A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge 1710. Book: George Berkeley “A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge. Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge

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George Berkeley.

Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge,

in which the main causes of errors and difficulties in the sciences, as well as the foundations of skepticism, atheism and unbelief, are investigated

Foreword

What I now put out into the light, after a long and careful study, seems to me obviously true and of no use for knowledge, especially to those who are infected with skepticism or lack proof of the existence and immateriality of God, as well as the natural immortality of the soul. Whether I am right or not, in this I rely on the impartial judgment of the reader, for I do not consider myself more interested in the success of what I have written than in accordance with the truth. But, lest it suffer, I think it necessary to ask the reader to refrain from judging until he has completely finished reading the whole book with the measure of attention and reflection that his subject seems to deserve. For although there are some passages in it that are in themselves very capable (you can certainly do this) to give rise to great misunderstandings and seem to lead to the most absurd conclusions (which, however, when fully read, will turn out not to follow from the premises), it is just as accurate, even if reading and it was completely brought to the end, with its fluency, it is still very likely that the meaning of what I said may not be understood; but I flatter myself with the hope that it will be perfectly clear and understandable to the thinking reader. As regards the character of novelty and originality, which may seem to be characteristic of some of the following concepts, I hope that any apology in this respect will be superfluous on my part. Undoubtedly, he is very weak or very little acquainted with the sciences who refuses the truth, which admits of proof only because it has appeared anew or contradicts human prejudices. This is all that I think it necessary to say beforehand, in order to prevent, if possible, hasty reproofs from that sort of people who are too inclined to condemn this or that opinion before they understand it rightly.

George Berkeley

Introduction

1. Since philosophy is nothing else than the pursuit of wisdom and truth, it would be reasonable to expect that those who have devoted the most time and labor to it should enjoy greater peace of mind and cheerfulness, greater clarity and evidence of knowledge and less tormented by doubts and difficulties than other people. Meanwhile, in fact, we see that the ignorant mass of people, who follow the broad path of ordinary common sense and are guided by the dictates of nature, for the most part are contented and calm. Nothing ordinary seems to her inexplicable or difficult to understand. She does not complain about the lack of evidence of her sensations and is out of danger of falling into skepticism. But as soon as we deviate from the guidance of sensations and instinct in order to follow the higher principle - reason, reflection, reasoning about the nature of things, then thousands of doubts immediately arise in our minds about those things that previously seemed quite clear to us. Prejudices and deceptive sensations are revealed on all sides before our eyes, and, trying to correct them with the help of reason, we imperceptibly become entangled in strange paradoxes, difficulties and contradictions, which multiply and grow as we move further in speculation, until we finally after wandering through many intricate labyrinths, we do not find ourselves again in the same place where we were before, or, even worse, do not plunge into hopeless skepticism.

2. It is believed that the reasons for what has been said lie in the darkness of the subject or in the natural weakness and imperfection of our mind. It is said that our faculties are limited and nature itself is intended to serve for the protection of life and the enjoyment of it, and not for the study of the inner essence and structure of things. Moreover, since the human mind is finite, they are not surprised that, while discussing things that are involved in infinity, it falls into absurdities and contradictions, from which it is impossible for it to free itself, because the infinite, by its very nature, cannot be comprehended by what is finite. .

3. However, we may be too partial to ourselves, attributing errors to our abilities, and not to their misuse. It is difficult to imagine that correct conclusions from true principles could ever lead to consequences that cannot be supported or brought into mutual agreement. We must believe that God treats the sons of men so kindly as not to inspire them with a strong desire for such knowledge, which he has made completely unattainable for them. This would not accord with the ordinary gracious ways of Providence, which, once it has instilled certain inclinations in its creatures, always supplies them with such means as, if properly used, cannot fail to satisfy these inclinations. On the whole, I am inclined to think that, if not all, then most of the difficulties that have hitherto occupied philosophers and blocked the path to knowledge, we are entirely indebted to ourselves; that we first raise a cloud of dust, and then complain that it prevents us from seeing.

