Yes, they steal, but Putin is good. Why are officials in Russia not afraid to steal, why do they feel their impunity? Causes of corruption in our country Officials will stop stealing

Painting 16.10.2020
Painting

But what is interesting: practically no one argues with the fact that officials steal.
And with the fact that they steal a lot - in general, too. And how can you argue if almost everything is in sight? Expensive cars and country cottages of "servants of the people" against the backdrop of chronically broken roads, dilapidated and dilapidated housing in a heap of garbage dumps, regular accidents with fatal mass outcomes without punishment for the perpetrators of loose juvenile acne of the bourgeois elite, including personal friends of the president, and other problems , speak for themselves.

And the billions found in the possession of the Governor of the Sakhalin Region Khoroshavin, spread throughout the house, right in the boxes - all confirm this. And not only Khoroshavin was caught in the outrageous theft. Yurchenko was suspended, Belykh was detained with a suitcase of cash. Zakharchenko's apartment, littered with banknotes. The Vasilyeva-Serdyukov case, again. Many other cases also confirm that officials steal and steal colossal amounts of the people's budget money.

Even if we only summarize the cases brought to court with proven facts of embezzlement, we get tens and hundreds of billions of rubles stolen from the budget. This is the proven part. But there is also unproven. For the same Vasilyeva. For the same Serdyukov. And how many of those who were not brought to trial at all, were not removed from cases, and who are still stealing?

It is clear that on Khoroshavin, Vasilyeva and other detainees the list of corrupt officials does not end, but barely begins. And the total amount of embezzlement is much higher than what was proven in the courts.

Some are still trying to stand up for the purity of the public procurement system or for the validity of the cost of the Sochi Olympics, but these are isolated guardians. Their zeal can be attributed either to party discipline, or to simple dementia, when a person argues according to the principle "I liked it - then everything is fine."

But in general, almost everyone agrees that theft is large-scale and systematic, that it has spread throughout the entire “vertical”. I will say more, their example infected a huge mass of people with klipomania, primarily officials in power, who, seeing the impunity of this crime, unwillingly wanted to live beautifully too. Because it cannot be that Khoroshavin has been stealing for many years by billions, and everyone around was clean. It doesn't work that way. Unbeknownst to the rest, you can steal once or twice, you can discreetly drain fuel from a state-owned car, squander travel expenses and forge a report. But it is impossible to steal for many years without being noticed, for this you need accomplices, many, in different departments, who will also have their accomplices ...

And since most of the embezzlement is carried out within the framework of federal legislation, which is the same for all regions, it is very naive to think that Khoroshavin found ways to steal, while others did not find or did not want to use them. In all regions, officials have found ways to steal. It's just that not everyone has become insolent to the same extent as Khoroshavin. And it was not decided to remove everyone, because the vertical would collapse if everyone was removed. And everyone understands this. Or almost everything.

But here's the phenomenon - with all the understanding of the above, half of the country continues to think that Putin is good, that he fights thieves, defends Russia, and so on and so forth. The tsar is good, the boyars are bad? Sometimes they say so directly - Putin is fighting the liberal environment, corrupt officials, swindlers and thieves ...

Sometimes even in reports devoted to corruption (for example, in "The Moment of Truth"), after the screen shows an outright tinny about large-scale embezzlement, the presenter draws a phenomenal conclusion like "but Putin is great because ..." Why is he good? Because he created the ONF and regularly says the right words about the fight against corruption? So these are just words. These words are specifically spoken to make everyone think that Putin is fighting corruption while he is just sitting and watching what is happening. Looks out for the law to steal.

Putin's speeches are simply words for all good versus bad. Exactly the same words as about the need to stop shelling Donbass and fulfill the Minsk agreements. Words, from which nothing changes and nobody gets any easier. These words - "halva", from the repetition of which no one becomes sweeter.

And if you look at it, then in essence this is the phrase "stop the thief", which the thief himself says, so that no one thinks about him, and everyone caught others.

By talking about the fight against corruption, Putin simply deflects suspicion and relieves responsibility. Like he knows everything, he knows, he is against corruption. Yes, he really is not against - he is part of it.

He is part of United Russia, the creation of which he himself said, recently speaking at the congress. And he even said that he created this party in the early 2000s, although this is not true. But the main thing is that Putin has publicly recognized himself as part of United Russia.

