 31, 1925 in Moscow. There were 665 voting delegates and 641 voting delegates…
• CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  CPSU Committee, the highest body governing the party between congresses; members of the Central Committee and candidates for members of the Central Committee are elected at congresses...
• CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE AUCP(B) in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  control commission of the CPSU (b) [TsKK VKP (b)], the highest control body of the party in 1920-34. Created according to the plan of V.I. Lenin, who ...
• CHARTER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the fundamental law of the internal life of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, defining the duties and rights of a party member, its ...
• UNIVERSITIES OF MARXISM-LENINISM in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  Marxism-Leninism, one of the forms of the highest level of the party education system. Listeners of U. M.-L. (mainly party, Soviet, economic workers, workers...
• UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
  Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukrainian SSR (Ukrainian Radyanska Socialistichna Respublika), Ukraine (Ukraine). I. General information The Ukrainian SSR was founded on December 25, 1917. With the creation...

Reforms of the state and party apparatus

The entire period of Khrushchev’s activity as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks became a period of constant reforms in the governance of the country. The over-centralized, militarized economy of the country during the Stalin era gave rise to an appropriate management system. This system included, in particular, a very extensive system of line ministries, a key link in the country's command and administrative system. The ministries, directly or through the main departments subordinate to them, managed their industrial enterprises, communicated to them the figures of the state plan, established numerous indicators for them - the number of employees, standards for increasing labor productivity, and many others. The ministries determined who should be the supplier of raw materials for enterprises, and where the products of enterprises should go. The fractional structure of executive authorities - ministries - in principle assumed that each branch of the economy, industry, and management assumed the presence of its own “industry headquarters,” as ministries were often called. In the post-war period, about 50 ministries functioned in the country (See table)

The first blow was dealt to this system after the death of Stalin. Already on March 15, 1953, there was a sharp reduction in the number of ministries. It affected mainly the related sectors of the defense industry and mechanical engineering. The Ministry of Mechanical Engineering of the USSR included the ministries of the automobile and tractor industry, mechanical engineering and instrument making, machine tool building, and agricultural engineering. The other surviving ministry, Transport and Heavy Engineering, included the Ministry of Heavy Engineering, Transport Engineering, Construction and Road Engineering, and the Shipbuilding Industry. The new Ministry of Defense Industry included two of several defense ministries - armaments and aviation industry.

Later, during the July 1953 Plenum, responsibility for the sharp reduction in the number of ministries was assigned to Beria. This was seen as a manifestation of his criminal intentions. It is not difficult to understand that the sharp reduction in the number of ministries caused discontent among the capital's bureaucracy. In 1954, the previous Stalin-era system of ministries was almost completely restored.

At the end of 1956, at the December plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the problem was discussed: how to strengthen centralized industrial planning, centralized control over it, etc. This course in the leadership of the CPSU is associated with the activities of M. G. Pervukhin, a member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. However, by December 1956 it became clear that the ambitious five-year plan drawn up under the leadership of Pervukhin, adopted by the 20th Congress of the CPSU, turned out to be unrealistic.

At the beginning of the next 1957, N.S. Khrushchev sent a note “On improving the management of industry and construction” to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. A commission was created, which included members of the Presidium, secretaries of the Central Committee, secretaries of regional party committees, and ministers. Khrushchev's proposals were submitted to the February (1957) plenum of the Central Committee. The proposals were extremely radical. They changed the entire previous order of industrial management.

“In accordance with the tasks of further development of the national economy...,” it was reported in the theses of Khrushchev’s report at the plenum, “it is necessary to shift the center of gravity of the operational management of industry and construction to the localities, closer to enterprises and construction sites. For these purposes... it is necessary to move from old... forms of management through line ministries and departments to new forms of management on a territorial principle. The form of such management could be, for example, councils of the national economy (economic councils)."

Behind Khrushchev’s usual love for political archeology, where the extreme starting point was the first years of Soviet power (economic councils were created in late 1917-early 1918 and existed in the 20s), there was hidden a transition from vertical planning - from directive instructions of the party - resolutions The USSR Council of Ministers - orders of ministries - to industrial enterprises - to the elimination of industrial ministries.

The proposals of the plenum, as usual, were approved in the form of the law “On further improvement of the organization of industry and construction” dated May 10, 1957 by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

ON FURTHER IMPROVEMENT OF INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

(USSR Law)

[Extract]

Article 2. Establish that industry and construction management should be carried out on a territorial basis based on economic administrative regions. Economic administrative regions are formed by the Supreme Councils of the union republics.

Article 3. To manage industry and construction, a national economic council is formed in each economic administrative region.

Article 4. The Council of the National Economy of the economic administrative region is formed by the Council of Ministers of the Union Republic, consisting of: the chairman of the Council of the National Economy, deputy chairmen and members of the Council of the National Economy.

To establish that the chairmen of the national economic councils, upon the proposal of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union Republic to the Supreme Council of the Union Republic, may be appointed ministers and be members of the Council of Ministers of the Union Republic.

Article 5. The Council of the National Economy of the economic administrative region is directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Union Republic in all its activities.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR exercises leadership over the national economic councils through the councils of ministers of the union republics.

Article 6. The Technical and Economic Council operates under the People's Economic Council of the Economic Administrative Region as an advisory body.

Article 7. The structure of the National Economy Council of the economic administrative region is approved by the Council of Ministers of the Union Republic.

to put an end to the arms race and begin disarmament as soon as possible. Moreover, the Soviet state supported this initiative by taking practical measures, implementing these measures unilaterally. The Soviet Union liquidated its military bases on the territory of other states, significantly reduced the size of its Armed Forces and its military spending, again stopped testing atomic and hydrogen weapons and decided not to resume them unless the Western powers resumed testing of nuclear weapons. Wishing to make a new contribution to the cause of peace and creation! the most favorable conditions for achieving an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees:

Article 1. Carry out a new major reduction in the Armed Forces of the USSR, namely by 1,200,000 people.

Article 2. In this regard, disband the appropriate number of units, formations, military schools of the Soviet Army and Navy, accordingly reducing weapons, and also reduce the Soviet Union's expenses for military needs according to the State Budget of the USSR.

Article 3. Instruct the Council of Ministers of the USSR:

a) take the necessary measures to implement Articles 1 and 2 of this Law, determine specific terms for the reduction of the Armed Forces of the USSR and ensure that the personnel of the Armed Forces dismissed from the army and navy are employed in the national economy;

b) maintain the country’s defense capability at the proper level, preserving the necessary Armed Forces of the USSR and weapons until an international agreement on general and complete disarmament is reached.

By adopting this Law, the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expresses the hope that the new reduction of the Armed Forces of the USSR will serve as a motivating example for other states, especially those with the greatest military power. This would facilitate the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 19bO, No. 3, art. 26.

The key link became the councils of the national economy of economic administrative regions. The Economic Council is, first of all, a territory united by the unity of economic management. The borders of this territory in the Russian Federation coincided with the autonomous republics, territories and regions. 70 economic councils were created in the RSFSR, 11 in Ukraine, 9 in Kazakhstan, 4 in Uzbekistan, and one each in all other union republics. Secondly, the Economic Council is a collegial governing body that led the comprehensive development of industry, to which industrial and construction companies, business establishments located in this territory. In the structure of this institution, in addition to the National Economic Council itself, the governing body, there were also production and sectoral departments created for individual industries, as well as functional departments - transport, finance and some others.

Centralized control was retained only for the most knowledge-intensive and important branches of the military industry.

The economic consequences of the creation of economic councils were already positive in the first years. The costs of transporting raw materials and products have decreased, and cooperation ties between enterprises located in the same territory have increased.