4. I intend, therefore, to try whether I can discover those principles which have been the cause of doubt, infidelity, absurdities, and contradictions in the various schools of philosophy, to such an extent that the wisest men have found our ignorance incurable, believing that it depends on natural weakness and limitation. our abilities. And, of course, it may be considered a matter quite worthy of our labors to make a complete study of the first principles human knowledge, to study and examine them from all sides, mainly because there is some reason to suspect that those obstacles and difficulties that delay and burden the spirit in its search for truth do not stem from the obscurity and confusion of objects or from a natural lack of mind, but rather from false principles on which people insist and which could be avoided.

5. Difficult and hopeless as this attempt may seem, considering how many great and extraordinary people have preceded me in the same intention, I am not without some hope, based on the consideration that the widest views are not always the clearest. and that one who is short-sighted is compelled to look at objects closer and is able, perhaps, by close and close examination, to distinguish what eluded the best eyes.

6. In order to prepare the reader's mind for a better understanding of what is to follow, it is appropriate to preface something by way of introduction concerning the nature of speech and its misuse. But this subject inevitably leads me to anticipate my aim to a certain extent by mentioning what seems to have chiefly made speculation difficult and confused, and given rise to innumerable errors and embarrassments in almost all parts of science. This is the view that the mind has the capacity to form abstract ideas or concepts about things. Those who are not wholly alien to the writings and controversies of philosophers must admit that no small part of them concerns abstract ideas. It is specially assumed that they form the subject of those sciences which are called logic and metaphysics, and in general of all the sciences which are considered the most abstract and sublime branches of knowledge. There is hardly any question in them that is treated in such a way that does not imply that abstract ideas exist in the mind and that the mind is well acquainted with them.

7. Everyone recognizes that the qualities or states of things in reality never exist separately, each in itself, especially and separately from all others, but that they are always connected, as if sour cream among themselves, several in one and the same object. But, we are told, since the mind is able to consider each quality separately or by abstracting it from those other qualities with which it is combined, it thereby forms abstract ideas. For example, an object that is extended, colored and moving is perceived by sight; by decomposing this mixed or complex idea into its simple constituent parts, and considering each by itself and to the exclusion of the rest, the mind forms abstract ideas of extension, color, and movement. It is not that it is possible for color or motion to exist without extension, but that the mind can form for itself by abstraction the idea of ​​color with the exclusion of extension, and the idea of ​​motion with the exclusion of both color and extension.

Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge

Thank you for downloading the book from the free e-library http://filosoff.org/ Happy reading! George Berkeley. Treatise on the principles of human knowledge. A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, which examines the chief causes of error and difficulty in the sciences, and the foundations of skepticism, atheism, and unbelief. -1753). It was first published in May 1710 in Dublin. The book did not evoke great interest readers, and some responses were restrainedly negative. The author's philosophy was discussed only after the publication of Alciphron... (1732), and Berkeley then decided to republish the Treatise..., which he did in London in 1734. Another reprint of the Treatise... took place in 1776, after which it is published in all collected works of Berkeley, starting from 1784. By 1869, the first edition of the "Treatise ..." in translation into German. Translations available in French, Italian, Danish, Spanish and Polish languages. Here the Russian translation by E.F. Debolskaya (St. Petersburg, 1905), re-verified by A.F. Gryaznov with English text in "The Works of George Berkeley..." (vol.2. London, 1949, p.21-113). A number of fragments of the Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge (from §1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 24, 35-37, 59, 65, 66, 80, 84, 86,92,94,96) are given by us translated by V.I. Lenin, made according to volume 1 of The Works of George Berkeley, D.D. Formerly Bishop of Cloyne" (in 4 vols., ed. A.C. Eraser. Oxford, 1871). See Lenin V.I. Materialism and empirio-criticism. - Full. coll. cit., vol. 18, pp. 15-24.], seems to me obviously true and not useful for knowledge, especially for those who are infected with skepticism or lack proof of the existence and immateriality of God, as well as the natural immortality of the soul. Whether I am right or not, in this I rely on the impartial judgment of the reader, for I do not consider myself more interested in the success of what I have written than in accordance with the truth. But, lest it suffer, I think it necessary to ask the reader to refrain from judging until he has completely finished reading the whole book with the measure of attention and reflection that his subject seems to deserve. For although there are some passages in it that are in themselves very capable (you can certainly do this) to give rise to great misunderstandings and seem to lead to the most absurd conclusions (which, however, when fully read, will turn out not to follow from the premises), it is just as accurate, even if reading and it was completely brought to the end, with its fluency, it is still very likely that the meaning of what I said may not be understood; but I flatter myself with the hope that it will be perfectly clear and understandable to the thinking reader. As regards the character of novelty and originality, which may seem to be characteristic of some of the following concepts, I hope that any apology in this respect will be superfluous on my part. Undoubtedly, he is very weak or very little acquainted with the sciences who refuses the truth, which admits of proof only because it has appeared anew or contradicts human prejudices. This is all that I think it necessary to say beforehand, in order to prevent, if possible, hasty reproofs from that sort of people who are too inclined to condemn this or that opinion before they understand it rightly. George Berkeley Introduction 1. Since philosophy is nothing but the pursuit of wisdom and truth, it might reasonably be expected that those who have devoted the most time and labor to it should enjoy more peace of mind and gaiety, more clarity and evidence of knowledge and be less tormented by doubts and difficulties than other people. Meanwhile, in fact, we see that the ignorant mass of people, who follow the broad path of ordinary common sense and are guided by the dictates of nature, for the most part are contented and calm. Nothing ordinary seems to her inexplicable or difficult to understand. She does not complain about the lack of evidence of her feelings and is not in danger of falling into skepticism. But as soon as we deviate from the guidance of sensations and instinct in order to follow the higher principle - reason, reflection, reasoning about the nature of things, then thousands of doubts immediately arise in our minds about those things that previously seemed quite clear to us. Prejudices and deceptive sensations are revealed on all sides before our eyes, and, trying to correct them with the help of reason, we imperceptibly become entangled in strange paradoxes, difficulties and contradictions, which multiply and grow as we move further in speculation, until we finally after wandering through many intricate labyrinths, we do not find ourselves again in the same place where we were before, or, even worse, do not plunge into hopeless skepticism. 2. It is believed that the reasons for what has been said lie in the darkness of the subject or in the natural weakness and imperfection of our mind. It is said that our faculties are limited and nature itself is intended to serve for the protection of life and the enjoyment of it, and not for the study of the inner essence and structure of things. Moreover, since the human mind is finite, they are not surprised that, while discussing things that are involved in infinity, it falls into absurdities and contradictions, from which it is impossible for it to free itself, because the infinite, by its very nature, cannot be comprehended by what is finite. . 