And for several years he was the chairman of this party, although he was not a member. And most of the governors, heads of departments, Putin appointed from among the United Russia. He himself surrounded himself with United Russia and liberals, swindlers and thieves, with whom he is allegedly fighting. What does this mean?

If the commander-in-chief surrounds himself with an enemy, then he either surrenders, or this is not an enemy for him.

But if Putin wanted to surrender, he probably would not have returned after castling with Medvedev. And he returned.

This means that the United Russia party, liberals, swindlers and thieves are not enemies for Putin, not strangers, but his own. And he is their own for them. It is no coincidence that Putin is so actively supported by all the members of United Russia. Agree that crooks and thieves would not support the president who is actually fighting with them. They support each other - Putin's United Russia, and Putin - United Russia. They support from the first day until now, they support them publicly and to the point.

Putin calls the government's actions correct, and the decisions of the Central Bank correct, United Russia obediently votes for laws that are written in the presidential administration (for example, the law on the National Guard). With Medvedev, Putin generally has complete mutual understanding, friendship and cooperation. Actually, Putin himself promoted it.

There is no Putin's fight against corruption. There is a struggle with individual representatives who became insolent, stole and began to spoil the furrow. And then there is the sacrifice of individual corrupt officials to the public in order to calm the people, and the rest could calmly steal further.

It's like a leader who sometimes gnaws at weak, sick or naughty wolves from a pack, and the rams rejoice and think that he represents their interests.

No, he just strengthens his power in the flock, and maintains his authority among the rams, which allows you to maintain the accuracy of the herd without resorting to forceful methods.

However, comparing Putin and United Russia with wolves is not entirely correct. Much honor. These are not wolves - this is shit.

Our so-called elite, post-Soviet and even post-Yeltsin, who jumped into Western liberal shoes and formed the United Russia party, is the real shit.

And all this shit got out of the same ass that it turned into (or was turned, how to look) late THE USSR. And since all this shit got out of one ass and formed an even shaped pile called United Russia, where could a cherry come from at the very top of this pile? Where a dung beetle can appear on a pile of shit - I can understand. Where the fly can come from - I can understand. Where a cherry pit can appear from there - and I can understand that. And where a cherry, a rose or a bee can appear on a pile of shit - I can't understand. This does not happen - it is unnatural, contrary to the laws of nature.

An attempt to prove that everyone is stealing, and Putin is good, is actually a manifestation of fear of losing faith in a good tsar. It is the subconscious fear of the sheep to look at the leader without a mask and to see the wolf. This is the fear of parting with the hope that everything will work out by itself, the good and wise tsar will defeat the bad and thieving boyars and life will become wonderful. By her own. And for this you do not have to get up from the warm old sofa.

Those who believe in a good Putin are simply afraid to face the truth, they are afraid of reality, they are afraid to see ahead, instead of Putin's great victory, his miserable and insignificant end, the deplorable result of his rule for Russia.

And the whole cunning plan is the same attempt to escape from reality, a passionate desire to believe that everything will work out by itself, and Russia will become great on its own, at the behest of the king and the king, and this does not require moving, it is enough to stay on couch, stick into Kiselev's box, believe in the cunning plan of his leader, good Putin, listen to Svanidze's tales, and everything will be fine. No, it will not. Nothing will happen by itself.

And Russia will not become great by itself, because 86% are sitting on the couch, believing in good Putin and his cunning plan, sticking it into the minds of Kiselev, Soloviev, Svanidze and others.

Russia will become great, but the path to this will lie, as in the past - through dirt and blood, through the cleaning of the Augean stables, into which the authorities have turned, through the raking of that shit that is the Russian elite together with United Russia, Putin and his entourage, through the raking of the manure that they leave behind. And you won't be able to sit on the couch.

Moreover, the longer you sit and believe in a good Putin and a cunning plan, the stronger your bummer will be when Putin escapes or simply surrenders his affairs, like Yeltsin, after which it suddenly turns out that there was no cunning plan, no fight against corruption. there was no defense of Russia, but there was only a lie, a translation of the arrows, nonsense for all good versus all bad, and the consistent sale of Russia to internal enemies, which are much more dangerous than external ones.

But we will not change Putin - this is not in our power with you and in general is not our business. Sooner or later it will be replaced without us. Perhaps even he will run away on his own, although personally I do not believe in Putin's ability to make independent decisions. But not the point.

