Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation. “Kutuzov” and “Commander Rumyantsev Belgorod-Kharkov operation

Code name of the plan for the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation, carried out on August 3-23, 1943 by troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, an important stage.

Situation at the beginning of the operation

During the fierce defensive battles of the first period of the Battle of Kursk, the advance of German troops was stopped, which created the preconditions for a strategic offensive operation. The Soviet command sought to liberate the Kharkov industrial region. In turn, this would make it possible to begin the liberation of Left Bank Ukraine.

On the southern front of the Kursk Bulge the following Wehrmacht forces were located: 4th Tank Army (commander - Colonel General G. Hoth), Army Group "Kempf" (commander - General of Tank Forces W. Kempf), 4th Air Fleet (commander - Field Marshal W. von Richthofen). All these formations were part of Army Group South (commander - Field Marshal). In total, the Belgorod-Kharkov group of the Wehrmacht numbered up to 300 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 3 thousand guns and mortars, up to 600 armored vehicles, more than 1 thousand combat aircraft. 15 infantry and 4 tank divisions were in operational reserve. On this section of the front, the German command, trying to forestall a possible attack by Soviet troops in a strategically important direction, deployed elite SS tank divisions: “Viking” (commander - SS Brigadeführer H. Gille), “Reich” (commander - SS Gruppenführer W. Kruger), “Dead Head” (commander - SS Gruppenführer M. Simon).

German troops defended themselves on powerful lines 6-8 kilometers wide, equipped with fortified strongholds connected by communication passages. The most powerfully fortified defense center was the city of Belgorod, prepared for street battles. Near Kharkov, by order of the Wehrmacht command, two ring defensive lines were created.

The offensive of Soviet troops in the Oryol direction that began on July 12, 1943 and the threat of flank attacks in the Prokhorovka area forced Manstein to withdraw his troops to their original positions. On July 16, 1943, the troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive - the 5th Guards (commander - Colonel-General A.S. Zhadov) and the 5th Guards Tank (commander - Lieutenant General of Tank Forces) armies, which, overcoming stubborn resistance enemy, managed to advance 5-6 kilometers. In the following days, the 6th Guards (commander - Colonel General I.M. Chistyakov) and 1st Tank (commander - Lieutenant General of Tank Forces) armies were brought into action. On July 20, 1943, the Steppe Front went on the offensive. The general offensive of two fronts - Voronezh and Steppe - began on July 22, 1943. By the end of the first day of the offensive, they managed to reach the lines occupied before the start of the Battle of Kursk, but were unable to advance further. Realizing the need to regroup and replenish troops, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief decided to conduct a decisive offensive in early August.

The critical situation in the Oryol direction forced Manstein to transfer some of his units there. In addition, tank units suffered heavy losses during Operation Citadel; many combat vehicles were either irretrievably lost or were under repair. All these factors created a favorable environment for conducting an offensive operation.

Operation plan and preparation for it

The development of the plan for the operation, codenamed "Rumyantsev", was carried out by the headquarters of the Voronezh Front. Initially, it was planned to encircle the entire Belgorod-Kharkov group of the Wehrmacht, but this would have required large regroupings of troops, for which there was no time. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief gave only 8 days for the replenishment and rest of units. The strike had to be delivered as quickly as possible in order to prevent the enemy from regrouping and completing repairs to the armored vehicles.

According to the final version of the plan for Operation Rumyantsev, the troops of the Voronezh (commander - army general) and Steppe fronts (commander - colonel general) struck with adjacent flanks, bypassing Kharkov from the west. From the south, the encirclement ring was to be closed by the 57th Army (commander - Lieutenant General N.A. Gagen) of the Southwestern Front. The command set a very high pace of attack - 100-120 kilometers in 3-4 days of attack.

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts were involved in the operation, which, together with the 57th Army, numbered more than 980 thousand soldiers and commanders, more than 12 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.5 thousand combat aircraft. The command had at its disposal 50 rifle divisions, 8 tank and 3 mechanized corps, a number of individual units and formations. The concentration of such forces became possible thanks to the large reserves of Headquarters preserved during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk.

Before the start of offensive battles, measures were taken to disinform the enemy about the location of the main attack. For this purpose, an imitation of a concentration of Soviet armored vehicles was created, which is why Manstein transferred an additional tank division to the wrong area.

Progress of hostilities

The offensive began on August 3, 1943, after massive artillery preparation and air raids. Enemy positions on the Voronezh Front sector were attacked by the 5th Guards, 6th Guards (commander - Lieutenant General of Tank Forces A.G. Kravchenko), 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies. On the very first day, the German defense was broken through to a depth of 8 to 25 kilometers, but the pace of the offensive set by the plan was not maintained. The troops of the Steppe Front also carried out massive artillery bombardment, after which the enemy was attacked by the 1st Mechanized Corps (commander - Lieutenant General of Tank Forces M.D. Solomatin), 53rd (commander - Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov) and 69th I (commander - Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) of the army.

On August 4, 1943, the 5th Guards and 6th Tank Corps made several attempts to take the fortified point of Tomarovka, but, having suffered significant losses, withdrew. At the same time, the activity of the German Air Force sharply increased in the Belgorod area, which delivered strong blows to Soviet tank and mechanized columns. All this led to great losses. However, the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies managed to move forward.

On August 5, 1943, the assault on Belgorod began. The 53rd Army bypassed it from the west, the 69th Army entered its outskirts from the north, and the 7th Guards Army crossed the Seversky Donets River and reached its eastern outskirts. Attacked from three directions, the half-encircled Belgorod garrison of the Wehrmacht offered fierce resistance, but by 18:00 the city was completely cleared. On the same day, in honor of the liberation of Belgorod and Orel, the first fireworks were given in Moscow.

On the same day, the 27th (commander - Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko) and 40th (commander - Lieutenant General) armies were brought into battle, which created a threat of encirclement of the German group in the Tomarovka area. As a result, on August 6, 1943, Manstein withdrew his troops. From that moment on, his main task was to retain the Kharkov industrial region. The command of Army Group South transferred tank divisions there, including the SS.

The Voronezh Front was actively advancing to the south and southwest. Troops of the 5th Guards and 27th armies surrounded a large Wehrmacht group - 2 tank and 2 infantry divisions - in the area of ​​the village of Borisovka, and on August 7, 1943 they defeated it. The 4th Tank Army of the Wehrmacht was saved from complete disaster only by the timely transfer of reserves. On August 9, 1943, after a bloody three-day battle, the city of Zolochev was liberated by troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army. After this, Rotmistrov’s army, which suffered serious losses, was put into reserve and transferred to the Steppe Front.

By that time, Katukov’s army had made a wide hole in the German defenses and was successfully developing an offensive. The Germans made a desperate attempt to attack, forcing its units to go on the defensive, and then partially retreat and encircling a motorized rifle brigade in Vysokopolye, which lost up to half of its personnel. The powerful onslaught of the elite units of the Wehrmacht jeopardized the plan of the Soviet command to encircle Kharkov. On August 14, 1943, Rotmistrov’s army crossed the Merchik River, but was soon also forced to go on the defensive near Bogodukhov, suffering heavy losses in armored vehicles. German counterattacks continued until August 17, 1943, when the front stabilized.

At this time, a large enemy group accumulated in the area of ​​​​the city of Okhtyrka. In order to defeat it, the 47th Army went on the offensive, immediately broke through the German defenses and began to advance inland. The enemy launched a series of fierce counterattacks, inflicting significant losses on the Soviet troops. Therefore, the Soviet command almost in full force transferred Katukov’s army to this area. The divisions “Totenkopf”, “Reich”, “Greater Germany” and other German units forced the attackers to go on the defensive, and the 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps were surrounded - only Katukov’s army arrived in time to release them. It was possible to push back the enemy and liberate Akhtyrka only after the capture of Kharkov, on August 24, 1943.

At this time, the Steppe Front was attacking Kharkov, where the enemy had built powerful defensive lines. The first line of defense - the outer contour - was located at a distance of 8-14 kilometers from the Kharkov outskirts. All settlements included in it are Dergachi, Cherkasskoye, Lozovoye, Tsirkuny. Prelestny, Yuzhny, Vasishchevo - were turned into powerful centers of resistance. Another line of defense was built around Kharkov itself - stone buildings were turned into fortified positions, and minefields were actively used. The city was defended by 7 infantry and 2 tank divisions, although they had suffered certain losses in previous battles, but continued to maintain combat effectiveness. In addition, SS and police units and a number of other units redeployed from Crimea were deployed to help them. Hitler demanded that Manstein hold Kharkov at any cost.

The assault on the outer defensive perimeter began on August 11, 1943, but it was only broken through on August 13, 1943. Until August 17, 1943, there were fierce battles on the outskirts of the city - there were huge losses on both sides. On August 18-22, 1943, the 53rd and 57th armies attempted to cover the city from the northwest and southeast, respectively, in order to encircle the garrison. however, it was not possible to achieve the set goals. The encirclement of Rotmistrov’s army also failed, and again suffered heavy losses. The Reich Division, reinforced with tank units, attacked the Soviet troops. She failed to achieve significant success, but thanks to this blow, Manstein managed to withdraw many units from Kharkov. The general assault on the city took place on the night of August 22-23, 1943. By 12:00 Kharkov was completely liberated.