3. However, we may be too partial to ourselves, attributing errors to our abilities, and not to their misuse. It is difficult to imagine that correct conclusions from true principles could ever lead to consequences that cannot be supported or brought into mutual agreement. We must believe that God treats the sons of men so kindly as not to inspire them with a strong desire for such knowledge, which he has made completely unattainable for them. This would not accord with the ordinary gracious ways of Providence, which, once it has instilled certain inclinations in its creatures, always supplies them with such means as, if properly used, cannot fail to satisfy these inclinations. On the whole, I am inclined to think that, if not all, then most of the difficulties that have hitherto occupied philosophers and blocked the path to knowledge, we are entirely indebted to ourselves; that we first raise a cloud of dust, and then complain that it prevents us from seeing. 4. I intend, therefore, to try whether I can discover those principles which have been the cause of doubt, infidelity, absurdities, and contradictions in the various schools of philosophy, to such an extent that the wisest men have found our ignorance incurable, believing that it depends on natural weakness. and the limitations of our abilities. And, of course, it may be considered a matter well worth our labors to make a complete investigation of the first principles of human knowledge, to study and consider them from all sides, mainly because there is some reason to suspect that those obstacles and difficulties that delay and burden the spirit in his search for truth, spring not from the obscurity and confusion of objects, or from a natural lack of intelligence, but rather from false principles which men insist upon and which could be avoided. 5. However difficult and hopeless this attempt may seem, considering how many great and extraordinary men have preceded me in the same intention, I am still not without some hope, based on the consideration that the widest views are not always the clearest and that one who is short-sighted is forced to look at objects closer and is able, perhaps, with close and close examination, to distinguish what eluded the best eyes. 6. In order to prepare the reader's mind for a better understanding of what is to follow, it is appropriate to preface something by way of introduction concerning the nature of speech and its misuse. But this subject inevitably leads me to anticipate my aim to a certain extent by mentioning what seems to have chiefly made speculation difficult and confused, and given rise to innumerable errors and embarrassments in almost all parts of science. This is the view that the mind has the capacity to form abstract ideas or concepts about things. Those who are not wholly alien to the writings and controversies of philosophers must admit that no small part of them concerns abstract ideas. It is specially assumed that they form the subject of those sciences which are called logic and metaphysics, and in general of all the sciences which are considered the most abstract and sublime branches of knowledge. There is hardly any question in them that is treated in such a way that does not imply that abstract ideas exist in the mind and that the mind is well acquainted with them. 7. Everyone recognizes that the qualities or states of things in reality never exist separately, each in itself, separately and separately from all others, but that they are always connected, as if swept together several in one and the same object. But, we are told, since the mind is able to consider each quality separately or by abstracting it from those other qualities with which it is combined, it thereby forms abstract ideas. For example, an object that is extended, colored and moving is perceived by sight; by decomposing this mixed or complex idea into its simple constituent parts, and considering each by itself and to the exclusion of the rest, the mind forms abstract ideas of extension, color, and movement. It is not that it is possible for color or motion to exist without extension, but that the mind can form for itself by abstraction the idea of ​​color with the exclusion of extension, and the idea of ​​motion with the exclusion of both color and extension. 8. Further, since the mind observes that in separate extensions, perceived through sensation, there is something common and similar, as well as some other things, for example, this or that form or magnitude, which differs from one another, it separately considers or singles out in itself that which is general, thus forming the most abstract idea of ​​extension, which is neither a line, nor a surface, nor a body, has no form or size, but is an idea completely detached from all this. In the same way, having discarded from the individual colors perceived in sensations that which distinguishes them from one another, and retaining only that which is common to all of them, the mind forms an abstract idea of ​​a color that is neither red, nor blue, nor white, and does not exist at all. any particular color. And in the same way, when considering motion in abstraction, not only from the moving body, but also from the path described by it and from all particular directions and speeds, an abstract idea of ​​movement is formed, corresponding equally to all particular movements that can only be perceived in sensations. 9. And just as the mind forms for itself abstract ideas of qualities or states, it achieves through the same separation or mental