I am not calling on anyone to change Putin. I just want you to give up your illusions about his "goodness". Just so that you do not fall into a deep and lingering prostration when you see that the king, figuratively speaking, was naked all this time.

Because when THIS happens - you will not be able to sit and lament about how bad everything is, how we were deceived, how we believed him, and what he really turned out to be - there will be no time for that. It will be necessary to roll up our sleeves to rake the shit piled up by Putin and United Russia ...

Well, finally, the long-awaited weakening of the ruble happened. Russian officials begged him publicly for several months, like the natives in the African desert - rain in the dry season. But the state itself is doing everything possible so that the weak ruble does not help anyone. Apparently, except for themselves.

On June 21, the ruble, as some Russian media wrote, broke through two psychological marks at once. Which, however, can be safely called “psychiatric” - for those who are forced to fixate on the fluctuations in the Russian currency, which seem to have calmed down more than a year ago.

“This has never happened before, and again ». In general, the dollar for the first time in a long time cost more than 60 rubles at the moment, and the euro - more than 67 rubles.

So, our officials competed in public statements about how good it was for the ruble to finally start to weaken, that it was over-strengthened by 10% (this was said when the exchange rate was around 57-58 rubles per dollar), that a strong ruble slows down economic growth. The weakening of the ruble was thought by the government as a way to significantly reduce the budget deficit and help exporting enterprises. And now, it seems, their secret and explicit desires began to come true.

It is clear that with a weaker ruble, even low inflation does not save the population from falling real incomes (by the way, according to the latest macroeconomic statistics, everything in our country grew in May, except for our incomes). Maybe at least the budget will feel better from the fall of the ruble?

On June 21, in the State Duma, Tatyana Golikova, the chairman of the Accounts Chamber, one of the best budget specialists in Russia, shattered these naive hopes of ours. Neither the fall in oil and gas revenues, nor the long recession in the economy (last year there was no growth in our economy yet) could not only stop, but at least slow down the drain of money from the Russian budget at the federal and regional levels. According to the report of the Accounts Chamber, which Golikova presented to the deputies, in 2016 the treasury suffered a heavy and irreparable loss - 966 billion rubles. Almost a trillion! 1.9 times more money disappeared from the budgets of all levels in various ways than in 2015. That's where the real growth is! The embezzlement of budget money knows no stagnation or recession. In the light of the report of the Accounts Chamber, the prime minister's catch phrase addressed to Crimean pensioners (that is, state employees): “There is no money, you are holding on” is filled with new meaning. It immediately becomes clear, thanks to whom, in fact, this money is not.

Is it a lot or a little - 966 billion rubles, which did not reach the target from the budgets of all levels? Judge for yourself: this is 13 times more than all state annual expenditures of Russia on housing and communal services and almost twice - on health care. The budget deficit of the Russian Federation for 2016, according to official data, amounted to 2.97 trillion rubles. So without the theft of a trillion, it would be less than a third.

How this "trifle" comes up can be roughly understood from the latest publication of Kommersant, according to which the Moscow Department of the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), after a request from the State Duma deputy from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Valery Rashkin, revealed violations in the purchase of tiles worth more than 4 billion rubles as part of the program on improvement of Moscow "My street". “The capital of the Federal Antimonopoly Service did not draw conclusions about the quality of the tiles, but revealed violations of the procedure for conducting competitive procedures for 4 billion 98 million rubles. The OFAS commission checked the purchases for the improvement of Tverskaya Street, carried out under the 2015 tender, as well as purchases related to the laying of granite paving slabs and curbs within the framework of the My Street program in Moscow in 2017, ”the newspaper reports.

And if the UFAS also looked at the quality of the tiles - well, for the sake of interest, the mechanism of violations would become clearer. It is imperative to do it expensively and of poor quality, so that later it can be done expensively and poorly - that is the whole simple business scheme (far from the only one) of free handling of budget funds. The estimate is overstated, part of the money ends up in the pockets of those involved. And then money is urgently required to alter and finish the deed. And they are spent about the same as last time. (At this point, you can postpone reading the text and google, for example, the history of the construction of the Krestovsky stadium, aka St. Petersburg Arena in the city on the Neva.)

This is one of the reasons why, with all the talk of officials about the resumption of growth in investment in Russia, as soon as oil prices began to rise at the beginning of the year, capital outflow jumped up (the reduction of which our officials were publicly proud of all last year). In January - April 2017, $ 21 billion flowed out of Russia against $ 9.8 billion in the same period last year.