Results of the operation

During the three-week offensive, Soviet troops advanced 140 kilometers and defeated 15 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. German troops lost more than 10 thousand soldiers and officers killed, more than 32 thousand wounded. more than 9 thousand are missing. Soviet units lost more than 43 thousand soldiers and commanders killed and missing, and more than 134 thousand wounded. The liberation of Kharkov contributed significantly to the final liberation of Donbass and Left Bank Ukraine. A number of units received the honorary names “Belgorod” and “Kharkov” and were transformed into guards. More than 180 soldiers and commanders were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the area of ​​the Kursk salient, the Soviet Army defeated a powerful group of German troops from the best divisions of the Wehrmacht that participated in the operation called “Citadel” - over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized), about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, more than 2,000 aircraft.

The Wehrmacht carefully planned and prepared the offensive in the summer of 1943. To the base of the Kursk Bulge (the front line protruding towards the enemy), the German command transferred the best formations, the latest models of weapons and military equipment. In total, almost 70% of tank, up to 30% of motorized, more than 20% of infantry divisions and over 65% of combat aircraft and the latest tanks operating on the Soviet-German front. All of them were brought together into the Army Group Center, the 4th Tank Army and the Operational Army Group South under the leadership of the Wehrmacht Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General K. Zeitler. The main bet for defeating the grouping of troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts and strategic reserves in the Kursk ledge area was placed on a sudden massive attack by tank forces in narrow breakthrough areas.

The idea of ​​the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was to repel the advance of a large group of Wehrmacht troops by troops of the Central Front from Orel, and from the Belgorod region by troops of the Voronezh Front. After the defense, it was planned for the Soviet troops to launch a counteroffensive in the Oryol direction by the troops of the left wing of the Western, Bryansk and right wing of the Central Front (Operation Kutuzov) and in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction - by the troops of the Voronezh Front and the Steppe Military District in cooperation with the troops of the Southwestern Front (Operation “Commander Rumyantsev”).

A special role was assigned to the strategic reserve of the Headquarters, the Steppe Military District (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), in order to prevent deep breakthroughs of enemy tank groups from both Orel and Belgorod, and when going on a counteroffensive, to increase the force of the strike from the depths. The Soviet command planned, as a result of the summer military operations in the Kursk Bulge area, to defeat the Wehrmacht group and develop a general offensive in the southwestern and western directions in order to liberate the left bank of Ukraine and move the front away from Moscow.

Military historians consider the Battle of Kursk as a unity carried out in two stages with a single strategic concept, general plan and purpose of three major strategic operations - Kursk defensive (July 5 - 23), Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operations (July 12 - August 23).

The defensive operation was characterized by a deeply echeloned formation of troops. They prepared 5-6 defensive lines, developed systems of trenches and other engineering structures in the zones of the Central and Voronezh fronts. In addition, a defensive line of the Steppe Military District was created, and a state defense line was created along the left bank of the Don. The defense near Kursk was prepared primarily as an anti-tank defense.

Soviet troops began active combat operations on July 5 with preemptive artillery counter-preparation 10 minutes before the start of the Nazi offensive.

The German troops, having suffered losses, went on the offensive 2.5 hours late. Hundreds of tanks, assault guns and armored personnel carriers moved towards the positions of the Soviet troops with the support of aviation. The attacks were carried out in converging directions from the north and south under the base of the Kursk ledge. Stubborn, protracted battles ensued. The advancing tanks were met by targeted anti-tank artillery fire, and dense fire from artillery, mortars and multiple rocket launchers scattered the infantry advancing behind the tanks.

On July 6-8, the enemy, introducing new forces, sought to develop the offensive of tank wedges deep into the defense of the Soviet troops. But Soviet troops continued to hold back German attacks and fought fierce battles for every position, every populated area.

Having failed to get through to Kursk through Oboyan, the Germans decided to make a tank breakthrough with more than 700 tanks and assault guns through the village of Prokhorovka. These were the newest "Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" from the German SS tank divisions "Totenkopf", "Reich" and "Adolf Hitler". The Soviet command decided to respond to the enemy with a counterattack.

Early in the morning of July 12, Soviet aviation launched a massive strike against hundreds of enemy tanks advancing. After a short artillery barrage, Soviet tanks launched a counterattack. For the enemy it was unexpected. Two powerful avalanches (over 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns) collided near Prokhorovka. The largest tank battle in the history of World War II and the Great Patriotic War broke out.

Advanced Soviet tanks at top speed, without encountering much opposition from the Nazis, wedged into the battle formations of the German troops and pierced them through. Soon the battle formation consisted of many local battles and fire duels between Soviet and German tank crews. The battlefield turned into a complete hell. Clouds of dust, smoke from artillery shells and burning tanks, exhaust fumes from combat vehicles stretched from horizon to horizon. Ammunition inside the burning tanks exploded, their turrets flew several tens of meters away from the hulls. The tanks, which had lost mobility and maneuverability, fired from the spot, and the crews of the burning vehicles rushed into hand-to-hand combat.

Both sides suffered heavy losses. The greatest tank battle lasted throughout the daylight hours and ended in the complete defeat of the main strike group of German troops, which was unable to complete its task and advance even a kilometer deep into the defense of the Soviet troops.

Having lost more than 400 tanks and assault guns, about 300 vehicles, thousands of soldiers and officers killed on the battlefield near Prokhorovka, the German command over the next three days renewed attempts to break through the defenses of the Voronezh Front, but they were doomed to failure.

In total, during the offensive from July 5, the troops of Hoth and Kempf only managed to wedge into the defensive positions of the Voronezh Front in certain directions - on Oboyansky up to 35 km and on Korochansky up to 12-15 km. This was the maximum that the Germans were able to achieve, while losing more than half of their forces and assets.

From July 16, the Nazis stopped trying to resume the offensive and gradually began to go on the defensive. The initiative completely passed to the Soviet troops, who retained strategic reserves and on July 18, the left flank of the Voronezh Front and the troops of the Steppe Front began pursuing the retreating enemy. By July 23, the position occupied by the Voronezh Front before the start of the enemy offensive had basically been restored.

Defensive battles on the Central Front ended on July 12, on Voronezh - on July 23. The total duration of the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk is 19 days. The total losses of the Soviet side in military equipment are approximately 1,600 tanks and self-propelled guns, 3,900 guns and mortars, 460 aircraft.

The defeat of the enemy’s strike forces created favorable conditions for the Soviet troops, made it possible to launch a counter-offensive and implement plans for two strategic offensive operations - the Oryol (“Kutuzov”) and the Belgorod-Kharkov (“Commander Rumyantsev”) operations.

Oryol (July 12 - August 18) was carried out by troops of the Central (commander K.K. Rokossovsky), Bryansk (commander M.M. Popov) and the left wing of the Western (commander V.D. Sokolovsky) fronts against the 2nd Tank and 9th 1st field army of Army Group Center (commander V. Model). The troops of the 3rd, 61st, 63rd and 11th Guards armies were the first to go on the offensive on July 12. On the second day of the offensive, they broke through the enemy’s defenses and advanced 7-25 km inland. As a result of bloody battles on August 4, troops reached the outskirts of Orel.

On the same day, the troops of the Voronezh (commander N.F. Vatutin) and Steppe (commander I.S. Konev) fronts went on the offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. They were opposed by the German 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf, occupying pre-prepared defensive lines.

The total offensive front of the five Soviet fronts is about 600 km. On August 5 they liberated Oryol and Belgorod. To commemorate this event, the first artillery salute of the war was held in Moscow.

The Soviet offensive continued. By August 18, the Germans were driven out of the Oryol salient. The Oryol bridgehead itself was liquidated, and the Oryol offensive operation, which lasted 38 days on a front of about 400 km, was completed.

The troops of the Steppe Front, with the support of troops of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts, reached the approaches to Kharkov. After a powerful night attack on the morning of August 23, he was released. Moscow saluted again. Now to the liberators of Kharkov. The victory fireworks became a tradition.

The Belgorod-Kharkov strategic operation, which lasted 21 days (August 3 - 23) on a front of 300-400 km, marked the end of the Battle of Kursk, which lasted almost without a break for 50 days and nights. It enriched Soviet military art with the experience of expedient massing and concentration of forces and means in the main directions. As a result, significant superiority over the enemy in means of destruction and development of success were achieved. Operationally new were powerful second echelons of fronts and mobile groups within tank armies. And to develop the success of the Voronezh Front, Headquarters gave 2 tank armies under operational subordination. The tactics of the offensive battle in the Battle of Kursk led to the need to build deeply echeloned combat formations of units and formations. The density of forces and resources has also increased.

The outcome of the Battle of Kursk shook Nazi Germany and its satellites to the core. The defeat was not only stunning for the Germans, but also difficult to explain. The German generals faced the formidable specter of an impending catastrophe, defeat in the war. After the Battle of Kursk, the Germans were unable to carry out a single strategic offensive operation. This was the beginning of the collapse of the Third Reich.

The results of the Battle of Kursk also had a foreign policy effect. In September 1943, Italy capitulated, and conditions were agreed upon for the speedy opening of a second front in Europe by the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.

The radical change that began at Stalingrad during the Great Patriotic War in favor of the Soviet troops turned into irreversible.

Nikolay ROYANOV, candidate of military sciences, professor

A new book from the author of the bestsellers “Penal Battalions and Barrier Detachments of the Red Army” and “Armored Troops of the Red Army.” THE FIRST study of the history of the creation and combat use of Soviet tank armies during the Great Patriotic War.

They have come a long and difficult path from the first failures and defeats of 1942 to the triumph of 1945. They distinguished themselves in all the major battles of the second half of the war - on the Kursk Bulge and in the Battle of the Dnieper, in the Belarusian, Yasso-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and other strategic offensive operations. Possessing crushing power and phenomenal mobility, the Guards tank armies became the elite of the Red Army and the main striking force of the “Russian blitzkriegs” that broke the back of the previously invincible Wehrmacht.