The social consequences of the organization of economic councils turned out to be more complex and contradictory. Of course, these reforms aroused the indignation of the capital's bureaucracy. The management vertical of the people's commissariats-ministries, which had developed over decades, collapsed, and with it the jobs of the ministerial nomenklatura. The prospect of leaving Moscow to work in the economic councils was both undesirable and not very realistic - they had their own candidates for governing bodies.

On the other hand, local party and economic elites saw the elimination of ministries as an expansion of their own capabilities. The producers were the winners. The direct leadership of the National Economy Council included the chairman of the Economic Council, his deputies and heads of departments and departments of the Economic Council. In April 1960, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution according to which the leadership of the economic councils also included directors of the largest enterprises and construction projects. Note that there was no place given to the party leadership of the regional party committees. Of course, connections between economic councils and regional committees existed, but they were not provided for normatively.

A situation arose when business executives found themselves relatively independent in relation to the regional committees.

For Khrushchev personally, it seemed that this was not of fundamental importance. In the fight against his old opponents - first with Malenkov, until the beginning of 1955, and then against Bulganin, who alternately occupied the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Khrushchev decided to take this position himself. In February 1958, Bulganin was removed, and Khrushchev joined higher authority in a party with state power, he himself became chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This created additional opportunities for direct control of the state apparatus, but, on the other hand, it gave rise to legitimate fears of the party apparatus about the unreliability of Khrushchev as its representative and defender, depriving him of the halo of a fighter for the interests of the highest party nomenklatura, which he received during the work of the June (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The bandwagon for the party nomenklatura was the new charter of the CPSU Central Committee, adopted in October 1961 at the XXX Congress of the CPSU. It provided for the need for systematic renewal of party bodies from the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee to the primary organization. The lowest level of the elected bodies of the party - up to and including the district committee - was to be renewed by half at each election, at the republican and regional levels - by one third, the composition of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee was to be renewed by one quarter. The possibilities for a particular person to be elected to the same party body several times were also limited. These decisions in themselves created a threat to the stability of the party apparatus.

In November 1962, a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held, at which two important decisions were made. One of them - the creation of a system of party-state control - will be discussed below. The other one - “On the development of the economy of the USSR and the restructuring of the party leadership of the national economy” - meant the division of party organizations according to the production principle. Party organizations - from regional and lower - were divided into industrial and rural. Thus, there were two regional committees on the territory of one region or region. And since the party management system was a kind of model for the Soviet government, instead of unified Soviets and their executive committees, rural and industrial Soviets and executive committees were created. The blow was also dealt to the largest group of party workers - the secretaries of rural district committees of the CPSU. According to these decisions, rural district party committees were liquidated, and agricultural management was transferred to territorial production departments covering several districts.

The changes also affected other public and government organizations - the Komsomol, trade unions, and the police. As V. E. Semichastny, who headed state security at that time, recalled, Khrushchev wanted to divide even the KGB departments into industrial and rural ones. “How can I divide spies into rural and urban?” - Semichastny fought back. He was able to change Khrushchev’s opinion, according to him, only by proving that the division of the KGB “according to the production principle” would lead to a sharp increase in the number of officers and generals in the KGB. “Khrushchev,” recalled Semichastny, “had a very bad attitude towards military ranks in the KGB, and often liked to repeat: “We need to disperse you, break you up.”

The changes also affected economic councils. Their functions have been slightly changed. Thus, the construction industry was outside their jurisdiction; their managerial rights now extended mainly to the industrial sector. The number of economic councils was sharply reduced and brought to 47. This time their borders covered several regions. It is not difficult to understand that this further weakened the position of the regional party committees, those industrial regional committees that were created by the decision of the November (1962) plenum. Industrial regional committees found themselves practically subordinate not only to the Central Committee, but also to local economic councils.

This decision brought complete confusion to the activities of the local government apparatus and became a nightmare for party and Soviet officials. Following the party and Soviet bodies, they began to divide into rural and industrial organizations of trade unions and the Komsomol. The administrative apparatus has increased dramatically. Thus, in the district town of Gus-Khrustalny, Vladimir Region, there were simultaneously a city party committee, a party committee of the production collective and state farm management, an industrial and production party committee, a city executive committee, and a rural district executive committee.

All these measures caused irritation and were perceived as an obvious administrative whim. However, these decisions had their own meaning. The separation of rural and industrial branches in the local party leadership was in its own way a logical continuation of the merging of the party and state apparatuses. The fact that it was rural party bodies that appeared created the usual illusion of the possibility of solving the problems of agriculture (by this time especially acutely realized) through a sharp strengthening of the party leadership.

We consider it necessary to note that such a weakening of the local party-Soviet leadership objectively strengthened the position of business executives, since the economic councils remained the only regional governing bodies. However, the influence of the business executives themselves was incomparable with the party apparatus. The nomenklatura system made them completely dependent on party bodies. The usual threat from party secretaries at all levels, “I didn’t appoint you to this job, but I can always remove you,” was quite real. Moreover, they were appointed to any responsible economic positions only with the consent of party bodies. Therefore, the November (1962) decisions did not create new allies for Khrushchev and added many new opponents among the influential secretaries of the regional committees - the most numerous part of the plenums of the Central Committee.

The changes in the CPSU Charter adopted at the 19th Congress of the CPSU could not but cause alarm among the party nomenklatura. The new Charter set a course for the rotation of the composition of elected party bodies - from the primary party organization to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. At the level from the primary party organization to the district committee of the CPSU, half of the members of elected bodies were to be re-elected, from the regional to the republican committees - up to a third, in the Central Committee and its Presidium - a fourth. With all the additions, clarifications and clarifications that retained the ability to influence the election results, the principle of turnover and renewal of party cadres hung like a sword of Damocles over the heads of the party nomenklatura.

Notes

1. Popov G. Kh. (SPECIFY THE NAME OF HIS ARTICLE IN “SCIENCE AND LIFE” ABOUT THE COMMAND-ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM)
2. Tsikulin V. A. History of state institutions of the USSR. 1936-1965 M., 1966, p. 52
3. There, p. 80
4. CHECK FROM THE TEXT OF THE PLENARY AGAINST BERIA
5. Shapiro L. Communist Party of the Soviet Union. London, 1990, p. 771
6. On further improvement of the organization of industry and construction management. Resolution of the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on the report of Comrade. N. S. Khrushchev, adopted on February 14, 1957 M., 1957, p. 4
7. Law "On further improvement of the organization of industry and construction management. M., 1957
8. Tsikulin V. A. History of state institutions of the USSR, p. 53-55
9. Khrushchev times. Record of N. A. Barsukov // Unknown Russia, Vol. 1. M., 1992, p. 273
10. Communist, 1964, N 16, editorial; True, November 17, 1964

Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB

The unprecedented nature of Khrushchev's resignation (and, to call a spade a spade, the success of the conspiracy to remove the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev) gives rise to a logical question - how did this become possible? In searching for an answer to this question, one cannot ignore the relationship between Khrushchev and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB.

After Beria's arrest, his first deputy S.N. Kruglov received the post of minister. We have already given evidence above that many of the Ministry of Internal Affairs employees perceived the removal of Beria as a signal to restore the order of Stalin’s time. However, the situation was not at all as clear-cut as it rashly seemed to the participants in the meetings to condemn Beria. On the one hand, a number of enterprises were returned to the Ministry of Internal Affairs - Glavspetsstroy and Glavpromstroy (however, not for long), on the other hand, the purge of its employees accused of close ties with Beria continued. Already at the end of August 1953, the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported to the Presidium of the Central Committee on the work to cleanse the apparatus of the ministry and the heads of regional departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A number of former leaders were put on trial and sentenced to death or to long prison terms.