What is the "moral of this fable"? Any economic reforms and government strategies are probably doomed if in Russia every year a trillion rubles are lost from the budgets of all levels. And finally, perhaps it should be said that the entire expenditure part of the federal budget - 2016 amounted to approximately 16 trillion rubles ...

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How many times I already come across the fact that justifying comments like "it is not proven", "this is his right" are written to posts about theft, and then, depending on the content.

They wrote about Peskov's watch "let him wear it if he can afford it."

No, don't let it. Even if we imagine that a watch was presented to him (by the way, in other countries there are laws that an official cannot accept expensive gifts, or must hand them over to the state), he should not appear with them in public, because he is like a press secretary the president is being followed by officials across the country. And if at least one official in the country, having seen a watch on Peskov's wrist, wants the same and goes into the budget to secure an expensive thing for himself, this means that Peskov must pass as the organizer of the theft, because he set a bad example.

In all the expensive watches that officials bought with stolen money after Peskov appeared in public with his watch, there is Peskov's participation.

The prosecutor's office should have immediately become interested in the origin of Peskov's watches, and the president had to publicly reprimand his press secretary, without waiting for the results of the investigation, and strictly warn him for the future - so that all officials would understand that there was no need to follow an example. And even better - to dismiss due to loss of confidence, as Ulyukaev was fired, although his guilt has not yet been proven by the court.

That is why Ulyukaev was fired, but Peskov was not fired?

From the point of view of the law, they are both innocent because their guilt has not been proven in court.

Why has a case been opened against Ulyukaev, but not against Peskov?

Incidentally, Ulyukaev could have been framed by putting in a case, the contents of which he did not know in advance. This is likely. And Peskov certainly deliberately put on the watch. And I repeat that even if the watch was donated, the very fact of an official wearing expensive things in public can be regarded as incitement to corruption, as a detrimental effect on other officials. And certainly the origin of expensive things from an official should be investigated in every known case.

However, for some reason Ulyukaev was detained and fired immediately, and no one reasoned that the case with the money flew into his office by accident or was presented by friends, and some began to actively justify the watch on Peskov's hand.

Double standarts? Have not heard ...

Some also justified White.

It seems like it was not a bribe, but money for the development of the region or something like that.

And why does the governor personally pick up a case with cash for the development of the region?

If a businessman decides to help the region, let him make a money transfer or directly finance some project that the governor will indicate.

What kind of regional project is this, for the financing of which money can only be transferred in cash and only to the governor in the hands of?

Even if we assume that this money was not intended for the Whites personally, then this money was transferred to him for some not very official project, to put it mildly. For a project that cannot be openly funded. This means that this project is not entirely legal and is not associated with the development of the region, but with something else.

If Belykh’s money is not a bribe, then it’s something like money "for the development of democracy," that is, illegal financing of political activities and NGOs, which does not make Belykh white and fluffy.

In due time, Serdyukov was also justified that his guilt was not proven.

Indeed, Serdyukov's guilt in embezzlement has not been proven. As well as Ulyukaev's fault at this particular moment. However, even if we imagine that Serdyukov was an ordinary henpecked, whom Vasilveva spun as she wanted, this does not relieve him of responsibility, because the boss should be responsible for the actions of the subordinate related to his work.

And the fact that our bosses are not responsible for subordinates according to the law is a very big flaw in our laws, which gives rise to a huge amount of abuse.

In the vast majority of cases, the management either knows or guesses about the violations committed by subordinates, but turns a blind eye to this, because it is interested in this. Often, the bosses deliberately shift dirty and illegal activities to subordinates, so that they themselves will not be responsible if something happens.

That's when the bosses will be responsible for their subordinates - then there will be order.

If the boss does not know about the abuses of the subordinate, this means that he is a bad boss, his control is poorly organized, he does not follow the actions of his subordinates, then he must also be responsible for creating a situation in which systematic uncontrolled abuse. If the boss himself did not discover and stop violations in the work of subordinates, but brought the situation to the intervention of the investigating authorities, this is already the basis for bringing such a boss to justice.

Therefore, Serdyukov also does not need to be justified. The fact that he was not convicted does not mean that he is innocent, but that we have imperfect laws and double standards, under which Ulyukaev was immediately fired and detained, and Serdyukov was transferred to a dust-free job and pretended that that's right. And Peskov was not even soldered with a reprimand.