In accordance with the plan of the operation “Commander Rumyantsev”, set out in the chapter “First Guards Tank Army”, the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army were to build on their success in the direction of Zolochev, Olshany, by the end of the third day to capture the area of ​​Olshany, Lyubotin and cut off the Kharkov retreat routes groups to the west. The depth of the task is about 100 km.

10 days were allotted to prepare for the offensive. During this time, the command staff of the 5th Guards Tank Army studied the terrain in the zone of upcoming actions, the nature of the enemy’s defense and organized cooperation. At the same time, military equipment was repaired and supplies were replenished. Telephone and radio communications, as well as communications using mobile devices, were organized with all interacting parts and connections. The army created operational groups that were supposed to move behind the first echelon of advancing troops. In preparation for the offensive, training and exercises were conducted on sandboxes with headquarters officers to practice command and control. Much attention was paid to carrying out measures to disinform the enemy, which made it possible to attract his attention to the Sumy direction and ensure surprise in attacks in the Belgorod area. The army headquarters worked out a plan of interaction and a scheme for introducing the army into battle. Support issues were reflected in the plans of the chiefs of engineering troops, intelligence and army logistics. The political department drew up a work plan for the period from August 2 to August 5.

The army included one mechanized and two tank corps, a separate tank, motorcycle, two self-propelled artillery, howitzer artillery, anti-tank artillery, guards mortar and light bomber regiments, an anti-aircraft artillery division and a separate engineering battalion (see table No. 39). The army had 550 tanks.

Table No. 39

General Rotmistrov decided to lead the army into the breakthrough in a two-echelon formation: in the first - the 18th and 29th Tank Corps, in the second - the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. The detachment of General K.G. was allocated to the reserve. Trufanova. To coordinate issues of interaction between the 5th Guards Army, the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies at the command post of the commander of the 5th Guards Army, General A.S. Zhadov held a meeting. On it are generals A.S. Zhadov, P.A. Rotmistrov and M.E. Katukov discussed all issues of interaction at the stages of the operation, outlined the routes of movement of the tank corps introduced into the breakthrough in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army.

On the evening of August 2, units of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army (18th and 29th Tank Corps) began moving to their original areas. At two o'clock in the morning on August 3, they concentrated on the line Bykovka, Krapivenskie Dvory, where army artillery, deployed the day before the tanks arrived, took up firing positions.

On the morning of August 3, after powerful artillery and air preparation, the strike forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts went on the offensive. At the same time, the partisans began carrying out Operation Rail War behind enemy lines. On the Voronezh Front, the 5th and 6th Guards armies had advanced only 4–5 km by mid-day. Therefore, to build up the strike in the zone of the 5th Guards Army, formations of the first echelon of tank armies and the 5th Guards Tank Corps were introduced into the battle. The entry was carried out in a narrow zone: the 1st Tank Army - 4–6 km, and the 5th Guards Tank Army - about 5 km. From the air, General Rotmistrov's formations were supported by the 291st assault aviation division of General A.N. Vitruk and the 10th Fighter Aviation Corps of Colonel M.M. Golovni.

Developing the success of the rifle divisions, the tank armies completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone, advanced units reached the Tomarovka, Orlovka line, advancing 12–26 km. As a result, the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance were separated. In the offensive zone of the 53rd and 69th armies of the Steppe Front, the 1st Mechanized Corps was introduced into the battle, which completed the breakthrough of the main enemy defense line and entered the area north of Rakov.

On the morning of August 4, the strike force of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy. By nine o'clock the forward detachments of the first echelon corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army reached Orlovka and Kozichev. But here they were stopped by the German 6th Panzer Division, reinforced by units of other formations. The enemy, relying on pre-prepared defenses along the impassable Gostenka River, offered stubborn resistance. As a result, part of the 18th Tank Corps of General A.V. Egorova were forced to pause the offensive. The 29th Tank Corps of General I.F. also did not advance. Kirichenko. The army commander was forced to bring up artillery and bring the second echelon of the army into the battle - the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps of General B.M. Skvortsova. He was ordered to strike at Kazachev, Udy, bypassing the left flank of the enemy’s 6th Panzer Division and by the end of the day to reach the Zolochev area. But this plan remained unrealized, since the commander of the Voronezh Front demanded that the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps be turned to Belgorod in order to assist the troops of the Steppe Front in capturing the city.

General Rotmistrov, left without a second echelon, urgently brought his reserve into the battle (the detachment of General K.G. Trufanov), giving it the same task as the 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps. At the same time, the 18th Tank Corps was ordered to bypass Orlovka from the northwest to Gomzino, and the 29th Tank Corps, in cooperation with the troops of the 5th Guards Army, destroyed the enemy in the Orlovka area.

Carrying out the assigned tasks, the 18th Tank Corps, having bypassed Orlovka from the west, by five o'clock in the evening on August 5, with the forces of the 110th Tank and 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigades, reached the Gomzino line and launched an attack on Shchetinovka. Units of the 29th Tank Corps, having captured Orlovka, developed their success to the southwest. The 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps in the Grezny area came into contact with units of the 1st Mechanized Corps. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front liberated Belgorod.

To increase the pace of the offensive, General Rotmistrov ordered the first echelon formations to conduct combat operations at night. At the same time, tank brigades, advancing in the second echelon of corps and, therefore, having a lower daily consumption of ammunition and fuel, advanced to the first echelon by nightfall. At this time, the rear was being pulled up, ammunition, fuel, and tanks restored by repairmen were brought in for the withdrawn units of the first echelon. This refreshment of forces made it possible to maintain a high tempo of the offensive. On the night of August 8, the 181st Tank Brigade of Lieutenant Colonel V.A. Puzyreva, acting as an advance detachment of the 18th Tank Corps, went behind enemy lines along an overgrown country road and suddenly burst into the city of Zolochev. The main forces of the corps, having knocked out the enemy from Shchetinovka and Uda, came to the aid of the 181st Tank Brigade. By evening, the enemy was completely defeated and thrown back from Zolochev to the southwest.

On August 7, the 6th Tank Corps of the 1st Tank Army liberated Bogodukhov with a sudden attack, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps liberated Grayvoron, cutting off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and south.

As a result of the successful actions of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, the enemy’s defenses were broken through in a strip 120 km wide. Formations of the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies advanced up to 100 km, and the combined arms armies advanced 60–65 km. This forced the enemy to begin advancing to the Belgorod-Kharkov direction the divisions “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Viking”, the 3rd Panzer Division from Donbass and the motorized division “Great Germany” from the Orel region.

On August 6, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the commander of the Steppe Front, General I.S. Konev was introduced to I.V. Stalin's plan to defeat the enemy in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction in two stages.

At the first stage, the troops of the 53rd Army with the 1st Mechanized Corps were to advance along the Belgorod-Kharkov highway, delivering the main blow in the direction of Dergachi with access to the Olshany-Dergachi line, where they would replace units of the 5th Guards Army. The 69th Army was entrusted with the task of advancing in the direction of Cheremoshny, capturing this settlement and then moving into the reserve of the Steppe Front. Formations of the 7th Guards Army were ordered to advance from the Pushkarny area to Brodok and Bochkovka, to capture the line of Cherkasskoye, Lozovoye, Tsirkuny, Klyuchkin. Part of the army's forces were to advance on Murom and Ternovaya in order to help the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front cross the river. Seversky Donets in the Rubezhnoye area, Stary Saltov. This army was ordered to strike in the direction of Nepokrytaya, state farm named after. Frunze. At the same time, it was proposed to transfer the army to the Steppe Front.

To carry out the second stage (Kharkov operation), it was planned to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army to the Steppe Front, which was supposed to reach the Olshany, Stary Merchik, Ogultsy area. The operation was planned to be carried out as follows. The troops of the 53rd Army, in cooperation with the 5th Guards Tank Army, were supposed to cover Kharkov from the west and southwest. The 7th Guards Army was to advance from north to south from the Tsirkuna and Dergachi lines, from the east from the State Farm line. Frunze, Rogan, covering Kharkov from the south - the 57th Army. The troops of the 69th Army were planned to be deployed at the junction between the 5th Guards and 53rd armies in the Olshany area with the task of advancing south to support the Kharkov operation from the south. The left flank of the Voronezh Front was to be brought to the line of Otrada, Kolomak, Snezhkov Kut. This task was to be completed by the 5th Guards Army and the left flank of the 27th Army. The 1st Tank Army was planned to be concentrated in the area of ​​​​Kovyagi, Alekseevka, Merefa.

At the same time, it was proposed that the forces of the Southwestern Front strike from the Zamosc region on both banks of the river. Mzha na Merefu. Part of the forces of the front was to advance through Chuguev to Osnova, as well as clear the forest south of Zamosc from the enemy and reach the line of Novoselovka, Okhochaya, Verkhniy Bishkin, Geevka.

To carry out the second stage of the operation, Marshal Zhukov and General Konev asked to allocate 35 thousand reinforcements, 200 T-34 tanks, 100 T-70 tanks and 35 KB tanks, four regiments of self-propelled artillery, two engineering brigades and 190 aircraft to strengthen the troops.