There is no doubt that the influence of this particular ministry, which was accused of repressions of the 30s and early 50s, was steadily declining. On March 12, 1954, the State Security Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers was formed. I. A. Serov, a long-time deputy minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, was appointed its chairman, in recent years - from the beginning of 1953 - Beria's deputy, and then S. N. Kruglov. A number of functions of the former Ministry of Internal Affairs are transferred to the KGB. In 1955, by decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR was created. Let us recall that for the last thirty years the Russian Federation has not had its own Ministry of Internal Affairs (the NKVD of the RSFSR was abolished in December 1930)

At the beginning of 1956, on the eve of the 20th Congress, S.N. Kruglov was dismissed. The former head of the construction department of the CPSU Central Committee, N.P. Dudorov, was appointed as the new minister. During 1956-1957 The ministry's apparatus was being cleaned. Deputy ministers - long-term employees of the NKVD-MVD - were replaced by party workers. In September 1957, border troops were withdrawn from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and transferred to the KGB.

The logical result of the process of reducing the role of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was the liquidation of this ministry. On January 13, 1960, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was abolished, and its functions were transferred to republican ministries. In Russia it was the Ministry of Public Order, renamed in 1962 in a new way.

The situation was different for the State Security Committee. I. A. Serov was associated with N. S. Khrushchev through joint work in Ukraine. Under the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Khrushchev, the People's Commissar of the NKVD in the period from September 2, 1939 to July 25, 1941 was I. A. Serov. He was considered "Khrushchev's man." Serov played one of the key roles in the preparation of Khrushchev’s “secret report” at the 20th Congress. The removal of the KGB chairman - as a supporter of Khrushchev - was sought by members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee at the same meeting on June 18-21, 1957, at which the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee - Khrushchev himself - was almost relieved of his post.

We do not know the exact reasons that forced I. Serov to be transferred from the post of Chairman of the KGB of the USSR to, although prestigious, it did not have political significance, and most importantly, the politically useless position for Khrushchev as head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. There is a tradition to connect the resignation of I. Serov with the investigation that intensified after the 20th Congress into the circumstances of political repressions of the Stalin era, with the important role of Serov in the deportation of the peoples of the North Caucasus. Perhaps it was so. A. N. Shelepin recalled that he repeatedly told Khrushchev about the need to expel Serov from the party and deprive him of military awards for his participation in the repressions of the past. In any case, the departure of I. Serov was a personal loss for Khrushchev.

In Serov's place, the head of the department of the CPSU Central Committee, former first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, A. N. Shelepin, was appointed. From the first days of its existence, the KGB performed a number of functions as a political police. With the arrival of A. N. Shelepin, these functions were enshrined in the “Regulations on the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR”, approved by a resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on January 9, 1959. This document, which defined the activities of the KGB, proclaimed: “State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and its local bodies are political bodies that carry out the activities of the Central Committee and the Government to protect the socialist state from attacks by external and internal enemies"

With the advent of Shelepin at the head of the KGB, the purge of the ranks of KGB officers continued. In a report sent to the Presidium of the Central Committee in January 1963 by Shelepin’s successor, also former first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee V. Semichastny in the first days of his work as chairman of the KGB, it was reported that “for the period since 1954 from the state security agencies (without troops ) ... more than 46 thousand officers were dismissed, including almost half since 1959. “The purge affected not only the KGB apparatus, but also intelligence and counterintelligence. “Over 90% of generals and military counterintelligence officers... have been appointed to senior positions in the last four years,” the document reported.

The recruitment of new KGB employees was carried out mainly through persons who had recommendations from Komsomol and party bodies, as well as from among party and Komsomol workers.

In turn, a number of KGB leaders moved in 1960-1962. for party-Soviet work, in the prosecutor's office.

The KGB and its apparatus merged with party bodies. Former employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security were performers - including criminal orders. The new KGB was headed political The leaders, and its employees, understood themselves more clearly than their predecessors as an “armed detachment of the party” and were more proactive and independent than their predecessors. This is far from identical to the personal support of N.S. Khrushchev personally.

And the KGB could not help but be irritated by the reduction in the number of staff by 110 thousand people, the reduction in pay, the elimination of a number of privileges (free supply of medicines, benefits for long service and a number of others).

The KGB leadership could not help but be alarmed by the obvious strengthening of opposition sentiments in the country. In the first half of 1962, there was a kind of explosion of mass discontent with the policies that were identified with Khrushchev. In a report sent to the CPSU Central Committee in July 1962, Shelepin reported an extremely alarming fact - for six months of 1962, twice as much leaflets and anonymous letters with anti-Soviet content, than for the same period in 1961. This KGB report stated that in the first half of the year there were 60 local anti-Soviet groups, and for the whole of 1961 there were only 47 groups. During this half of the year, 7,705 leaflets and anonymous letters were recorded, produced by 2,522 authors.

What was also new was that after a long break, letters praising the anti-party group began to be sent out. This was already a personal political defeat for Khrushchev. Through the efforts of the security officers, 1,039 authors of 6,726 anti-Soviet documents were identified. They were written by representatives of almost all walks of life - 364 workers, 192 employees, 210 students and schoolchildren, 108 people without specific occupations, 105 pensioners and 60 collective farmers. More than 40% had average and higher education, 47% are under 30 years old. Among the authors of these documents were military personnel and old communists.

The function of the political police in the KGB increased sharply after the events in Novocherkassk, which reverberated throughout almost the entire country. Both the party authorities and the KGB were essentially taken by surprise. Immediately after the suppression of unrest, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee adopted big number decisions aimed at strengthening political investigation and combating dissent in the country. On July 19, 1962, at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, a lengthy resolution was adopted, which stated: “1. Agree with the draft resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Prosecutor General of the USSR presented by the Commission on the issues of strengthening the fight against hostile manifestations of anti-Soviet elements...

2. Allow the KGB of the USSR to increase the staffing level of counterintelligence units of the territorial bodies of the KGB by 400 military personnel. "

The KGB was criticized for its weak intelligence work, primarily in many higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, institutions of science, culture, and art. He was criticized for his poor contacts with the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the fight against antisocial elements

Attached to the resolution was a draft order from the KGB chairman. It noted: “Recently, mass riots have occurred in some cities, accompanied by pogroms of administrative buildings....” Responsibility for them was assigned to criminal elements, former German punitive forces, “church members and sectarians,” who sought to give the spontaneous events a counter-revolutionary character. (Note that such an assessment did not correspond at all to the specific circumstances of the unrest in Novocherkassk)

The draft order ended - standard in form, but in essence - with new wording in content: "... to eliminate serious shortcomings in the placement of agents and their use." Particular vigilance was supposed to be shown in relation to re-emigrants, “reactionary church and sectarian authorities.” . . "more actively use the capabilities of operational and technical services, external surveillance; ... signal about persons ... holding anti-Soviet positions and trying to undermine the people's trust in the policies and activities carried out by the party and the Soviet government ...; suppress any open hostile manifestations anti-Soviet elements, ... authors of anti-Soviet leaflets and anonymous documents, ... and all kinds of instigators of mass riots in agreement with party bodies take measures to isolate them. . . "

These events required additional organizational decisions. Considering that industrial enterprises became the centers of unrest, the appearance of a section in this order becomes clear: “Create in the Second Main Directorate... A department that will be entrusted with the functions of organizing intelligence and operational work at large and especially important industrial enterprises...”