But Vasilyeva was convicted. But how condemned!

For embezzlement on an especially large scale (several hundred million only for proven episodes), she escaped with house arrest in a 13-room apartment among luxury. And some other strange 3-month imprisonment, which was most likely fictitious.

It turns out interesting, right?

For theft of a mobile on the street, you can get a real term with a real release, for a bribe in the amount of hundreds of thousands - too, and for proven theft of hundreds of millions - practically nothing.

In essence, this means that the more you steal, the shorter the term. In any case, in terms of the days spent in prison for every million stolen.

I think that the dependence of the term on the amount stolen should still be direct, not inverse.

For example, like this: take the square root of the sum of the stolen and the resulting number will be the duration of the imprisonment in days. For 10,000 rubles - 100 days of imprisonment. For a million - a thousand. For 100 million - ten thousand days, that is, almost 30 years. With good behavior - parole in 15.

If more than a billion is stolen, you get a life sentence. But if you share it with the boss who allowed the theft and accomplices who helped steal, then you can someday get out.

That will be fair.

However, here we are not talking about justice, but about justifying theft.

To justify theft is to facilitate it.

Just as a boss who turns a blind eye to the abuse of subordinates indulges them, and Peskov, who publicly puts on an expensive watch (or any other official who publicly uses an expensive car that does not correspond to his income) sets a bad example - one who justifies theft, is an obscure accomplice.

And just as the boss turns a blind eye to the abuse of subordinates out of his own interests, because it is beneficial for him himself, because they steal for him or he himself steals and allows others to do it - in the same way, the one who justifies the theft does this is because he either steals himself, or is ready to steal, finding himself in the place of the one he justifies and most likely hopes to be there.

Justifying theft is aiding the theft, albeit implicitly.

The one who acquits Peskov is most likely himself received expensive gifts for some services related to his official position.

The one who justifies Belykh is most likely himself involved in financial transactions that could not be carried out officially.

The one who justifies Serdyukov most likely witnessed the thefts himself, but did nothing to prevent them, because he had certain weaknesses for those who stole.

And the one who justified Makhlai yesterday, most likely himself received a piece of state property as a result of privatization and believes that he can now dispose of it as he pleases, while he considers tax avoidance not a violation, but a sign of business dexterity.

Concerning Makhlai:

Anyone who, as a result of privatization, received an enterprise in his ownership and invests in its development a little less than 99% of the profit - is already a thief in essence, a thief and a bourgeois scum, with which an implacable struggle must be waged.

And the fact that the law allows you to freely dispose of the profits of privatized enterprises is a lack of legislation. And this drawback is not an accident, but a deliberate loophole created by thieves in order to make it easier and more convenient to steal.

If the legislation allows stealing, this does not mean that theft should be justified, it means that we should seek to amend the legislation, including by paying attention to it.

A privatized enterprise must either develop or return to the state, everything else is the essence of theft, even if it is legalized.

You can freely dispose of only what is created with your own hands from scratch. And even then with care for the environment and the implementation of other safety standards.

And when two people in the course of privatization (which itself was a thief) appropriated the enterprise and is now pumping out profit from it, this is theft.

This is double theft.

The first theft was privatization, and the second was the siphoning of profits, 99% of which should go to the development of the enterprise.

And tax evasion is the third theft.

Therefore, Makhlai, whom some rushed to defend yesterday, is a thief three times.

And the fact that he changed his Russian citizenship to American and left the country also says a lot.

And the one who justifies such people - justifies not only theft on an especially large scale and in various forms (including offshore, fictitious contracts, ephemeral and banking fraud, tax evasion), but also the denationalization of the Russian economy.

The privatization of a Russian (Soviet) enterprise, which is accompanied by the change of citizenship of the owner and his departure from the country, is precisely the denationalization of the economy, in other words, the plundering of Russia.

And you have to be an exceptional bastard to justify this.

And as for legality - I repeat that theft, which was not suppressed by the law, does not cease to be theft in its essence. It's just that it is legalized theft. And this is a reason to think about the quality of our laws and who adopts them.

The laws that privatized thousands of enterprises were passed by Yeltsin's team - a team of traitors and thieves who created a thieves' system.

And the results of the implementation of these laws over the past 17 years have not been corrected, because the successors of Yeltsin's team, the guardians of the results of the thieves' privatization and a new generation of thieves are in power.