Stalin approved the presented plan. According to his decision, from 24 hours on August 8, the 57th Army was transferred to the Steppe Front from the Southwestern Front with the task of assisting the main group of the Steppe Front in capturing the city by attacking Kharkov from the south. The main task of the South-Western Front is to deliver the main blow to the south in the general direction of Golaya Dolina, Krasnoarmeyskoye, defeat the Donbass enemy group in cooperation with the Southern Front and capture the Gorlovka, Stalino (Donetsk) region. The Southern Front was to deliver the main blow in the general direction of Kuibyshevo and Stalino with the aim of connecting with the strike group of the Southwestern Front. Readiness for the offensive of the Southwestern and Southern fronts - August 13–14. Marshal Zhukov was entrusted with coordinating the actions of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, and Marshal Vasilevsky - the Southwestern and Southern fronts.

The troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army, transferred to the Steppe Front on August 9, began regrouping in the Bogodukhov area the next day. The main forces of the 1st Tank Army by this time had reached the river. Merchik. Troops of the 6th Guards Army reached the Krasnokutsk region, and formations of the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. The troops of the Steppe Front approached the outer defensive perimeter of the city and hung over it from the north. Units of the 57th Army, transferred to the Steppe Front on August 8, approached Kharkov from the southeast.

On August 10, Stalin sent directive No. 30163 to the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Zhukov, on the use of tank armies to isolate the Kharkov enemy group:

“The headquarters of the Supreme High Command considers it necessary to isolate Kharkov by quickly intercepting the main railway and highway routes in the directions to Poltava, Krasnograd, Lozovaya and thereby speed up the liberation of Kharkov.

For this purpose, Katukov’s 1st Tank Army cut the main routes in the area of ​​Kovyaga, Valka, and the 5th Guards. Rotmistrov's tank army, bypassing Kharkov from the southwest, cut the tracks in the Merefa area" .

Field Marshal E. von Manstein, trying to eliminate the breakthrough of the Soviet troops, pulled up the 3rd Panzer Corps (about 360 tanks) to Kharkov, which he intended to use together with the Kempf task force to strike the eastern flank of the wedged Soviet troops. “At the same time,” writes Manstein, “the 4th Tank Army was supposed to strike the western flank with the forces of two tank divisions returned by the Center group and one motorized division. But it was clear that these forces and the group’s forces in general could no longer hold the front line.”

On August 11, a counter battle took place between the enemy’s 1st Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps, during which he managed to stop the army’s troops. On the same day, the Supreme High Command Headquarters, by its directive No. 30164, ordered the commander of the Steppe Front troops to take all measures to ensure that the 5th Guards Tank Army, without expecting complete concentration, marches along the route Kovyagi, Valki, Novaya Vodolaga and closes the enemy’s escape routes from the area Merefa. Part of the forces needed to take crossings on the river. Mzha on the Sokolovo, Merefa site.

On the morning of August 12, a counter battle broke out again between the 1st Tank Army (134 tanks) and the 3rd Tank Corps (about 400 tanks), during which the enemy forced the army to go on the defensive and then pushed it back 3–4 km. In the middle of the day, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps came to the aid of the 1st Tank Army. Together they stopped the enemy. The next day, formations of the 6th and 5th Guards armies entered the battle. With the support of front-line aviation, ground troops inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and then threw them back to their original position.

After this, the troops of the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies went on the defensive. It was carried out in those combat formations in which they conducted offensive operations, trying to concentrate the main efforts on consolidating the occupied line. Therefore, the second echelons and reserves of the corps were located at a distance of 2–3 km from the front edge, and then the depth of defense gradually increased. The defense was focal in nature with the creation of a system of tank ambushes, anti-tank areas and mine-explosive barriers. The ambushes were located in a checkerboard pattern at a depth of 2–3 km, together with submachine gunners and anti-tank artillery units. Anti-tank areas (an anti-tank artillery division or regiment in each) were created in the corps and army units in the most important directions.

Tank armies had a single-echelon formation and rather low densities of forces and means. They carried out defensive actions together with suitable rifle formations of combined arms armies: the 1st Tank Army with the 23rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 6th Guards Army; 5th Guards Tank Army with the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Army.

A quick transition to the defensive and its skillful conduct allowed the 5th Guards Tank Army to repel enemy counterattacks. At the same time, she suffered minor losses over the course of three days - only 38 tanks and self-propelled guns.

On August 12, the Supreme Command Headquarters, by directive No. 10165, assigned new tasks to the troops of the Voronezh, Steppe and Southwestern Fronts. They are described in detail in the chapter “The First Guards Tank Army”. Let us only recall that the Voronezh Front was ordered to strike the 1st Tank Army in the general direction of Valki, Novaya Vodolaga, together with the 5th Guards Tank Army, to cut off the retreat routes of the Kharkov group to the south and southwest. After its defeat and capture of the city of Kharkov, it was prescribed to continue the offensive in the general direction of Poltava, Kremenchug and by August 23–24 to reach the line Yareski station, Poltava, (leg.) Karlovka with the main forces. In the future it was planned to go to the river. Dnieper in the Kremenchug, Orlik section, providing for the capture of river crossings by moving parts. To ensure the offensive of the strike group, it was necessary for the right wing of the front to reach the river by August 23–24. Psel, where to firmly gain a foothold.

Meanwhile, the enemy did not abandon his plan. After unsuccessful attempts to break through the defenses of the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army, he decided to bypass it from the left flank. On August 15, units of the SS tank division "Reich" broke through the defenses of the 13th Guards Rifle Division, defending on the left flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, and rushed in the direction of Lozovaya, Bogodukhov. General Rotmistrov at 10 o’clock on August 16 ordered the 53rd Tank Regiment (general reserve) and the army’s artillery and anti-tank reserve to move from Bogodukhov to the area south of Lozovaya. By three o'clock in the afternoon they arrived in the designated area, took up defensive positions and, having met the enemy with fire of all means, stopped his advance. The timely maneuver of the reserves greatly contributed to the enemy's refusal to undertake further offensive actions in this direction.

The enemy launched a new attack on the morning of August 18 from the Akhtyrka area with the forces of two tank and two motorized divisions and a separate tank battalion equipped with Tiger and Panther tanks. They managed to break through the defenses of the 27th Army. At the same time, from the area south of Krasnokutsk, the Totenkopf tank division attacked Kaplunovka. The attempt by the commander of the Voronezh Front to defeat the enemy’s Akhtyrka group with a counterattack was unsuccessful. He managed to stop the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front and even push them back in some places. After Stalin’s intervention, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Zhukov, and the commander of the Voronezh Front took measures to localize the breakthrough of the enemy’s Akhtyrka group. The 4th Guards Army with the 3rd Guards Tank Corps and the 47th Army with the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were brought into the battle. By August 27, they, in cooperation with the troops of the 27th and 6th Guards Armies, the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, defeated the enemy’s Akhtyr group and began to advance towards the Dnieper.

During these days, the 53rd Army of the Steppe Front continued to push back the enemy in the Kharkov direction. The 1st Mechanized Corps began fighting for Peresechnaya, and rifle units cleared the forest northwest of Kharkov. The troops of the 69th Army began to flow around Kharkov from the northwest and west. To speed up the liberation of the city, the 5th Guards Tank Army (without the 29th Tank Corps) was transferred from near Bogodukhov to the area northwest of Kharkov. Breaking enemy resistance, units of the 18th Tank and 5th Guards Zimovnikovsky Mechanized Corps liberated Korotich by the end of the day on August 22, and the tank brigades of the 57th Army reached the Bezlyudovka line and further south, enveloping the Kharkov enemy group from the southeast. On the night of August 23, the assault on the city began. In the morning, Kharkov was completely cleared of the enemy.

With the liberation of Kharkov, the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation ended, and with it the entire Battle of Kursk. Their results are summarized in the chapter devoted to the 1st Guards Tank Army.

On August 3, 1943, the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev) began. The operation was carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, with the aim of defeating the Belgorod-Kharkov group of the German army, liberating the Kharkov industrial region, and creating the preconditions for the final liberation from the occupiers of Left Bank Ukraine. The Voronezh and Steppe Fronts took part in the operation, as well as the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front: more than 980 thousand people, over 12 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.5 thousand. airplanes. In total, by the beginning of the offensive on August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts had 50 rifle divisions, 8 tank corps, 3 mechanized corps, several separate tank regiments and self-propelled artillery regiments.

From the Wehrmacht side, the 4th Panzer Army, the Kempf Army Group and the 4th Air Fleet took part in the battle: about 300 thousand people, more than 3 thousand guns and mortars, about 600 tanks and over 1 thousand aircraft (according to Soviet data); 200 thousand people and 210 tanks (according to German data). The Wehrmacht had 15 infantry divisions and 4 tank divisions in operational reserve in this direction (6th, 7th, 11th and 19th). Already during the battle, the German command transferred from Donbass and the Oryol direction the SS Viking Panzer Division and the 17th Panzer Division, the SS Panzer Divisions "Great Germany", "Reich", "Totenkopf" and the 3rd Panzer Division. The Kharkov group was also reinforced with three infantry divisions.

It is officially believed that the beginning of the offensive operation of Soviet troops on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge began on August 3, but this is not entirely true. On July 16, the German command, fearing that the troops stationed in the Prokhorovka area would become victims of flank attacks by the Red Army, ordered a retreat to their original positions under the cover of strong rearguards. The offensive of the Western and Bryansk fronts, which began on July 12, and the offensive of the Central Front on the Oryol Bulge on July 15, also played a role. The troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on July 16. On July 17, units of the 5th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army were able to push back the German rearguards and advance 5–6 kilometers. On July 18–19, the 6th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army joined the offensive. Tank formations advanced 2–3 km.