Series: "Educational Library"

St. Petersburg, 1905. Publishing house O. N. Popova. Typographic cover. The safety is satisfactory. There are tears on the cover, several notebooks fall out. "Treatise on the principles of human knowledge" ("A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge"), one of the main works of the outstanding English philosopher George Berkeley, in which he develops and substantiates his philosophical system of metaphysical idealism. Considering the main task to refute skepticism, atheism and unbelief, the author finds a solution by establishing the doctrine of immaterialism, that is, the denial of the existence of matter, understood as a substance outside the spirit. It is recommended both to philosophers and historians, and to all who are interested in the history of philosophy. Not subject to export outside the Russian Federation.

Publisher: "Publishing house of O. N. Popova" (1905)

Format: 140x200, 184 pages

George Berkeley

George Berkeley

Bishop George Berkeley
Date and place of birth: March 12, (Thomastown, County Kilkenny, Ireland)
Date and place of death: January 12, (Thomastown, County Kilkenny, Ireland)
School/tradition: Subjective idealism
Period: 18th century philosophy
Direction: Western Philosophy
Significant Ideas: Subjective idealism
Influenced: Locke
Followers: Kant, Hume, Schopenhauer

Links

Berkeley's writings

  • J. Berkeley "Three conversations between Hylas and Philonus" on the RGIM website
  • "Three conversations between Hylas and Philonus" -- parallel text in Russian and English
  • Works by J. Berkeley in the original: Mickelsen, Carl. Readings in Modern Philosophy. George Berkeley - Anthology of Electronic Texts (English)

About J. Berkeley

  • Garth Kemerling. George Berkeley -- Web Resource Index (Berkeley writings, books and articles on Berkeley's philosophy, including electronic versions)
  • Berkeley Time Line - milestones life path J. Berkeley
  • Berkeley International Society
  • Downing, Lisa. George Berkeley - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • George Berkeley A Bibliography - about 300 titles from the 19th century Until now
  • Atherton, Margaret. Berkeley Philosophy Papers in Word 97-2003
  • Bettcher, TaliaMae. Berkeley: A Guide for the Perplexed. -- Berkeley Philosophy Course and Articles (California State University)
  • Omelchenko N.V. The experience of philosophical anthropology. - Volgograd: publishing house of Volgograd University, 2005. (The monograph contains paragraph 3.1 "The omnipotence of the thoughts of George Berkeley, or the metaphysics of tyranny", pp. 147-153.)

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    20. Moreover, the communication of the ideas denoted by words is not, as is commonly supposed, the main or only purpose of language. There are other goals, such as, for example, arousing some passion, excitation to action or deviation from it, bringing the soul into some particular state - goals in relation to which the above-mentioned goal in many cases is purely auxiliary or even completely absent. if the ends indicated can be achieved without her help, as is often the case, I believe, in the ordinary use of language. I invite the reader to reflect on himself and see if it often happens while listening to a speech or reading that the passions of fear, love, hatred, surprise, contempt, etc., arise directly in his soul when he perceives certain words without the mediation of any ideas. In the beginning, perhaps, words really aroused ideas capable of producing such mental movements; but, if I am not mistaken, it turns out that when speech becomes ordinary for us, the hearing and seeing of signs often directly entail those passions that were originally evoked only through the medium of ideas, now completely omitted. Can't the promise of a good thing, for example, arouse feelings in us, even though we have no idea what that thing is? Or is the threat of danger not enough to arouse fear, even if we do not think of some particular evil that is probably threatening to overtake us, and do not form an abstract idea of ​​danger? If anyone thinks for a moment about what has been said, I believe that he will probably come to the conclusion that common names are often used as constituent parts of a language, without the speaker himself intending them to serve as signs of the ideas he wishes to evoke with them in the mind of the listener. Even proper names do not seem always to be used with the intention of evoking in us the ideas of the individuals they are supposed to signify. If, for example, a scholastic says to me: "Aristotle said . Aristotle. And such an action is often so instantaneous in the mind of those who are accustomed to subject their judgment to the authority of that philosopher, that it would be even impossible for any idea of ​​his person, writings, or reputation to precede this action. Such a close and immediate connection can be established by the custom between in simple words"Aristotle" and the urges to consent and reverence that he evokes in the minds of some people. Innumerable examples of this kind could be cited, but why should I dwell on things that, no doubt, are fully suggested to everyone by his own experience.

    Ideas and spirit

    BIOGRAPHY BERKELEY

    Born near Thomastown (County Kilkenny, Ireland). He studied at a college in Kilkenny, then at Trinity College (College of the Holy Trinity) in Dublin. In 1721 he was appointed court preacher to the viceroy of the Irish Duke of Grefton, and was soon promoted to the dean of the city of Derry.

    He had an extensive and versatile education, was not a stranger to any branch of human knowledge, and his noble character inspired respect in all who came into contact with him.

    Berkeley's philosophical outlook developed partly as a protest against the realistic and materialistic ideas that dominated his time, and partly under the influence of Locke's sensationalism.