Therefore, Vasilyeva escaped with house arrest in her luxurious apartment.

Therefore, Serdyukov was left alone.

Therefore, no one made any remarks to Peskov.

And Ulyukaev, Belykh and Khoroshavin were removed only because they began to interfere with someone. Dropped out of the clip. Or have allowed themselves too much.

Those who justify them either steal themselves, or want to steal, or their close relatives are doing it.

And anyone who thinks that it is okay to siphon profit from an enterprise instead of investing in its development is just a hopeless idiot. Any normal owner invests the maximum amount of money in the development of the enterprise, the majority also attracts investors for this, or takes loans. Either a thief or a saboteur who acts in the interests of competitors is pumping money out of the enterprise.

Siphoning money out of your own business is a particularly sophisticated form of theft.

This form of theft arose in the post-Soviet space, because many enterprises received at their disposal degenerates who did not build them, did not invest their efforts and resources in them, which treat them simply as gifts of fate and do not value them at all. Their thieves' mentality simply does not allow them to treat these businesses differently - they perceive them as stolen things that should be pushed to resellers or siphoned off profit as long as there is such an opportunity.

These thieves-proprietors are afraid that at any moment the government will change, new laws will be adopted and it will be impossible to steal, therefore they try to steal more, resell and pump out as long as there is an opportunity. Because they are unable to develop and build due to their thieves' mentality, because they are not entrepreneurs or builders, but hedonists-degenerates who live for their own pleasure.

And the one who justifies them is most likely the same in their mentality.

But the most important thing is to justify theft, any, even implicit, justification of connivance, which makes theft possible, justification that pushes others to steal, like Peskov with his watch - all this gives rise to new theft.

Justifying theft makes it acceptable in society.

And as long as theft is considered permissible - we will always have laws that allow stealing and this vicious circle will never break - justifiers will refer to the fact that "everything is according to the law," and the law will allow thieves' schemes, because they are all justified with reference to law.

And only when society ceases to justify theft, in any, the most implicit, and even more so in legalized forms, the situation will begin to improve.

And in order for society to sooner stop justifying theft, it is necessary to introduce responsibility for this, by analogy with the responsibility for justifying terrorism.

Because the one who justifies terrorism is an accomplice of terrorists, and the one who justifies theft is an accomplice of thieves.

And if Vasilyeva, according to the “square root of the stolen,” should have served at least 15 years, sharing part of the term with Sedryukov, who allowed her to steal, then anyone who excuses them can help them in this and take on 10-15 days from the term ...

I would argue that as soon as the one who justifies the thieves will receive at least a small part of their term - the number of those who want to write "this is their right", "let him wear it if he can afford it", "there is nothing to envy successful people" - will quickly go to zero.

Seven points for a worker to understand

"People have always been and always will be stupid victims of deceit and self-deception in politics, until they learn to seek out the interests of certain classes behind any moral, religious, political, social phrases, statements, promises."

IN AND. Lenin

1. The arrest of the minister has nothing to do with the fight against corruption. The entire power vertical in Russia rests on the private appropriation of state budget funds. Private appropriation is carried out by officials and managers of public corporations. The means for this are both multi-million bonuses, which management pays to itself, and for kickbacks, the transfer of government orders to controlled commercial organizations. The arrest of one, even the most thieving official, cannot change this system of relations. By definition, neither the state machine nor its first / second / third person can fight against those mechanisms that ensure the operation of the state machine. Let us recall at least the case of Oboronservis and Anatoly Serdyukov, who did not incur any punishment and now controls the Rostec corporation.

2. You can put anyone in jail. The history of modern Russia knows many examples when unwanted people were imprisoned for committing crimes that they knowingly did not commit. Two examples from trade union practice come to mind. Valentin Urusov, the initiator of the creation of a trade union at the mining and processing plant of the diamond-mining company Alrosa, was arrested on charges of drug possession. Valentin spent more than 4 years in prison, from 2008 to 2013, and now works for the Confederation of Labor of Russia. The leaders of the Sheremetyevo trade union of the flight crew (SHPLS) A. Shlyapnikov, V. Pimoshenko and S. Knyshov were arrested in October 2013 on charges of taking bribes. The real reason for the arrest was that the activists, through appeals to the supervisory authorities, forced Aeroflot to pay the pilots unpaid salaries totaling about one billion rubles. On June 1, 2016, all the accused were found guilty, but released from custody, since the court credited them with a period of detention in a pre-trial detention center and under house arrest. These examples are known because trade union leaders interacted with the central bodies of trade unions and informed the public about their activities. In reality, there are many more such examples. Since it is possible to fabricate cases against trade union and social activists, then there are no obstacles to doing the same with your former partners.