On July 18, the Steppe Front under the command of Ivan Konev was supposed to enter the battle, but until the end of July 19, he was regrouping forces. Only on July 20 did the troops of the Steppe Front manage to advance 5–7 km. On July 22, units of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts launched a general offensive and by the end of the next day, having knocked down German barriers, they generally reached the positions occupied by Soviet troops before the start of Operation Citadel on July 5. However, further advance of the Soviet troops was stopped by German forces, which relied on the previous defensive lines and received reinforcements. The headquarters proposed to immediately continue the offensive, but for its success it was necessary to regroup forces and replenish units with personnel and equipment. After listening to the arguments of the front commanders, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command postponed the date of further offensive until the beginning of August.

Plans of the Soviet command, preparation of the operation

The offensive operation plan was prepared by the headquarters of the Voronezh Front on instructions from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The operation was called “Commander Rumyantsev”, in honor of the great Russian commander of the 18th century, the winner of the Prussian troops Frederick the Great and the Turkish troops at Larga, Kagul. The first version of the operation provided for the encirclement of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group. The commander of the Voronezh Front, Nikolai Vatutin, wanted to carry out the classic version of encircling and destroying enemy troops with converging attacks (“cannes”). They planned to deliver one strike in the Krasnopolye area, the other in the Chuguev area. One strike group was supposed to bypass Kharkov from the south, advancing to the west. The second group was supposed to advance from north to south, bypassing Kharkov from the west. If the operation had been successful, the 4th Tank Army and the Kempf group would have fallen into the “cauldron,” i.e., almost the entire Belgorod-Kharkov group of the Wehrmacht. The second scenario was less ambitious and ambitious. It was proposed to deliver the main attacks from the Proletarsky - Krasnaya Yaruga and Chuguev area. If the operation was successful, the entire Kempf group and most of the 4th Panzer Army would be surrounded.

However, to implement both variants of the offensive operation, it was necessary to concentrate large strike groups on the flanks, which would break through the enemy’s defensive formations and break through to a depth of 250 km. To create them, it was necessary to carry out a series of regroupings of forces, which took a lot of time. In addition, the possibility of detection of these regroupings by German intelligence increased. The rate was not happy with this development of events. Stalin gave about 8 days to replenish units, transport ammunition and rest. The current situation required a strike as soon as possible. Soviet intelligence informed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the Belgorod-Kharkov group was seriously weakened at that time. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was transferred to the Donbass, and the SS Panzer Division “Great Germany” was transferred to the Oryol direction. This was caused by the offensive of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts in the Donbass and the Western and Bryansk Fronts on the Oryol Bulge. However, both offensives of the Soviet troops were already running out of steam, and it was necessary to hurry while the German elite divisions were tied up in battles in the Donbass and in the Orel region. In addition, after Operation Citadel, a significant number of German tanks and assault guns were under repair. The armored units were being replenished with equipment. So in Army Group South on July 31, 1942 there were 625 combat-ready tanks, 633 were under repair, 190 were on the way, 251 were combat-ready assault guns, 84 were under repair, 11 were on the road. Most of the equipment required short-term repairs lasting 6–21 days. If the preparation for Operation Rumyantsev had been delayed for a longer period, Army Group South would have seriously strengthened its anti-tank potential.

The strike had to be delivered as quickly as possible, until the German troops recovered from Operation Citadel. Based on the instructions of the Headquarters, an offensive plan was developed. The main blow was delivered by the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts, bypassing Kharkov from the west. This plan provided a significant gain in time, since there was no need to regroup forces. During previous battles, on the left flank of the Voronezh Front and the right flank of the Steppe Front there were already established strike groups. In addition, they planned to attack along the rivers, which weakened their defensive potential. After the strike groups of two fronts entered the area west of Kharkov, the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front was to begin an offensive to meet them. As a result, the idea of ​​​​encircling German troops was retained. But the surrounded territory was smaller, and the strike force of the Voronezh Front was stronger than that of the Steppe Front. The offensive plan included very high rates of movement of strike groups. In 3-4 days they had to advance 100-120 km. Such a rapid rush should have led to the defeat of the Belgorod-Kharkov group before the arrival of German reserves. From the air, the Voronezh Front was supported by the 2nd Air Army (753 aircraft), the Steppe Front by the 5th Air Army (769 aircraft).

For such an offensive, fresh forces were needed. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts withstood the German offensive, but suffered serious losses. However, the Headquarters had reserves. Even during the preparation of the defensive operation on the Kursk salient, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed very powerful reserves in case of a negative development of the situation. Even if the German armies had been able to cut off the Kursk ledge, encircling significant forces of the Voronezh and Central fronts, the disaster would not have occurred. The Soviet command had a whole new front capable of closing the gap. Partial reserve armies had to be used during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk; the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle.

But most of the reserves were retained. They were used during Operation Rumyantsev. The steppe front was reinforced by the 53rd Army under the command of Ivan Managarov. The Voronezh Front received the 27th Army under the command of Sergei Trofimenko and the 47th Army of Pyotr Kozlov (from August 3, the army was led by Pavel Korzun). The 4th Guards Army of Grigory Kulik remained in reserve, they planned to use it to develop success or parry enemy attacks. In addition, the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army, which suffered significant losses in defensive battles, received reinforcements.

Konev placed Managarov's 53rd Army at the forefront of the frontal attack; it was supposed to deliver the main blow. Vatutin did not transfer fresh armies to the strike group; there were already serious forces there - the 5th and 6th Guards Armies, the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army. Therefore, the 27th Army had to advance together with the 40th Army, west of the main grouping of the Voronezh Front. Their strike was aimed at the southeast, in the Grayvorona area. The 47th reinforced the 38th Army on the western flank of the front.

In addition, the auxiliary strike group from the 40th and 27th armies solved the problem of possible German counterattacks against the main grouping of the Voronezh Front. If German troops tried to strike at the base of the Soviet strike force, then the 40th and 27th armies would have to take the blow. If the German reserves had attacked the flank of the Soviet tank armies enveloping Kharkov, they, in turn, would have been attacked by the advancing 40th and 27th armies. To fend off possible German attacks, these two armies received three tank corps (more than 400 tanks). Thus, the armored potential of the 40th and 27th armies was comparable to an entire tank army (the 1st Tank Army had 450 tanks). In addition, the 4th Guards Army was located in their rear.

Before the offensive, the Voronezh Front carried out an operation to mislead the enemy regarding the area where Soviet troops would deliver the main blow. To the west of the assembled strike force, in the Sudzhi area, a concentration of large armored and rifle formations was simulated. For camouflage, 8 radio stations, 450 tank models and 500 gun models were used. The radio stations imitated the operation of tank radios. The infantry moved towards the front. These events led to success. The German command concentrated the 7th Panzer Division to protect this direction. The activity of German aviation in the Sudzha area also intensified and began bombing “concentrations” of Soviet troops.

German defense

The Belgorod-Kharkov group consisted of 15 infantry and 4 tank divisions. The German infantry divisions suffered serious losses in Operation Citadel and have not yet had time to fully restore their combat potential. The German tank divisions were replenished with personnel and, having repaired the damaged tanks, were in good condition.

After the withdrawal of troops to their original positions, the Germans went on the defensive in well-fortified positions. The main line of defense was 6-8 km wide and consisted of two positions that had strongholds connected by trenches and communication trenches. The second defensive line was located 2-3 km from the front line, having various engineering and barrier structures and long-term firing points. The total tactical defense zone of the German troops was 15-18 km. All settlements in the defensive zone were prepared for all-round defense. The powerful strongholds of Tomarovka and Borisovka were of particular importance. Belgorod was a powerful defense center. 50-60 km from the front line of defense, through Bogodukhov, Zlochev, Kazachya Lopan, Zhuravlevka and Vesyoloye, there was an operational rear defensive line. Near Kharkov itself, the Wehrmacht created two ring defensive lines.

Belgorod was turned into a powerful defense hub. Many strongholds were built on its territory. An external defensive perimeter was created around the city, defending the closest approaches to it. A significant number of long-term firing points were built on the outskirts of the city, and stone buildings were turned into strongholds. The city was prepared for street fighting. The intersections were blocked with barricades and were shot at with machine guns. Many buildings and streets were mined. The northern and eastern parts of the city were covered with strong minefields.

Start of operation. Liberation of Belgorod

On August 2, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts took their starting positions for the offensive. For the headquarters of Army Group South, the Soviet offensive in this sector of the Eastern Front came as a surprise. The German command believed that the strike capabilities of the Soviet troops in this direction were depleted by Operation Citadel. The Germans did not expect the Soviet troops to go on the offensive so soon.

On August 3, from 5.00 to 5.05, a short artillery raid by all fire weapons of the fronts along the front edge of the German defense continued. A pause was taken until 5.35, and then full-fledged artillery preparation began, lasting three hours. From 7.55 to 8.15, all guns again fired powerfully at the German front line, while at the same time the Soviet infantry, behind the fiery rampart, began to advance to the first German trench. By 8.15 the fire began to move deeper into the German positions. Simultaneously with the artillery barrage, Soviet aviation in groups of 20-30 aircraft carried out bombing attacks and fired at German positions using machine guns and cannons. Aviation also ironed out the locations of German artillery and reserve forces.

At 8.15, Soviet infantry, supported by tanks, broke into the enemy's forward trenches. At 13.00, when the rifle units of the 5th Guards Army wedged about 2 km into the enemy’s main defensive line, the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle. Tank formations were supposed to complete the breakthrough of the German defense and enter the operational space. The tanks were introduced into the breakthrough in a narrow 5-kilometer area; it was a huge accumulation of armored vehicles.