The viciously anti-church orientation of the KGB is noteworthy. This document, in essence, confirms the previous Chekist policy of eradicating religion by destroying the church. KGB officers are ordered: “To decisively increase the level of intelligence and operational work to suppress hostile manifestations on the part of churchmen and sectarians, paying special attention to the rapid paralysis of the activities of illegal groups and communities. In relation to the leaders and organizers of church and sectarian formations, carry out active security measures, (Our italics. Author) which would make it possible in the near future to completely expose the anti-Soviet work they are carrying out, and to bring the worst of them to criminal liability in accordance with the law.

The old Khrushchev plan to combat the “parasites” was not forgotten either. But if in the late 40s. it spread to the collective farm village, then in the early 60s - to the whole country. Therefore, it was prescribed: "... The KGB bodies are obliged to provide more assistance to the party bodies in the steady implementation of Soviet laws against parasites."

The order of KGB Chairman A.N. Shelepin ends with an instruction defining the relationship between the party and the KGB: “The leaders of the KGB-UKGB, authorized by the KGB in cities and districts, to provide clear information to the Central Committee of the Communist Parties, ... regional committees, regional committees, city committees and district committees of the CPSU.”

The leadership of the KGB, which was directly part of the party and political elite of the country, could not help but be concerned about the growing discontent in the country. The situation offered two options. The first is the intensification of repression (let us recall that it was in July 1962 that the notorious Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR was adopted, which restored and legitimized political repression). The second way out is changes in the political leadership itself, the removal from it of that person whose name was identified with failures in the development of the country - N. S. Khrushchev. The developing situation in the country could not help but worry Khrushchev himself. He had to face incredible amounts of fraud, the most gross deception. Moreover, the deceivers were regional committee secretaries and major economic managers. It is clear that the party could create “lighthouses”. Postscripts were allowed (more precisely, secretly allowed) for them, but in those cases where it had to meet a certain political goal - to stimulate others. And the right to be a “beacon” presupposed a certain party support, almost legitimation. This is exactly what happened, for example, with the first secretary of the Ryazan regional committee of the CPSU Larionov. But even they were prohibited from committing simple criminal acts, to which the Ryazan party leader, personally supported by Khrushchev, went. But, especially in agriculture, almost all any major party, Soviet and economic officials cheated. (Another question is why they did this).

Khrushchev tried to fight this. He personally traveled around the camp, scolded those who came to his attention, organized checks, but the situation did not change. The super-centralized government was unable to ensure control over the implementation of its own decisions. Since such a power, as it well knows, in principle cannot make wrong decisions, those who do not follow its wise instructions are to blame. And in order for them to be carried out, it is necessary to establish verification of execution, for which it is necessary to create another institution, another department, which should ensure “accounting and control,” as the great Lenin said.

Notes

1. The last "anti-party" group. Verbatim report of the June (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee // Historical archive, 1993, N3, p. 32, 39, 57-58
2. See, for example, information about the surveillance of physicist L. D. Landau: According to intelligence agents and operational equipment. Information from the KGB of the USSR about Academician L. D. Landau // Historical Archive, 1993, No. 3, p. 151-162
3. Okhotin N.G. et al. Expert opinion. . . , With. 31
4. See the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On measures to prevent facts of deception of the state and to strengthen control over the reliability of reports on the implementation of plans and obligations" dated May 19, 1961, 9

Committee and Council of Ministers of the USSR

Among the numerous administrative transformations of N. S. Khrushchev, this is perhaps the least studied, although it played a significant role in the events of the mid-60s

Control institutions have been reformed many times. The former Ministry of State Control, headed by such political figures as L. Z. Mehlis (1946-1950) and V. N. Merkulov (1950-1953), was abolished in 1957, along with a number of other ministries . Instead, the Commission of Soviet Control of the Council of Ministers of the USSR appeared. However, the effectiveness of this institution, according to Khrushchev, was insufficient.

Khrushchev came to the idea of ​​​​the need to create a special control institution that could check both party and state bodies at the end of 1961, when it was already clear that it was impossible to implement the plan for building communism in the USSR, recently adopted at the XXX Congress of the CPSU.

Khrushchev, who in every possible way demonstrated his commitment to resurrecting Leninist traditions, tried to give his own interpretation of Lenin’s instructions on control here. It is curious that in the process of preparing the decision, Khrushchev was provided with original documents from 1923-1928. about the activities of the commission of A.D. Tsyurupa, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, deputy chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense and at the same time the People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (let's pay attention to this circumstance!). They spoke about the activities of the commission on improving the functioning of the state apparatus and combating abuse. The commission was created on the initiative of F.E. Dzerzhinsky, it was led by Tsyurupa, and included people's commissars and representatives of the judiciary.

Reform of the control apparatus in the USSR in the early 60s. It took an unusually long time (unusually for Khrushchev’s sudden reforms). Decisive opponents of the creation of the Committee of Party and State Control, judging by the memoirs of A. N. Shelepin, were A. N. Kosygin and A. I. Mikoyan. On January 8, 1962, a draft resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee “Issues of state control and party control” was prepared. No decision has been made on this project. On February 19, 1962, a note by N. S. Khrushchev “On improving control over the implementation of party and government directives” was sent to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, in which he substantiated the need to strengthen party-state control, and in fact, to carry out a reform of control, party and government bodies of the country.

The note is multi-page, replete with quotes from Lenin, and is not at all Khrushchev’s in style. As a rule, such documents are rarely personally written by the person who signs them. But the ideas and basic provisions contained in such papers were always clarified and agreed upon with him in advance. Khrushchev’s note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee stated: “Due to the fact that the 19th Congress of the CPSU instructed the Central Committee to develop measures to improve and improve party-state and public control, we in the Central Committee need to immediately think through practical issues related to the implementation of this instruction. I I would like to express some thoughts about the measures that should be taken for these purposes... During the period of Stalin’s personality cult, the wonderful Leninist system of party and state control was actually overturned and replaced by an essentially bureaucratic control apparatus, divorced from the masses.

Khrushchev informed members of the Presidium that corruption in the country had affected the highest levels government controlled that bribery has penetrated into the State Planning Committee and other ministries and departments. Facts of bribery, Khrushchev reported, were also revealed in some other regions of the RSFSR, in the Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, Azerbaijan, Georgian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Kazakh republics.

Khrushchev's note described in particular detail that these phenomena - bribery, corruption - penetrated into the courts, the prosecutor's office, and the bar. “Over the past two years, a number of prosecutors, investigators and members of the Moscow city and regional courts, people’s judges and lawyers have been prosecuted for bribes in Moscow and the Moscow region alone.” These examples were supposed to prove the need for extrajudicial prosecution. These extrajudicial or pre-trial proceedings were to become the subject of the activities of the new control bodies.

What should this control body be like? First - party rhetoric. “The main and decisive condition for a radical improvement in control must be the involvement of the broad masses of workers... Therefore, we need, along with special party control bodies, to have a system of public inspections that would work under the guidance of the party control bodies and cover every enterprise, construction site, state farm, collective farm, establishment... an instrument for improving the state apparatus, eradicating bureaucracy, and timely implementation of party decisions."

Next is Khrushchev's first reform plan. “Based on this, I would consider it advisable to form a single control center - the Committee of Party Control of the Central Committee of the CPSU (CPC) with the relevant local bodies, entrusting it with the responsibility to exercise control over all lines. This will be the implementation of Lenin’s instructions.”

Khrushchev defined the tasks of the future Party Control Committee: “To monitor the strictest observance of party and state discipline, the fight against any manifestations of departmental and parochial tendencies, fraud, misrepresentations, mismanagement and wastefulness, ... the strictest regime of economy for the correct and most appropriate spending Money and material assets. The special attention of the CPC and its local bodies should be directed to a decisive fight against bureaucracy and red tape, which cause the greatest harm to our cause."