3. An honest person cannot get a high position. Since being in the post of a major official allows you to control financial flows and extract income from this in the ways indicated above, this position itself acquires a certain monetary expression. To occupy it and gain access to the distribution of financial flows, you must already have a solid financial or administrative resource. Therefore, a person from the people can get into a government post only for show, and even then as someone's puppet.

4. Why should a minister take bribes? Sometimes they ask why a minister with a legal income of 60 million a year would take bribes and risk his position. So just to reduce the risk of your dismissal or arrest. The more financial resources a person or his clan has, the more influence he enjoys. The more connections he has in the so-called law enforcement agencies. The larger and more influential the offender, the more difficult it is to bring him to justice. The richer and more influential an official or a businessman, the more opportunities he has for maintaining and increasing his influence. Did I take a bribe?

Did I take a bribe?

5. The redistribution of spheres of influence is caused by a change in the structure of income of the ruling class. The arrests of top officials in the Investigative Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and, now, the Minister of Economic Development are due to the redistribution of spheres of influence between different clans of the ruling class. As a result of the decline in oil prices, the profitability of various sectors of the economy has changed significantly. And since different industries are controlled by different clans, their strength in relation to each other has changed. Just as the uneven development of states gave rise to two world wars, a change in the strength of clans gives rise to a war between clans.

6. The common people will not get better from the lordly squabbles. Many ordinary people hope that the patriotic clan can win in the inter-clan struggle. However, such hopes are unfounded. Firstly, the clan's interest is not determined by its ideology, but, on the contrary, the propagandized ideology is determined by the clan's objective interests. Sberbank benefits from the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine, because otherwise it suffers losses on the world stage. The military-industrial complex obviously has the opposite interest. No matter how oil prices change, Sberbank will not disappear in Russia, and its interests will not change. Secondly, the interests of all clans of the bourgeoisie are opposed to the interests of the working people. A couple of years ago, employees of IzhMash (supervised by Mr. Rogozin, pretending to be a great patriot) rallied with a demand to raise their minimum salary to 10 thousand rubles. So patriotism is patriotism, and they will feast all the same at our expense.

7. Propaganda effect. The fight against corruption is only a legal cover for the redistribution of property and spheres of influence between clans. However, creating the appearance of a fight against corruption gives the impression that some politicians have finally taken up the solution of one of the key "problems" (as the media describe it) of the Russian state.

And as for whether the minister really took that bribe of two million dollars, which he is accused of, we will never know about it, and it does not matter at all.

PhD in Economics, Academic Director of the Center for Modernization Studies at the European University at St. Petersburg

Recently, an intelligent foreigner who knows Russia well asked me why many Russians are not shy about showing off their luxurious lifestyle, which clearly does not correspond to their legal income. After all, it is obvious that this luxury is a consequence of corruption. It would seem that if you are stealing from the state, then live modestly, like citizen Koreiko from the Golden Calf. Otherwise, everyone will despise you. Isn't Russia despised?

I replied that the nouveau riche hardly cares about the contempt of people from the "lower social strata" (including journalists or professors like me). But in their own circle, the situation is developing in exactly the opposite way. It is a shame to be poor there, but it is important to be successful. And at any cost. Of course, behind the eyes, and there they can be outraged by illegal sources of wealth. But at the same time, they will take any corrupt official for their own, deal with him, rotate with him in the same society. A professor or a journalist in this society will be shown only occasionally, as a curiosity - when they suddenly manage to become famous for something.

I discovered all this long ago, but what are the reasons for the formation of such a situation, it was difficult to say. Perhaps, for the first time, I managed to get closer to understanding the problem after reading the section on corruption in the new book by St. Petersburg professor Boris Mironov "The Russian Empire: From Tradition to Modernity." This is perhaps the most fundamental study of Russian history of the imperial period today. Three volumes of large format and incredible depth - both literally and figuratively. Each volume contains almost a thousand pages of text with illustrations and a lot of interesting information about how Russia existed for more than two centuries.