On the very first day, the troops of the Voronezh Front broke through the German defenses to the entire tactical depth. The riflemen of the 5th and 6th Guards armies advanced 8-12 km. The 1st Tank Army, which was forced to participate in breaking through the second line of Wehrmacht defense, advanced 12 km and reached Tomarovka. The tankers of the 5th Guards Tank Army achieved the greatest success, advancing to a depth of 20-25 km. The operation was successful, but not as planned. The tankers advanced 20 km, and not 40 km as originally planned.

The offensive of the Steppe Front troops also developed quite successfully. The front artillery dealt a powerful blow to German defensive positions. However, the German troops initially withstood the blow. Then significant masses of aviation were thrown into battle. Stormtroopers and bombers dealt heavy blows to German centers of resistance. For the final breakthrough of the German positions, the 1st Mechanized Corps was brought into battle at 15.00. During the first day of fighting, units of the 53rd Army and the right flank of the 69th Army advanced 7-8 km.

On the second day of the operation, the first hiccups began. The commander of the 6th Tank Corps, Getman, did not follow Katukov’s order - without getting involved in the battle for the well-fortified Tomarovka, bypass it and move on, putting up a barrier. The hetman began the battle for the German stronghold in the morning; the corps lost 21 vehicles. Only the personal intervention of Katukov forced Hetman to continue the offensive in the afternoon, bypassing Tomarovka from the east. A motorized rifle brigade was left as a barrier. The 5th Guards Tank Corps, which was operationally subordinate to Katukov, also took part in the frontal attacks on Tomarovka. The corps lost 23 vehicles without achieving success. As a result, two tank corps lost time; only Krivoshein’s 3rd mechanized corps developed the offensive. The 31st Tank Corps was in reserve.

On the same day the situation in the air changed. Luftwaffe activity in the Belgorod area increased sharply. German attack and bomber aircraft began to strike hard at Soviet mechanized columns. Mobile formations began to suffer heavy losses in men and equipment from the effects of enemy aircraft.

However, despite these obstacles, Katukov's 1st Tank Army was able to cover about 20 km that day. German reserves were not in the way of Katukov’s army. The 19th Tank Division was transferred to Tomarovka, and the 6th Tank Division to the Belgorod area. The 3rd Mechanized Corps was able to wedge itself between two German mobile formations without getting involved in battle with them. Soviet tanks continued to move south and southwest.

Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army was less fortunate on the second day of fighting. The guardsmen entered into battle with the enemy's 6th Tank Division, which took up previously prepared defensive positions in the area of ​​Orlovka and Bessonovka. The terrain was difficult to reach for tanks, with a large number of ravines, gullies, and rivers. German troops occupied the heights, preparing positions for tanks and anti-tank artillery. The approaches to them were mined. The German defense was also strengthened by the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks (6 Tigers). Egorov's 18th Tank Corps ran into German defenses and, lacking the ability to flank maneuver, stopped.

The 18th and 29th tank corps of Rotmistrov's army, after a tense first day of the offensive, had limited supplies of fuel and ammunition. They decided to bring the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, which was in the second echelon, into battle. However, Vatutin received an order to send part of the army’s forces to storm Belgorod, to help the troops of the Steppe Front. The mechanized corps had to be sent to the east. As a result, on August 4, Rotmistrov’s army marched 10 km. Comfronta was angry. Vatutin threatened Rotmistrov with court for exposing the flank of Katukov’s army.

On August 5, the battles for Belgorod began. Konev sent the strong 53rd Army to bypass the city from the west, and the 69th Army entered the city from the north. Units of the 7th Guards Army crossed the Seversky Donets and reached the eastern outskirts. From the west, the offensive was supported by units of the 1st Mechanized Corps (as part of the 53rd Army). The city found itself semi-surrounded and attacked from three directions. The Wehrmacht put up stubborn resistance, clinging to every block and strong point. The German command wanted to keep this powerful center of resistance in their hands. However, the German troops could not withstand such a massive attack. As a result, by 18 o'clock Belgorod was completely cleared of Germans. The Steppe Front solved the problem of liberating Belgorod. The deployment of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps from Rotmistrov's army did not have a decisive impact on the collapse of the defense of the Belgorod resistance center. The steppe front managed quite well on its own.

On August 5, the offensive of the 27th and 40th armies began. As early as August 4, their forward formations were conducting reconnaissance in force, probing the enemy’s defenses. On the morning of August 5, a powerful artillery strike was carried out on enemy positions, after which the armies went on the offensive. The defense of the enemy's 11th Tank Division was broken through in a 26-kilometer area. Soviet troops advanced 8-20 km per day. The entry of the 7th Panzer Division into the battle saved the German defensive formations in this direction from complete collapse.

After the 27th and 40th armies were brought into battle, the enemy Tomarov group was under threat of complete encirclement. In Tomarovka, formations of the 255th, 332nd infantry and 19th tank divisions held the defense. German troops held back the onslaught of the 6th Guards Army and the 6th Tank Corps, but were now surrounded on both flanks. There was only one escape route left - to Borisovka. On the night of August 6, the Wehrmacht abandoned the fortified point. By the morning of August 6, Tomarovka was liberated from the enemy.

Katukov's 1st Tank Army, due to the delay of the 5th Guards Tank Army, was forced to leave two brigades of the 3rd Mechanized Corps to cover its left flank. Which reduced the strike capabilities of the spearhead of the attacking forces. The tank army experienced the greatest resistance that day from German aviation, and not from enemy ground forces. In general, Katukov’s army showed good results that day and covered about 30 km.

In fact, the commander of the BrF decided to immediately develop the breakthrough that was emerging at the junction of the 3rd and 63rd armies, so at 21.15 on July 12 he gave the 1st Don Guards. tk order, which set the task on the night of July 13 to move to the western bank of the Zushi River and concentrate in the Ivan - Zatishye - Vyazhi area; in the morning, as soon as the infantry takes the line Evtekhovo - Grachevka, immediately enter the breakthrough in this sector and, building on the success, capture the Mokhovoye area by the end of the day 148
Cm.: Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. pp. 396–397.

As part of the 1st Guards. TK included three tank and one motorized rifle brigades, a tank regiment, anti-tank fighter, mortar and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, as well as a motorcycle battalion (about 13 thousand soldiers and officers, over 200 tanks); the entry of the corps into the breakthrough was ensured by the main forces of the 15th VA and the 2nd Automatic Regiment of the 63rd A (at the beginning of the operation, the tank corps was transferred under the control of the command of the 63rd A) 149
Cm.: Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. pp. 319, 397, 756; The balance of forces and losses in the Battle of Kursk. Appendix 3. The balance of armored forces near Kursk. Appendix 4 // Kursk battle. Decisive turning point of World War II. pp. 362, 367.

Supporting the Oryol operation from the southwest was entrusted to the troops of the right wing of the Central Front, which on July 15 were to launch an offensive on Kromy. Despite the fact that fighting did not stop in the Central Front zone, the troops of the right wing of the front, according to the instructions of the Supreme High Command, were intensively preparing to launch a counter-offensive, with their immediate task of destroying the enemy who had wedged themselves into the defense and restoring their previous position, and then developing an offensive to the north -west, in the general direction to Kromy. On July 12, the commander of the Central Front set the troops the task of going on the offensive on July 15, so that 3 days were given to prepare the operation. The units regrouped their forces, concentrated artillery and tanks, replenished ammunition, and bomber aircraft intensified their operations. To go on the offensive, the 48th, 13th, 70th, 2nd Tank and 16th Air Armies were allocated. The front commander gave them the general task of destroying the enemy strike force in the area of ​​Nizhny Tagino - Awakening - Ponyri - Protasovo - Gremyachevo, so that by the end of July 17, the main forces would reach the line Nagorny - Shamshin - Novopolevo - Kamenka - Lebedikha - Morozikha - Katomki.

In the future, it was planned to develop a strike to the north in the general direction of Oryol, entering into interaction with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts.

Fulfilling the order of General Rokossovsky, given to the troops on July 12, the armies of the right wing of the Central Front on the same day began to regroup forces for the offensive, so that by July 15, a strike group consisting of the 18th Infantry and 16th Tank was formed in the Ponyri and Olkhovatka area buildings 150
Cm.: Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. P. 400.

At the same time, the enemy did not show activity, limiting itself to reconnaissance actions. The main attention of the German command was drawn to the offensive of the Western and Bryansk fronts towards Oryol, so the Germans began to withdraw some troops from the sector opposite the right wing of the Central Front and hastily transfer them to the north. During July 13, Soviet aviation recorded the movement of railway trains with artillery equipment and tanks to the north to the Glazunovka and Zmievka stations. Columns of vehicles and infantry were walking along dirt roads in the same direction.

According to General Greben 151
Cm.: Newton S. Battle of Kursk: a German view. pp. 145–146.

Initially, the command of the GA "Center" (Commander Field Marshal Hans Kluge, Chief of Staff General Hans Krebs. - P.B.) paid special attention to holding Orel, otherwise, due to the loss of this key transport hub, as well as the blocking of the railways and highways leaving the city, there was a threat to the supply of the 9th and 2nd tank armies. Therefore, on July 12, Field Marshal Hans-Guenther Kluge ordered the 2nd, 18th and 20th tank, 36th infantry divisions, as well as Ferdinand tank destroyer units and heavy artillery to be sent to the 2nd TA zone. The field marshal hoped that the critical situation at the front of this army could improve as a result of the lightning intervention of allocated reinforcements. At the same time, on Hitler’s instructions, the command of the troops of the Oryol group was changed. At the very beginning of the Soviet offensive (according to some sources 152
Haupt V. Battles of Army Group Center. The view of a Wehrmacht officer. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2006. P. 257.