“The Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee should be a broadly representative body,” Khrushchev wrote. “It could be formed by 80-100 people, including representatives of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Komsomol Central Committee, the Central Union, the press, workers, collective farmers, intelligentsia, and chairmen of party control committees.” union republics and the largest territories and regions. It would be correct to approve the composition of the Committee at the plenum of the Central Committee for a period of 4 years, and the board of the CPC could be approved at the presidium of the Central Committee... The structure of the Committee apparatus should be thought out in such a way that it is built on the principle providing for effective control over both sectors of the national economy, as well as on an administrative-territorial basis. The CPC should have freelance inspectors, in particular, it would be possible to attract communists and non-party people who have retired, but are capable of performing public duties."

Khrushchev also foresaw the danger of such an institution. “Providing for the broad rights of the Party Control Committee, I want to emphasize that it is necessary to exclude any possibility of any opposition to its Central Committee of the CPSU. In this regard, it must be firmly established that all the work of the Committee must be carried out under the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPSU and its Presidium, the Committee is obliged to constantly report before the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee about their activities, submit their work plans for consideration by the Central Committee, all responsible employees of the Committee apparatus must be approved by the CPSU Central Committee."

Note that initially Khrushchev saw this control body as a Committee party control. This Committee should have been controlled Central Committee. Its number, according to Khrushchev, should be small.

Based on Khrushchev’s note, a special resolution of the Presidium was adopted. It stated: “1. Approve the proposals of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, ... set out by him in a note dated February 19, 1962 and send it to members of the CPSU Central Committee, candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee and members of the Central Audit Commission

2. Instruct the secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee to prepare a draft resolution of the CPSU Central Committee “On improving control over the implementation of party and government directives.”

However, more than half a year passed before the decision to create the Committee was made. One after another, draft regulations on it were submitted to the Presidium, but they did not receive support. The situation changed dramatically at the November (1962) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The reason for the delay, according to A. N. Shelepin, was the resistance shown to this idea by A. N. Kosygin and A. I. Mikoyan.

Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU,

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR

ABOUT THE FORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE

PARTY AND STATE CONTROL OF THE CPSU Central Committee

AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR

Central Committee CPSU, Presidium of the Supreme Council

The USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR decreed:

Form the Party and State Control Committee of the Central Committee!

CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR

Central Presidium Council

Supreme Ministers Committee

CPSU Council of the USSR USSR

SP USSR, 1962, Yu~ 20, Art. 159.

REGULATION 0 OF THE COMMITTEE

PARTY AND STATE CONTROL OF THE CPSU Central Committee

AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR AND RELEVANT

ORGANS ON THE LOCAL

[Extract]

The correct establishment of control and verification of execution is the most important Leninist principle of the activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet state in building a new society, a powerful means of improving party and state leadership, strengthening the connection between the party and the people, and involving the masses in the management of the affairs of society. As our country further advances towards communism, the management of economic construction becomes more complex and the productive forces develop enormously, the role of mass control will increase more and more.

In pursuance of the directive of the XXII Congress of the CPSU, the November (1962) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee decided on a radical reorganization of the control system in the country, basing it on the Leninist idea of ​​​​combining party and state control, creating a system

At this plenum, Khrushchev objectively weakened the party apparatus, introducing proposals to divide it into rural and party apparatus, and to enlarge the economic councils. And at the same time, a resolution “On the formation of the Committee of Party and State Control of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR” was adopted.

Speaking at the plenum, Khrushchev proposed appointing the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, head of the KGB, A. N. Shelepin, as chairman of the new committee. Khrushchev made a proposal to approve Shelepin additionally as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. He will need to deal with ministers, with government bodies,” Khrushchev said, “and he must have the necessary powers.”

No special evidence is required to assert that the draft of this decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee was created in the entourage of A. N. Shelepin, the then chief of the KGB, who aimed and became the head of this control body. Shelepin, in the eyes of Khrushchev, fully met the necessary requirements. He made a career under Khrushchev and in this sense should have been personally obliged to him, as the chairman of the KGB, he already had considerable experience in controlling all aspects of the country’s life, and finally, he had experience working in the party apparatus, he was elected secretary of the CPSU Central Committee at the XXX Congress ,

The creation of the Committee of Party and State Control of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR was supposed to compensate for the growth of decentralization that was objectively emerging in the party and Soviet bodies. The decision of the November plenum stated: “To form a single body of party and state control, the Committee of Party and State Control of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the relevant local bodies. Consider the most important task of the bodies of party and state control to provide assistance to the party and the state in the implementation of the CPSU Program , in organizing systematic verification of the implementation of party and government directives, in further improving the leadership of communist construction, observing party and state discipline, and socialist legality."

The Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee carefully considered the Regulations of the new committee. This was the subject of its meeting on December 18, 1962. In the decision of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee it was written: “Instruct the commission consisting of: comrades Kozlov (convocation), Brezhnev, Mikoyan, Kosygin, Voronov, Suslov, Shelepin to consider in accordance with the exchange of views on meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, draft documents submitted to the Central Committee on the structure and staff of the Committee of Party-State Control of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, as well as the draft Regulations on the Committee of Party-State Control of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR and relevant local bodies and submit proposals to the Central Committee ".

Such attention from the top party leadership to the fate of the new committee is not accidental. A bureaucratic monster arose, which actually duplicated both the sectoral departments of the CPSU Central Committee and the apparatus of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, moreover, endowed with greater control powers. Committee employees received the right to conduct special investigations in contact with administrative bodies.

In the central apparatus of the committee, a system of departments and sectors was created that reproduced the structure of the national economy, social sphere, administrative and military bodies of the USSR.

There were, in particular: departments of party-state control: department of metallurgical industry and geology, heavy industry, fuel industry sector, general engineering sector, heavy sector, transport department of party-state control for transport and communications, sector of energy and electrification of heavy industry, the general engineering sector, the construction industry sector, the urban and rural construction sector, architecture and design organizations, the food and fishing industry sector, and so on and so forth. . .

The staffing level matched this. Instead of Khrushchev's 80-100 people, who, as he assumed, would work in the new control body, by the time of its establishment the committee already had 383 “responsible employees” and 90 technical workers on its staff. And this is only the central apparatus and only in the first days!

The creation of the committee became an essential part of the entire reform of party and Soviet bodies. At a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on December 20, 1962, the issue of “On the reorganization of leading party bodies in regions, territories, autonomous and union republics” was considered. In the decision on this issue it was written: “In accordance with the resolution of the November (1962) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee On the construction of party organizations from bottom to top according to the production principle, the CPSU Central Committee decides: ... in the newly formed industrial and rural regional committees, regional committees and the party must There are, as a rule, four secretaries of the regional committee, one of whom is the head of the ideological department, and the other is the chairman of party-state control, as well as the corresponding department.

The same system was duplicated at the level of local Soviets - the chairman of the regional committee of party-state control was also one of the deputy chairmen of the regional executive committee.

This was a truly unique situation! The Committee of Party-State Control at all its levels - from central to district - actually duplicated both the party and the Soviet system, having, moreover, the right to conduct investigations, impose penalties and fines on those responsible, and transfer cases to the prosecutor's office and the court. In March-April 1963, the Committee of Party and State Control of the USSR received the right to control the armed forces, the State Security Committee and the Ministry of Public Order.

Power slowly flowed from Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev to his protege, Alexander Nikolaevich Shelepin.

By April 1963, 3,270 party-state control committees had been created in the country, including 15 republican, 216 regional and regional, 1,057 city and district in cities, 348 for zones, enterprises and construction sites, collective and state farms, 170 thousand groups and 270 thousand posts of people's control, to which more than 2 million 400 thousand people were elected.