In fact, this is a socio-political encyclopedia of our country. The emphasis in it is not on the now popular biographies of endless princes, kings and heroes (although there are such sections), but on the biography of the people. The way he worked and rested, prayed to God and worshiped the sovereign, colonized the outskirts and modernized in large cities. “Corruption” is only a small but very informative section of the second volume.

“In the 17th - first half of the 18th century,” notes Mironov, “offerings to officials were an integral part of their content. The law prosecuted only those offerings that provoked an official to break the law. Such illegal offerings were called "promises", while legal ones, contributing to a quick and benevolent consideration of the case in accordance with the law and custom - "honors". "Honor" symbolized the respect and desire of the petitioner to fall under the protection of an official, "promise" - a proposal to break the law. From a modern point of view, the line between “honor” or a gift and “promise” is shaky, but the population and officials were aware of it, and therefore the “promise” was many times greater than “honor”. An official who made an illegal decision was always in danger - a complaint from the injured party and punishment. Meanwhile, the acceptance of the gift did not threaten anything. Apparently, the lion's share of the offerings was intended to expedite the solution of the case as far as possible in a favorable sense, and comparatively rarely, gifts led to a violation of the law.

In today's Russia, this picture looks like the following. "Promise" is a clear abuse of power, when, for example, an official finances a project to create a road, stadium or military facility with costs deliberately increased by two to three times, and receives part of this amount as a kickback (the rest is put into his pocket by the construction company ). "Honor" is when an official does not spend specially budget money, but when placing a state order, he favors one of the applicants to the detriment of another equally worthy one. The official does not cause any damage to the state, since the budget money will be spent in any case (and, perhaps, even usefully), but the firm that receives the order will receive significant benefits. And for this she is ready to pay an influential person who is favorably disposed towards her.

In this kind of "honors" there is often no violation of the law at all. Even in the case when government orders are distributed through a competition. You can always find many legitimate ways to generally weed out the applications of competitors who do not resort to "honors", or at least find convincing arguments in favor of a favored company as the best and most worthy. And if people who receive "honors" for this kind of operation buy Mercedes cars or houses on Rublevka, will they be ashamed of their ostentatious luxury? Even the historical term itself makes successful officials think that this is a reward for their managerial talent, for their high position, for their ability to build a complex system of relations, thanks to which the state is not harmed, and business receives profitable orders.

In other words, officials view the additional remuneration they receive from business as a fair share of their salary, since the government (they believe) is severely underpaid. After leaving their post in business, such officials can often indeed receive much higher salaries than the state gives them. So they compare the bureaucratic salary with the managerial remuneration potentially available to them, and then they themselves get the difference between them.

As Boris Mironov convincingly demonstrates, the entire system of "honors" grew out of state "underpayments" in Russia. In the XV-XVI centuries. there was no budget at all for the maintenance of the apparatus. “Representatives of the princely administration for the performance of their duties received 'food' from the controlled population, usually 3 times a year - on Christmas, Easter and Peter's Day (June 29, old style). When they took office, the population paid them "entry feed".<…> In the XVII century. the system of payment has changed: the most significant and regular offerings were received by the clerks for doing business, and festive meals and other 'honors' were retained as an additional voluntary surcharge ”. All this was apparently explained by the fact that with an undeveloped fiscal system, it is much easier to feed an official locally at the expense of the population than to collect taxes, form a huge budget in Moscow, and then pay everyone the salary prescribed by law.

Naturally, as a modern-type state was forming in Russia, officials began to receive salaries from the budget, but even in the 19th century it often did not cover the basic needs of Akaki Akakievich for the purchase of greatcoats. “Without bribes,” Mironov notes, “officials, especially those of lower ranks and clerical officials, would simply die out. Therefore, the supreme power and government<…> were lenient with bribes. " Nicholas I used to say that in all of Russia he alone did not take bribes, and although this was clearly an exaggeration, the words of the emperor could be interpreted so that only those who did not need them did not take bribes.

The current bureaucracy is, of course, earning money for an overcoat. But the general logic of receiving “honors” continues to be valid, as they are considered fair rewards. At the same time, those who take billions of dollars in "promises" themselves are often referred to as the recipients of "honors" as dishonorable destroyers of the country. They do not take them according to their rank, not according to their conscience and not according to their concepts.

Dmitry Travin, Professor of the European University at St. Petersburg

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