In the afternoon of July 12th. – P.B.) the commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, General Rudolf Schmidt, was removed from his post (the reason for this decision was that Schmidt’s brother was arrested for treason, and letters were found in his apartment where the general criticized Hitler 153
It is noteworthy that the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who during World War II served in the Red Army on the Soviet-German front as an artillery officer and was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 2nd degree and the Red Star, for critical remarks expressed in letters about the political leadership of the Soviet state not only was he removed from office, but he was tried by a military tribunal and sentenced to 8 years in prison. Moreover, this did not happen during the critical period of the war, but in the victorious year for the Red Army in 1945. General Rudolf Schmidt, who escaped serious reprisals from Hitler, was also arrested by the Soviet authorities after the war and was imprisoned until the early 50s, having been in Butyrskaya, Lefortovo and Vladimir prisons. ( Note auto)

), and General Walter Model was appointed to this post (at 17.45 on July 12, the chief of staff of the 2nd TA, Colonel August Winter, received an order to transfer command to General Model 154
Cm.: Newton S. Hitler's "firefighter" is Field Marshal Model. M.: AST; Guardian, 2007. P. 295.

(Model actually took command on July 13, officially took office on July 15. – P.B.), who thus united under his control all German troops on the Oryol bridgehead (Model's responsibilities for commanding the troops of the 9th A were temporarily taken over by the army chief of staff, Colonel Harald Elverfeldt). - P.B.) At the same time, the headquarters of both armies remained where they were, so this measure only ensured unified operational command of the troops in the Oryol salient.

2.2. Development of the situation on July 13

In the Bolkhov direction, all the efforts of the troops of the 11th Guards. And during July 13, they were aimed at eliminating enemy strongholds and resistance centers and breaking through the enemy’s rear defensive line. To do this, on the second day of the operation, the command of the 8th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps brought two second-echelon rifle divisions into battle. In turn, the Germans, clinging to well-fortified settlements (Medyntsevo, Ulyanovo, Staritsa, Rechitsa, Durnevo, Slobodka, etc.), put up stubborn resistance, trying to prevent the development of a breakthrough, pull up reserves from the depths and, with their help, restore the situation. On July 13, the most stubborn fighting broke out in the Medyntsevo-Ulyanovo-Staritsa area. The units of the 211th and 293rd German infantry divisions that retreated here relied on the strong fortifications of these key points of the second defensive line, and also received support from tanks of the 5th TD, so they tried to hold the rear line with strong fire and repeated counterattacks until larger reserves arrived.

During the night from July 12 to 13 and the next day, aviation of the 1st VA ZapF carried out bombing strikes on enemy troops and positions in the Khatkovo, Moilovo, Ktsyn - Sorokino areas (in total, 652 sorties were carried out in 24 hours) 155

On the morning of July 13, 8th Guards. CK resumed its offensive. He was given the task: to break through the rear defensive line of the Germans in the Staritsa - Rechitsa sector; ensure the entry into the breakthrough of the 5th Tank Tank; in cooperation with him, advance in the direction of Ulyanovo - Krapivna. At dawn on July 13, after a 30-minute artillery barrage, parts of the 8th Guards and 5th Tank Corps of the 11th Guards. And they continued to move forward, trying to capture a large stronghold of the enemy’s second line of defense in the village of Staritsa, but were met by a counterattack by the 13th and 14th Panzer-Grenadier Regiments of the 5th Panzer Division, which was tasked with creating a defense line west of Rechitsa. Using previously prepared fortifications and folds of the terrain, the Germans met the attackers with strong crossfire and counterattacked on the flanks with forces of up to two or three infantry battalions with 15–30 tanks 156
Cm.: Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. P. 211; Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. P. 346; Fiery arc. P. 348.

At the same time, German attack aircraft, operating in small groups of 4 to 8 aircraft, tried to strike the battle formations of the advancing Soviet troops (in total, 80 sorties of German aviation were taken into account in the ZapF zone on July 13 157
TsAMO RF. F. 208. Op. 2511. D. 2424. L. 324.

). However, the counterattacks not only did not bring success to the Germans, but at the same time they were partially pushed back from their positions, and partly surrounded by the 13th PGP of the 5th Tank Division under the command of Colonel Heinrich Bronsart-Schellendorff. 158
Cm.: Haupt V. Battles of Army Group Center. The view of a Wehrmacht officer. M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2006. pp. 258–259.

After repelling the counterattacks, General Malyshev ordered the corps artillery group to carry out a ten-minute fire raid, for which more than 250 guns and mortars were concentrated on a two-kilometer front 159
Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. P. 211.

The fire raid was supplemented by a strike by the 224th assault air division of Colonel Mikhail Kotelnikov (Mikhail Vasilyevich Kotelnikov), assigned to the 5th Tank Tank, on artillery positions and accumulations of equipment in the area of ​​the strong point in Staritsa. After this, parts of the 11th Guards. SD of the 8th Corps, commanded by General Ivan Fedyunkin, operating with the support of the 43rd Guards. TBR Colonel Mikhail Lukashev (Mikhail Pavlovich Lukashev), captured Staritsa from the east, secretly advancing through ravines and hollows in small groups of infantry and tanks and at the same time distracting the enemy’s attention with fire and a demonstration of an offensive from the north. Having completed coverage by 1 p.m., units of the division suddenly attacked the strong point from the southeast, started fighting on the outskirts, and then broke through into the village. After a street battle, the remnants of the defeated German garrison tried to retreat to Medyntsevo, but were scattered by a blow from the left flank of the 1st Guards. SD 16th Guards sk under the command of General Nikolai Kropotin and the 10th Guards. TBR Colonel Andrei Burlyga, who advanced to block the Staritsa-Ulyanovo road, who bypassed Staritsa from the west and south-west.

Thus, by the middle of the second day of the operation in this area, the second line of defense of the German 53rd Army Corps was also overcome. The advancing Soviet troops opened their way to the south and southeast, while German units hastily consolidated their positions at the Zhelyabovo-Pustoy-Medyntsevo line.

The attack aircraft of the 1st VA ZapF began to strike along the road Staritsa - Dudorovsky - Ktsyn and destroyed the bridge over the Resseta River near Ktsyn, completely blocking the movement of vehicles in this area and prohibiting the approach to the site of the breakthrough of enemy reserves. Now, in order to develop success and deeply dismember the enemy’s defense, the command of the 11th Guards. And it decided to introduce a large group of tanks from the 5th Tank Tank into the breakthrough with the task of pursuing the enemy in the direction of Krapivna - Afonasovo. The tank group entered the breakthrough at 14:30 and, in cooperation with the advanced infantry detachments, pursuing the enemy to the southeast, immediately captured the villages of Vesniny and Krapivna, with separate detachments continuing to develop the offensive towards Yagodnaya. By the end of the day, formations of the 8th Guards and 5th Tank Corps reached the line Bely Verkh - Staritsa - Vesniny - Krapivna.

At the same time, as Marshal Baghramyan notes 160
Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. pp. 213–214.

Shock group of the 11th Guards. And she cut through the German defense with a narrow wedge and, although she successfully advanced into the depths, her flanks were poorly covered. The enemy was preparing a counterattack from the west, from the Medyntsev area, in order to cut off the units of the 5th Tank Tank that had advanced far forward. At the same time, the main forces of the German 25th Infantry Division, with the assistance of units of the 293rd Infantry Division and aviation support, were preparing to launch a counterattack on the left flank of the 36th Guards Corps, advancing a reconnaissance detachment of the Infantry Division to the village of Mekhovoe. Aviation reconnaissance data and testimony from prisoners indicated that large columns of enemy tank and motorized troops were approaching from the southeast, from the Orel area. From midday on July 13, the activity of enemy aviation increased sharply: groups of 20–30 dive bombers attacked the battle formations of tank and rifle corps. Under the current conditions, in order to achieve the development of a tactical breakthrough into an operational one, it was necessary, first of all, to use the combat capabilities of the tank corps assigned to the army.

Accordingly, taking into account the threat of flank counterattacks, Bagramyan ordered General Sakhno to gain a foothold with the main forces of the 5th Tank Tank at the reached line and pull back the tank brigades that had become separated from other units. In particular, the army commander considered that leaving the 70th Tank Brigade in Yagodnaya when it was separated from the rest of the corps by more than 15 km was impractical and dangerous, since this gave the enemy the opportunity to relatively easily cut it off from the main forces of the army. Based on this, Bagramyan ordered the brigade to withdraw to the Krapivna area 161
Cm.: Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. P. 347.

Leaving Yagodnaya subsequently required two days of stubborn fighting with enemy reserves that had arrived here, which slowed down the rate of advance of the Soviet troops and increased their losses. On the other hand, the command of the 11th Guards. And it decided to increase efforts in the Medyntsevsky direction with the goal of defeating parts of the 5th TD of the Germans before the arrival of their reserves, advancing from the Orel area.

On the afternoon of July 13, formations of the 1st Tank Corps of General Vasily Butkov entered the battle in the Medyntsevsky direction. At 14.30 hours, the commander of the 11th Guards. And he introduced the 1st Tank Tank, following the 5th Tank Tank, into a breakthrough in the Staritsa-Ulyanovo sector, setting the task of attacking Medyntsevo, in cooperation with the left flank units of the 16th Guards. sk, destroy the 5th TD of the Germans. The offensive of General Butkov's corps was supported by the 231st assault air division of the 1st VA under the command of Colonel Leonid Chizhikov, units of which on July 13 launched a series of attacks on enemy strongholds in Medyntsevo and Dudorovo (Dudarovo, 6 km southwest of Ulyanovo). According to Baghramyan 162
Cm.: Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. P. 214; Haupt V. Battles of Army Group Center. P. 259.