Despite all this, the huge machine was spinning without much effect. There was no expected economic effect from the activities of the army of controllers. The shortcomings identified by the CPC in the production of tires at the Yaroslavl plant, the additions at the Minsk Radio Plant, the facts of localism on the part of workers of the Council of National Economy of the RSFSR, abuses in the sale of passenger cars in Moscow - all this clearly did not correspond to the scope and powers of the CPC.

The matter, as it seems to us, was different. Khrushchev was beaten. He wanted to strengthen control, but he himself found himself blocked by the system that he proposed. The CCP was ideally suited to creating the preconditions for the organizational elimination of Khrushchev. Shelepin’s power turned out to be more real, better organized, and therefore more dangerous for any official than the power of the very first secretary and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Khrushchev.

Let us note another paradox: the CCP system itself became an additional irritating factor AGAINST Khrushchev. It is no coincidence that Brezhnev, soon after the removal of Khrushchev, tried to get rid of the CCP.

Note

1. AP RF, f. 3, op. 55, no. 26
2. Khrushchev times. Publ. N. A. Barsukova // Unknown Russia. Vol. 1, M., 1992, p. 286
3. AP RF, f. 3, op. 55, d. 23, l. 1
4. AP RF, f. 3, op. 55, d. 23, l. 3-5
5. Ibid., l. 10-13
6. Ibid., l. 14
7. Ibid., l. 16
8. Ibid., l. 17
9. Ibid., l. 2
10. Khrushchev times. Recorded by N. A. Barsukov. // Unknown Russia. Vol. 1, M., 1992, p. 286
11. AP RF, f, 3, op. 55, d. 24, l. 1
12. Ibid., l. 48
13. Ibid., l. 50
14. AP RF, f. 3, op. 55, l. 106
15. Ibid., ll. 151-160, 191-192

October Revolution

The circumstances of the immediate preparation for the removal of Khrushchev will never be fully clarified. With a minimum of written evidence (moreover, edited with the participation of interested parties - participants in these events) and the presence of memories of these same people, many “technical” details remain unclear. But the main events can well be reconstructed. It is clear that already in 1962 the failure of the main goals of the just adopted new Program of the CPSU - the program of “expanded construction of communism” - became obvious. Failure in the field of agriculture was inevitably associated with Khrushchev's personal defeat. In 1962 - 1963, food cards were introduced in most cities and workers' towns of the country. There was a shortage of essential foodstuffs. Food had to be urgently purchased abroad. Funds were needed. In 1963, the USSR State Fund sold for export a record amount of post-war period the amount of gold is 520.3 tons, of which 372.2 tons went directly to the purchase of food.

Attempts to create a parity with the United States, no longer in competition in agriculture, but in the military-political field, by placing Soviet missiles in Cuba, failed, including due to Khrushchev’s characteristic desire to “personalize” future success, to link the signing of the Soviet Cuban Treaty with Khrushchev's upcoming visit to Cuba in November 1962. The result is known - peace on the brink of war, the forced and public evacuation of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba and secret agreements on the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey and Italy.

In the face of growing political problems, Khrushchev rushed about. His actions are inconsistent and contradictory. One gets the feeling that, while going through options for organizing management, he tried to find for himself those that could stabilize the situation. Hence his proposals for the division of party organizations according to production principles, the desire to strengthen control mechanisms by creating a Committee of Party-State Control. Khrushchev was equally inconsistent in his attitude towards the intelligentsia. On the one hand, there is demonstrative support for the anti-Stalin works of A. T. Tvardovsky, A. I. Solzhenitsyn, E. Yevtushenko, on the other hand, the persecution of “formalists”, the desire to strengthen the party leadership of culture in every possible way.

At the June (1963) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the official speaker, Secretary of the Central Committee L. F. Ilyichev, stated: “The enemies of socialism hoped that, perhaps, along with the elimination of the consequences of the cult of personality, everything done by the party and the people would be undone, the correctness would be called into question historical path chosen by the people. Indeed, some politically immature or embittered people took the bait of bourgeois propaganda... Some representatives of the intelligentsia, including young people who were not ideologically stable enough, picked up the fiction of a generational conflict... " Ilyichev concluded his observations with the conclusion: “it is necessary to strengthen the revolutionary vigilance of the Soviet people.” Examples of revolutionary vigilance at this plenum were successfully demonstrated by Khrushchev himself, who attacked the writer V. Nekrasov and demanded his expulsion from the party. At the same time, Khrushchev insulted scientists and insisted on stopping payments for academic degrees. It seems that Khrushchev had a personal score, a personal disappointment towards science and scientific recommendations, which he was often given and which he often tried to turn into party and state policy.

Khrushchev became unnecessary and burdensome. The isolation around him grew. An interesting photograph has been preserved - the awarding of the first secretary of the Central Committee on April 17, 1964 in connection with his anniversary with another Golden Star. Photographer M. Kulikov was photographing what seemed to be a protocol-ceremonial ceremony - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L. I. Brezhnev awards the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. S. Khrushchev. However, the camera lens captured something very different from this protocol scene. First of all, only two people, as can be seen in the photograph, are seriously engaged in this procedure - Brezhnev, reading out the Decree, solemn and filled with awareness of the importance of the moment, and Khrushchev listening to him, seeming embarrassed, half-smiling either confusedly or mournfully. But members and candidates for members of the Presidium and secretaries of the Central Committee look different. Not a single smile, not even the most conventional expression of joy on this occasion. Judging by the photograph, the other participants in the procedure can easily be divided into two groups. The first - the smaller - are people demonstrating their indifference, self-removal from what is happening. Shvernik closed his eyes and threw his head back, Suslov looked down, looking at the chandeliers in the Ilyichev hall. Most of the top party and state leaders looked at Khrushchev and Brezhnev, looked attentively and intently, with an unkind, studying, evaluative look.

Remembering these days, the then KGB leaders A. N. Shelepin and Semichastny, who replaced him, said: " Back in the spring, on the eve of his 70th birthday (in April), those around him were outraged by his (that is, Khrushchev. - Ed.) intolerance." Khrushchev was fed up. In addition, he became increasingly inconvenient and even dangerous. Inconvenient with his constant and chaotic reforms , which did not give a sense of stability of the party state apparatus, and dangerous, since the discontent of the population, forced to receive food on cards, was directed against it (or, as it was written in the KGB reports, “against one of the leaders of the party and government”) "meant to reduce the level of discontent in the country.

In the summer of 1964, Khrushchev started a new reorganization of the management system in the country. As always, the nearest testing ground for its development was supposed to be agriculture. On July 11, 1964, 1964, at the plenum of the Central Committee there was supposed to be one question - about the appointment of A. I. Mikoyan to the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the associated dismissal of L. I. Brezhnev from the post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council. He was given the position of “second secretary” of the party. However, contrary to the agenda, Khrushchev made a large report at the plenum, in which he tried to justify the need to create so-called specialized production departments, which were supposed to oust party bodies from managing agricultural production. Let me remind you that two years earlier, Khrushchev actually liquidated the most massive party bodies - rural district party committees, replacing them with party committees of production departments. Now it's their turn. In addition, Khrushchev sharply criticized the system of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Agricultural Academy for their inefficiency, threatened to close these academies, and insisted on the transfer of agricultural scientific institutions from Moscow and Leningrad to the provinces.