    According to the teachings of Berkeley, only the spirit exists in reality, while the entire material world is one deception of our senses; the involuntary nature of this deception is rooted in the initial ideas aroused by the soul of all souls - by God himself. This spiritualism of Berkeley has been the occasion for numerous misunderstandings and has stirred up philosophers and theologians alike.

    BERKELEY PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM

    Berkeley's life is inextricably linked with religion, and he sets one of his main goals to irrefutably prove the existence of the creator and the immaterial nature of the soul. Berkeley sees the cause of errors in the sciences, atheism and skepticism, as matter that exists independently of the spirit.

    Berkeley entered the history of philosophical thought as one of the most prominent representatives of idealism. His work has only one goal - "to expel the cornerstone of matter from the system of atheists, after which the whole building will inevitably fall apart".

    To achieve this goal, Berkeley uses all the means available to him, his arguments sometimes contradict each other, concepts are substituted for one another, scientific principles are brought to the point of absurdity, and the evidence does not stand up to scrutiny. But, despite all the weaknesses of the system he built, he does conclusion about the existence of a god, "infinitely wise, good and omnipotent". God, whose existence is abundantly sufficient to explain all natural phenomena.

    The philosophical system created by Berkeley has been and is being subjected to well-deserved criticism. At the same time, she has her followers. His works continue to be studied to this day and, although he was largely mistaken, they are of undoubted interest to philosophers.

    A TREATMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

    In 1710, Berkeley published one of his main works - "A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge", in which he tries to find the causes of errors and difficulties in the sciences.

    The main idea is that nothing exists outside the human mind. The author comes to this conclusion, adhering to his concept of real world objects as a set of ideas inherent in them (shape, color, smell, taste, etc.). The essence of ideas, according to Berkeley, is their perceptibility. Consequently, all the objects we perceive cannot exist except in the spirit that perceives them.

    He's writing:

    “... the whole heavenly choir and all the decoration of the earth, in a word, all the things that make up the Universe, have no existence outside the spirit; their being consists in being perceived or known...”


    At the same time, Berkeley believes that ideas are not copies or reflections of things that exist outside the mind. An idea, he says, cannot be like anything but another idea, a color can only be like another color, and a shape like another shape.

    At the very beginning of his work, Berkeley tries to understand the mechanism of the formation of abstract ideas. In his opinion, the existence of abstractions is impossible, since they must contain all the features of the private concepts included in them, which are often completely incompatible. Berkeley considers language to be the source of the emergence of abstract ideas.

    TREATMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE - IDEAS AND SPIRIT

    Along with various combinations of ideas called things, Berkeley singles out the cognitive component, the mind, the spirit, which is not itself an idea, but in which they exist.

    "There is no other substance than the spirit or that which perceives."


    The spirit, in his opinion, is a simple, inseparable, active being.. As it perceives ideas, it is called mind, as it produces or acts on them, it is called will. Ideas act as something passive and cannot influence other ideas. From this it follows that the spirit cannot be perceived by itself, since the idea cannot convey to us through an image or likeness the idea of ​​what acts.

    Berkeley also distinguishes ideas of sensation and ideas of imagination. The former, in his opinion, are more definite, livelier and more distinct, they have order, constancy and connection, and do not arise by chance. "Those fixed rules and certain methods by which the spirit on which we depend, generates or excites in us the ideas of sensation, are called laws of nature."

    Berkeley divides human knowledge into two areas - knowledge of ideas and knowledge of the spirit. The reason for the difficulties in the cognition of ideas, he sees such, in his opinion, delusion, as the dual existence of sensible objects - in the mind and the real, independently of the spirit. The very possibility of the existence of things outside the spirit is considered by him to be absurd and the source of all contradictions and skepticism.

    Knowledge of the spirit, that is, the only possible thinking substance and carrier of ideas, is difficult, as Berkeley writes, with theories about the existence of matter, incomprehensible, imperceptible and, therefore, non-existent. Matter Berkeley calls "the support of atheists and idolaters." The spirit is fundamentally incomprehensible only because it is not an idea, and, therefore, imperceptible.

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