As a result of the battle, the enemy's 5th TD suffered enormous damage, lost a large number of tanks and was left bleeding (according to German sources, the frontal counterattacks launched by the 5th TD on July 13 caused the loss of 45 tanks, while the enemy had 40 combat vehicles were shot down).

By 19:00, two brigades of the 1st Tank Tank, in cooperation with rifle units of the 1st Guards. General Kropotin's SD captured Medyntsevo and Dudorovo. As a result of the battles on July 13, units of the 1st Tank Tank managed to advance 12–15 km and capture three large enemy strongholds, which lost 47 tanks, 7 self-propelled guns, 2 armored vehicles, 43 guns of various calibers, 6 mortar batteries, 800 military personnel were killed and captured, and in addition, he left three large warehouses. The losses of the 1st Tank Corps amounted to 350 military personnel killed and wounded, 10 tanks were destroyed and 13 vehicles received combat damage.

By 21 o'clock all the tank and motorized rifle brigades of the 1st Tank Corps were concentrated in the area of ​​Medyntsevo, Dudorovo and in the grove east of Dudorovo, and the advanced detachments of the 16th Guards that approached the Cherebet River. CK began pursuing units of the enemy's 5th Tank and 293rd Infantry Divisions, retreating in a southwestern direction to Kholmishchi - Dudorovsky. Moreover, due to the fact that the 211th Infantry and 5th Tank Divisions found themselves to the north and northwest of the breakthrough site, having lost contact with the 293rd Infantry Division, Müller’s task force came under the command of the commander of the 55th Army Corps, General Erich Jaschke (Yashke, Erich Jaschke).

At the same time, formations of the 16th Guards. sk, advancing to the southwest, continued to expand the breakthrough towards the right flank of the 11th Guards. And by the end of July 13, they had fought their way to the Chernyshino-Dudorovo line, having captured several strong points in the defense zone of the German 211th Infantry Division. At the same time, in the evening of the same day, the commander of the 16th Corps, Hero of the Soviet Union, General Afanasy Lapshov, died, and the acting chief of the corps’ artillery group, General Lavr Mazanov, was taken prisoner by the Germans (Lapshov and Mazanov went to the Medyntsevo area to inspect damaged German tanks, among which supposedly there were “Tigers”, and on the way they came across one of the retreating enemy groups). At the end of July, the commander of the 16th Guards. sk General Ivan Fedyunkin was appointed.

On the left flank of the army, in the offensive zone of the 36th Guards. sk General Ksenofontov, on July 13, fierce battles continued for the strongholds of Dolgaya, Durnevo, Debri, Slobodka. Troops of the 36th Guards. sk, continuing the offensive to the southwest, fought with the 293rd Infantry Division of General Karl Arndt, as well as with units of the 25th Infantry Division under the command of General Anton Grasser, transferred by the command of the 53rd Army Corps to the line Vytebet River. Using prepared positions, the Germans sought to maintain a bridgehead on the left bank of the river as a starting position for preparing a flank counterattack. Heavy fire, repeated counterattacks and terrain crossed by a number of ravines made it difficult for the attackers to advance and maneuver, but by the end of July 13, units of the 36th Guards Corps captured the key enemy strongholds of Dolgaya (2 km west of Durnevo), Durnevo, Debri (2 km north of Durnevo), Slobodka and reached the border of the Vytebet River. The advanced detachments of the corps captured river crossings south of Dolgaya and east of Durnevo and crossed to the eastern bank, but their attempts to build on their success in the direction of Sorokino were unsuccessful. On the night of July 14, corps reconnaissance discovered the approach of enemy tanks and infantry; captured prisoners showed that units of the 18th and 20th tank divisions (from the 41st and 47th tank corps of the 9th A) were arriving in Sorokino and Ukolitsy . – P.B.), which will operate jointly with the 25th MD 163
Cm.: Bagramyan I. Kh. Decree. op. P. 216.

Reconnaissance also noted the approach of artillery, including large-caliber artillery. The corps command reported to army headquarters that a counterattack on the left flank was being prepared. As a response, the command of the 11th Guards. And it moved an anti-tank reserve - iptap - to the threatened area.

By the end of the day on July 13, the troops of the 11th Guards. And we reached the line Chernyshino - Medyntsevo - Vesniny - Krapivna and further along the Vytebet River to Zhukovo. For July 12 and 13, 11th Guards. And she broke through the enemy’s tactical defense zone and wedged into his position to a depth of 25 km, expanding the breakthrough along the front to 23 km and inflicting serious losses on the 5th Tank, 211th and 293rd Infantry Divisions 164
Cm.: Battle near Kursk: From defense to offensive. pp. 348–349.

The paths for developing an offensive both on Bolkhov and Khotynets, to the railway and the Orel-Bryansk highway were open. The offensive of the troops of the 11th Guards. And already on the second day of the operation, it created a serious threat of enveloping Bolkhov from the north-west and west and reaching the rear and communications of the entire Oryol group of Germans.

At the same time, on July 13, the 50th A ZapF under the command of General Ivan Boldin went on the offensive, which carried out the task of covering the right flank of the 11th Guards. And with the help of an auxiliary strike in the direction of Zikeevo. The enemy's 110th, 296th, 134th and part of the forces of the 211th infantry divisions were defending in front of the army front: in front of the right flank and center of the 50th A, on the Zaprudnoye - Puzanovka section, 21 km long, the 110th and 296th divisions were located , and then, in a strip over 26 km wide, the positions of the 134th and 211th divisions occupied; in tactical depth, in the Zhizdra-Lyudinovo area, the 5th TD remained in reserve 165
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 1–1 vol.

On the other hand, the forces and means of the Western Front concentrated here for the offensive were approximately two to three times smaller than the strike force of the 11th Guards. A. So, the 50th A, consisting of 7 rifle divisions (3 of which are under the control of the 38th sk); 3 artillery cannon, 3 anti-aircraft artillery, 3 mortar, 1 anti-tank artillery regiments; 2 engineering b-nov; 2 divisions of armored trains numbered “only” about 63 thousand people, over 530 guns (236 guns of 76 mm caliber and above, 241 anti-tank guns, 50 anti-aircraft guns) and 594 mortars of 82 and 120 mm caliber, and received a separate 196-mm for reinforcement. South Tank Brigade, as well as a tank regiment and a heavy self-propelled artillery regiment - a total of 75 tanks and 12 self-propelled guns 166
See: Combat schedule of the Red Army, July 1, 1943. Appendix 2. Balance of forces and losses in the Battle of Kursk. Appendix 3 // Kursk battle. Decisive turning point of World War II. pp. 305–306, 362; Fiery arc. P. 592; Pankov F. D. Fiery lines: the combat path of the 50th Army in the Great Patriotic War. M.: Voenizdat, 1984. pp. 128–143; Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. P. 286.

According to the operational department of the 50th A headquarters, by the beginning of the operation, the following balance of forces had developed in its zone, which was not entirely favorable for an attack on the enemy’s previously prepared defenses (Table 2).

table 2

The balance of forces and means at the front of the 50th A ZapF by July 13, 1943167
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 1 volume-2.

Note.

Data only for the 196th brigade.

According to the initial decision of the army commander, which was in accordance with the provisions of the Infantry Combat Manual, the main blow was to be delivered by two left-flank infantry divisions on the Kolpino front - mark 199.9, with the goal of breaking through in the direction of Khromyli - Maryinsky, and an auxiliary blow - by one rifle regiment 64- th SD in the direction to Kremischnoye; The 38th infantry regiment under the command of General Alexei Tereshkov, deployed on the right flank of the 50th A (17th, 326th and 413th rifle divisions), received the task of holding the defense and ensuring army formations from a possible enemy counterattack, as well as being ready to attack Marinka 168
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 2–5.

Here, on the right flank of the army, in the area of ​​Zagorichi - Bukan - Usty, a camouflage operation was carried out, and on July 12 - reconnaissance in force. To carry out the command's decision to break through the enemy's defenses, the 50th A regrouped and delivered the main blow with the left flank from the Kolpino area in the direction of Budskie Vyselki - Maryinsky - Khromyli. The 212th and 324th rifle divisions, operating with the support of the 196th tank brigade, two artillery and two mortar regiments, as well as one artillery and one mortar divisions, were concentrated in a breakthrough area 6 km long along the front. As a result of this strike, carried out with the assistance of the 440th rifle regiment of the 64th infantry regiment, which attacked Kremischnoye, it was planned to encircle and destroy in the Paliki - Rechitsa - Dubrovka area parts of the 134th German infantry regiment of General Hans Schlemmer, and subsequently build on the success at Zikeevo, using the 49th Infantry Division and a tank regiment, which remained in the reserve of the army commander in the area of ​​​​the village of Maklaki. To provide artillery support for the breakthrough, an artillery group was concentrated, which included three divisional artillery regiments (64th, 212th and 324th divisions), the 39th and 188th cannon artillery regiments of the RGK, the 54th and 307th mortar regiments, artillery and mortar divisions : 113 guns of 45 mm caliber, 88 guns of regimental and divisional artillery of 76 mm caliber, 48 guns of 122 and 152 mm caliber, 182 mortars of 82 mm caliber and 68 mortars of 120 mm caliber, 40 M-13 rocket launchers 169

As you can see, in total there were 539 guns and mortars in the group, that is, 90 guns per kilometer of the 6-kilometer breakthrough section, although the headquarters of the 50th A indicates a different artillery density - 56 guns per kilometer 170
TsAMO RF. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 161. L. 3.