A week later - July 18 - Khrushchev sent a detailed note to the Presidium of the Central Committee "On the management of agriculture in connection with the transition to the path of intensification." It contained a detailed argumentation of the positions that were expressed by him at the recent plenum. This note exists in two editions. The first is more radical, containing proposals for the creation of a system of Union-Republican departments for the production of agricultural products - for the production of grain, sugar beets, cotton, vegetable oil, potatoes, vegetables, grapes and fruits, meat and milk, pork, poultry, lamb and wool , compound feed, fur farming, beekeeping.

The First Secretary of the Central Committee was faithful to the win-win bureaucratic logic: if you want to solve a problem, create a special institution. Hence the direct consequence is to create a dozen chapters and by this solve agricultural problems. Khrushchev sharply, almost insultingly criticized the agricultural science of that time, but, at the same time, called for increasing the role of industrial science, focused on practical needs, in the specialized departments he organized, and reducing the role of the party apparatus. In the second edition of this note, criticism was muted, although all the main provisions were preserved. A careful study of this note suggests that Khrushchev was preparing a new management reform that affected not only agriculture, but also other sectors of the economy. On July 20, 1964, at the Presidium of the Central Committee, it was decided to send Khrushchev’s note to the localities in order to receive comments from there.

The Presidium of the Central Committee decided to hold a discussion of this note in November 1964. Another personnel shake-up was brewing. On instructions from the Presidium of the Central Committee, D. Polyansky and V. Polyakov prepared in August 1964 the corresponding draft resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers “On the management of agriculture in connection with the intensification and specialization of production.”

But this time the reform failed. The hunt for the main reformer began.

Information about the initial stage of the hunt for Khrushchev is based on the memories of the participants - A. N. Shelepin, V. E. Semichastny, N. G. Egorychev. They reported very important information, but it is difficult and impossible to hear from them the main thing: who, when and why decided to move on to " active actions"against Khrushchev. They unanimously call the main organizer of the "second secretary" - L. I. Brezhnev, and his main associate - N. V. Podgorny. In Semichastny's memoirs it was repeatedly reported that Brezhnev suggested to him - the chairman of the KGB - to eliminate Khrushchev, using this poison, a car or plane crash, arrest him. But Semichastny, according to him, rejected all these options. This version was also published in the book of N. S. Khrushchev’s son - S. N. Khrushchev.

This is one of those cases when historians are left with only speculation. It is unlikely that it will be possible to find any reliable and contemporary sources on this issue. Although contradictions are also obvious in the recollections of the participants who lived until it became possible to talk about the October plenum of 1964. Two people whose influence in the country was enormous - the chairman of the Party and State Control Committee Shelepin and the KGB chairman Semichastny - tend to downplay their role in the preparation plenum. Both claimed that in July they had already spoken openly against Khrushchev.

Judging by some information, an extremely important role in preparing the conspiracy was played by the head of the department of administrative bodies of the CPSU Central Committee N. R. Mironov, who was directly connected with Shelepin and Semichastny, since by status he oversaw the army, state security agencies, the prosecutor's office, the judiciary and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the past, he was the secretary of the district party committee in Dnepropetrovsk, when Brezhnev was the secretary of the regional committee. Before his appointment to the Central Committee, he headed the KGB in Leningrad. Egorychev, at that time the secretary of the Moscow city party committee, recalls that it was Mironov who attracted him to participate in the conspiracy.

According to Shelepin, the plenum was prepared by Brezhnev and Podgorny. " Brezhnev and Podgorny talked with every member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, with every secretary of the Central Committee. They also had conversations with the secretaries of the Central Committee of the union republics and other major organizations, including city committees. There was a conversation with Malinovsky and Kosygin. They talked to me too. I agreed. The final impetus, the “bell” for the convocation, was a new note to Khrushchev, which he handed over before leaving for Pitsunda on vacation, about the next reorganization - the division of management of the entire branch of agricultural production. . . "

The connection between the preparations for the overthrow of Khrushchev and the preparations for the plenum that Khrushchev was preparing is quite obvious. It’s more difficult with the role of Brezhnev. The same Shelepin, Semichastny, Yegorychev in every possible way emphasize Brezhnev’s indecision, his desire to withdraw himself at the most critical moments. Shelepin was not embarrassed by the contradiction between the role he assigned to Brezhnev as the main conspirator and his obvious indecisiveness: “Brezhnev showed cowardice - he left for the GDR. In his absence, they already spoke with Semichastny.” Semichastny immediately began to significantly clarify his colleague: “Already on the eve of the celebration of Khrushchev’s 70th anniversary, there were conversations that this could not be tolerated, that is, this was back in the spring of 1964. And I was among the first with whom they had a conversation...”.

Beyond the information provided, the question remains: Who conducted conversations with Shelepin and Semichastny with proposals to participate in a conspiracy against Khrushchev. Let me remind you that in the spring of 1964 Brezhnev was not the “second secretary”, but held the semi-decorative post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This assumption that behind Brezhnev’s shadow was hiding some other person - influential and decisive - is confirmed by Yegorychev’s memoirs: “When Brezhnev was in the GDR - this was already on the eve of the Plenum - the official visit ended, but he still did not return. here. Went hunting. Semichastny was instructed (by whom? - Author) call him there and say: “If you don’t come, the Plenum will take place without you. Draw your conclusion from here.” And then he arrived urgently."

The fact that the role of Brezhnev and Podgorny in the events related to the removal of Khrushchev, in our opinion, is clearly exaggerated, is evidenced by simple chronological calculations: Brezhnev flew from Berlin on October 11. Podgorny flew to Moscow from Chisinau, immediately before the meeting of the Presidium. Already because neither Brezhnev nor Podgorny were in Moscow immediately before the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee and before the plenum where Khrushchev was overthrown, they could not prepare the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee. But who cooked? Who could order the KGB chairman to call Brezhnev in Berlin and essentially threaten Brezhnev himself?

We believe that such a person was A. N. Shelepin, not a performer, but an organizer of the action to remove Khrushchev. The recent head of the KGB, he only strengthened his position in the leadership, becoming chairman of the Party and State Control Commission and actually subordinating the KGB, the army, and the party and state apparatus to himself. Such activity, as a rule, is always rewarded. Shelepin also received what he deserved; he was relatively soon removed from his post, and his Committee was reorganized and weakened. But in 1964, it was Shelepin who had the opportunity to become the true coordinator of the conspiracy and, in our opinion, became its central figure. And stories about Brezhnev’s special villainous role are most likely a way to deflect possible accusations in the future.

The members of the Presidium agreed in advance on the date of their meeting, which was to become the main link in the procedure for Khrushchev’s removal from power. The deadlines were pressing: the meeting had to take place before the November plenum, at which not only extremely unpopular decisions on changing the agricultural management system could have taken place, but further changes in the personnel of the Presidium could have been achieved

On October 12, a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee met. It was attended by members of the Presidium: G. I. Voronov, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, N. V. Podgorny, D. S. Polyansky, M. A. Suslov, N. M. Shvernik, candidates for members of the Presidium - V.V. Grishin, L.N. Efremov, secretaries of the Central Committee Yu.V. Andropov, P.N. Demichev, L.F. Ilyichev, V.I. Polyakov, B.N. Ponomarev, A.P Rudakov, V. N. Titov, A. N. Shelepin. The meeting was chaired by L. I. Brezhnev. The meeting ended with the adoption of a resolution by the Presidium of the Central Committee, which actually meant the beginning of the process of removing Khrushchev. However, the resolution was titled quite innocently: “On questions that have arisen regarding the upcoming Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the development of a long-term national economic plan for the new period.”

Another thing is the content of this document.

The resolution stated; "1. In connection with requests received by the CPSU Central Committee about ambiguities of a fundamental nature that have arisen regarding issues scheduled for discussion at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in November of this year, and in the development of a new five-year plan, it is considered urgent and necessary to discuss them at the next meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee with the participation of Comrade Khrushchev.

Instruct tt. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov and Podgorny contact Comrade Khrushchev by telephone and convey to him this decision in order to hold a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee on October 13, 1964.

2. In view of many ambiguities arising locally according to Comrade Khrushchev’s note dated July 18, 1964 (Zh P1130) “On the management of agriculture in connection with the transition to the path of intensification,” sent to party organizations, and the confusing instructions contained in it, withdraw the specified note from party organizations.

3. Considering important nature of the issues that have arisen and their upcoming discussion, we consider it advisable to call members of the CPSU Central Committee, candidates for members of the CPSU Central Committee, and members of the CPSU Central Control Commission to Moscow to report to the Plenum on the results of the discussion of issues at the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

The question of the time of holding the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee will be decided in the presence of Comrade Khrushchev."

Khrushchev received a call. They called me to Moscow. On the 13th he flew to the capital and immediately went to the meeting of the Presidium, where everything was already prepared for the second act in this performance. A. I. Mikoyan, who was vacationing with him in Pitsunda, flew in with Khrushchev. Candidates for members of the Presidium, first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties - Georgia - V. P. Mzhavanadze, Belarus - K. T. Mazurov, Uzbekistan - Sh. R. Rashidov, Ukraine - P. E. Shelest - also flew to Moscow for this meeting.

Judging by the memoirs of A. N. Shelepin, the meeting of the Presidium was chaired by Khrushchev. The meeting was well choreographed, and the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee was assigned the role of an extra. Unfortunately, a stenographic recording of this meeting of the Presidium has not been identified and may not exist. Shelepin competed third or fourth. He sharply criticized Khrushchev's domestic and foreign policies. First of all, he suffered from his activities in managing agriculture. Recalling the past, Shelepin recalled his speech this way: “Criticism of Khrushchev’s agricultural policy, very reasoned, since I did not have fake data submitted by the Central Statistical Office, but true data due to the fact that I was the Secretary of the Central Committee, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers - Chairman of the Party Committee -state control. This gave me great advantages over others in knowing the true state of things." (Italics are ours. Author).

Shelepin condemned Khrushchev for his proposal to divide the regional party committees into rural and industrial, characterizing it as “anti-Leninist”, and, frankly speaking, erroneous, since in addition to industry and agriculture there are also military men and students who do not fit into Khrushchev’s division into rural and industrial; he criticized the first secretary of the Central Committee for the fact that personnel, military and political issues were never discussed in the Central Committee.

He pointed out the adventurism in Khrushchev's foreign policy, because of which our country was on the brink of war three times (Suez, Berlin and Caribbean crises). Shelepin was convinced that it was Khrushchev’s fault that the Paris Summit Conference, which opened on May 16, 1960, was disrupted. At the very first meeting, Khrushchev sharply demanded that US President D. Eisenhower apologize for sending a spy plane into Soviet airspace. Eisehower did not apologize. The conference was cancelled. Khrushchev also received punishment for his tactlessness in mixing state and family affairs - for awarding his son, Sergei, with the titles of Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the State Prize, and for family trips abroad. I did not forget to remember how Khrushchev, by his will, awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union not only to the President of Egypt G. Nasser, but also, without any preliminary agreements, to the Vice President of Egypt Amer.

According to Shelepin’s memoirs, Khrushchev was sharply criticized by other participants in the meeting. Mazurov spoke about the oblivion of theoretical work in the party, Kosygin - that Khrushchev with his notes replaced the Central Committee and the government. Khrushchev's few supporters also suffered - the agricultural department of Polyakov, the real author of the ill-fated note on improving agricultural management, Efremov - the first deputy of the Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee for the RSFSR. Khrushchev fought back. However, he was forced to sign a previously printed statement in which he asked to be relieved of the posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and First Secretary of the Central Committee “for health reasons.”

Shelepin reproduced the speech at the Khrushchev Presidium. He said: “I’m not going to fight with you, and I can’t.” He apologized for the rudeness, said that he did not want to combine posts, “but you gave me these two posts!”, expressed the conviction that combining the posts of the first secretary of the Central Committee and the chairman of the Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR will always be, asserted that “corn will continue to be yours.” I'll have to study." He disagreed with the assessment of his role in foreign policy, saying that he was proud of his role in the Suez and Berlin crises; The issue of missile deployment was discussed more than once. He expressed disagreement with criticism against the division of regional committees into rural and industrial. In fact, he did not agree with any of the accusations against him.

And in this most difficult situation, 70-year-old Khrushchev was able to find the exact scale of what was happening, to give an assessment that turned his personal defeat into recognition of the victory of his main political course to change the situation in the CPSU. “I’m worried now, but I’m happy, because the period has come when members of the Presidium of the Central Committee began to control the activities of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and speak out loud... today’s meeting of the Presidium is a victory for the party...” Khrushchev left as a loser, but not defeated. The conspiracy, framed as a regular meeting of the Presidium, completely party-legitimate, but immoral in essence, turned Khrushchev into a victim. And the victim in Russia often becomes a political legend, cute and little similar to his real prototype.

The result of the meeting of the Presidium on October 13-14, 1964 was the adoption of a resolution in which it was reported that “as a result of the mistakes and incorrect actions of Comrade Khrushchev, violating the Leninist principles of collective leadership,” an abnormal situation had developed in the Presidium itself; that Khrushchev, having combined the posts of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, began to escape the control of the CPSU Central Committee. The decision of the Presidium stated that “given the existing negative personal qualities as a worker, advanced age and deteriorating health, Comrade Khrushchev is not able to correct the mistakes made and non-partisan methods in his work.” Hence the conclusion: accept Khrushchev’s statement on his release from all party and government posts “due to advanced age and deteriorating health”, it is considered inappropriate in the future to combine the posts of First Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

The resolution stated that a plenum of the Central Committee was to be convened immediately. It is clear that it was possible to hold a meeting of the Presidium over two days and gather from all the republics, territories and regions of the Soviet Union only when enormous preparatory work had been carried out in advance.

On October 14, the plenum began its work. It was well rehearsed. In fact, the model for resolving organizational issues that was used by Khrushchev himself against Marshal Zhukov in 1957 was used. A short introductory speech by Brezhnev, a detailed report by the “staff rapporteur” at such plenums - Suslov, which turned into an indictment of Khrushchev; Khrushchev himself did not speak at the plenum, the report was not discussed. The party crowd - “voices from the audience” - said what they had to say: “Everything is clear. We propose not to open the debate”; Brezhnev was elected first secretary of the Central Committee, Kosygin - chairman of the Council of Ministers; and with voices from the audience - “Long live our mighty Leninist Party and its Central Committee” - the plenum finished its work.

Based on the results of the plenum, brief information was published in Pravda on October 16. More detailed information was sent to the regional and regional committees of the party. But there were no discussions. This time no “closed letters” were sent to ordinary communists. Experience of the mid-50s. was taken into account.

A month later, a new plenum of the Central Committee was held, at which the most odious decisions of Khrushchev were canceled. The division of party organizations into industrial and rural was eliminated, and the former territorial regional committees were restored.

Khrushchev's resignation demonstrated the victory of the course that was approved by Khrushchev himself: the course towards autocracy of the party apparatus. The words once spoken by Khrushchev in the summer of 1957 that the members of the Presidium were only servants of the plenum were once again confirmed. The Plenum - the highest level of the CPSU party apparatus - dismissed the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, whose actions interfered with and complicated the life of this party apparatus. His successor was supposed to serve this apparatus, guarantee it stability, continuity, the very best impunity. This man was Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. Energetic young leaders - the same Shelepin - should have remained unclaimed. And so it happened.