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Historians have an unspoken rule that at least 15-20 years must pass before giving a reliable assessment of certain events. However, in the case of the First Chechen War, everything is completely different and the more time passes from the beginning of those events, the less they try to remember them. It seems that someone is deliberately trying to make people forget about these bloodiest and most tragic pages in the newest Russian history. But society has every right to know the names of the people who started this conflict, in which about three thousand Russian soldiers and officers died and which actually marked the beginning of a whole wave of terror in the country and the Second Chechen War.
The events leading to the First Chechen War must be divided into two stages. The first is the period from 90 to 91, when there was still a real opportunity to overthrow the Dudayev regime bloodlessly and the second stage from the beginning of 92, when the time to normalize the situation in the republic had already been lost, and the question of a military solution to the problem became only a matter of time.
Stage one. How it all began.
The first impetus for the start of events can be considered Gorbachev’s promise to give all autonomous republics the status of union and Yeltsin’s subsequent phrase - “Take as much independence as you can carry.” Desperately fighting for power in the country, they wanted to gain support from the residents of these republics in this way and probably did not even imagine what their words would lead to.
Just a few months after Yeltsin’s statement, in November 1990, the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, headed by Doku Zavgaev, adopted a declaration on the state sovereignty of Checheno-Ingushetia. Even though in essence it was only a formal document adopted with an eye to gaining greater autonomy and powers, the first signal had already been given. At the same time, the hitherto little-known figure of Dzhokhar Dudayev appeared in Chechnya. The only Chechen general in the Soviet Army, who was never a Muslim and had state awards for military operations in Afghanistan, began to quickly gain popularity. Perhaps even too quickly. In Chechnya, for example, many are still convinced that behind Dudayev there were serious people sitting in Moscow offices.
Perhaps these same people helped Dudayev to overthrow the Supreme Council with its chairman Doku Zavgaev on September 6, 1991. After the dissolution of the Supreme Council, power as such no longer existed in Chechnya. The warehouse of the KGB of the republic, in which there were riflemen for an entire regiment, was looted, and all the criminals who were there were released from prisons and pre-trial detention centers. However, all this did not prevent the presidential elections to be held on October 26 of the same year, which, as expected, Dudayev himself won, and a declaration on the sovereignty of Chechnya to be adopted on November 1st. It was no longer a bell, but a real ringing of a bell, but the country seemed not to notice what was happening.
The only person who tried to do something was Rutskoy, it was he who tried to declare a State of Emergency in the republic, but no one supported him. During these days, Yeltsin was at his country residence and did not show any attention to Chechnya, and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR never accepted the document on the emergency. This was largely due to the aggressive behavior of Rutskoi himself, who literally stated the following during the discussion of the document: “these black-assed people must be crushed.” This phrase of his almost ended in a fight in the Council building and, naturally, there could no longer be any talk of adopting a state of emergency.
True, despite the fact that the document was never adopted, several planes with internal troops, totaling about 300 people, still landed in Khankala (a suburb of Grozny). Naturally, 300 people had no chance of completing the task and overthrowing Dudayev and, on the contrary, they themselves became hostages. For more than a day, the fighters were actually surrounded and were eventually taken out of Chechnya on buses. A couple of days later, Dudayev was inaugurated as president, and his authority and power in the republic became limitless.
Stage two. War becomes inevitable.
After Dudayev officially assumed the post of President of Chechnya, the situation in the republic was heating up every day. Every second resident of Grozny walked freely with weapons in his hands, and Dudayev openly declared that all weapons and equipment located on the territory of Chechnya belonged to him. And there were a lot of weapons in Chechnya. The 173rd Grozny training center alone contained weapons for 4-5 motorized rifle divisions, including: 32 tanks, 32 infantry fighting vehicles, 14 armored personnel carriers, 158 anti-tank installations.
In January 1992, there was practically not a single soldier left in the training center, and this entire mass of weapons was guarded only by the officers who remained in the military camp. Despite this, the federal center did not pay any attention to this, preferring to continue to share power in the country, and only in May 1993, Defense Minister Grachev arrived in Grozny for negotiations with Dudayev. As a result of negotiations, it was decided to divide all weapons available in Chechnya 50/50, and already in June the last Russian officer left the republic. Why it was necessary to sign this document and leave such a mass of weapons in Chechnya still remains unclear, because in 1993 it was already obvious that the problem could not be solved peacefully.
At the same time, due to Dudayev’s extremely nationalistic policies in Chechnya, there is a mass exodus of the Russian population from the republic. According to the then Minister of Internal Affairs, Kulikov, up to 9 Russian families per hour crossed the border every day.
But the anarchy that was happening in the republic affected not only the Russian residents in the republic itself, but also the residents of other regions. So, Chechnya was the main producer and supplier of heroin to Russia, also, about 6 billion dollars were seized through the Central Bank as a result of the famous story with fake Advice notes and, most importantly, they made money from this not only in Chechnya itself, they received financial benefits from it in Moscow. How else can one explain that in 92-93, famous Russian politicians and businessmen arrived in Grozny almost every month? According to the recollections of the former mayor of Grozny, Bislan Gantamirov, before each such visit of “distinguished guests,” Dudayev personally gave instructions on the purchase of expensive jewelry, explaining that this is how we solve our problems with Moscow.
It was no longer possible to turn a blind eye to this, and Yeltsin instructs the head of the Moscow Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), Savostyanov, to carry out an operation to overthrow Dudayev using the forces of the Chechen opposition. Savostyanov placed his bets on the head of the Nadterechny district of Chechnya, Umar Avturkhanov, and money and weapons began to be sent to the republic. On October 15, 1994, the first assault on Grozny by opposition forces began, but when less than 400 meters remained to Dudayev’s palace, someone from Moscow contacted Avturkhanov and ordered him to leave the city. According to information from the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Ruslan Khasbulatov, this “someone” was none other than the organizer of the assault on Savostyanov.
The next assault attempt by opposition forces was carried out on November 26, 1994, but it also failed miserably. After this assault, Defense Minister Grachev will in every possible way disown the Russian tank crews who were captured and declare that the Russian Army would have taken Grozny within an hour with the forces of one airborne regiment.
Apparently, even in the Kremlin itself they did not really believe in the success of this operation, because a couple of weeks before this assault, a secret meeting of the Security Council had already taken place in Moscow, entirely devoted to the Chechen problem. At this meeting, Minister of Regional Development Nikolai Egorov and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev made two polar reports. Egorov stated that the situation for sending troops into Chechnya is extremely favorable and 70 percent of the republic’s population will undoubtedly support this decision and only 30 will be neutral or will resist. Grachev, on the contrary, emphasized in his report that the introduction of troops would not lead to anything good, and we would meet fierce resistance and proposed postponing the introduction to the spring, so that there would be time to prepare the troops and draw up a detailed plan for the operation. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in response to this, openly called Grachev a coward and stated that such statements were not acceptable for the Minister of Defense. Yeltsin announced a break and, together with Rybkin, Shumeiko, Lobov and several other unknown members of the government, held a closed meeting. Its result was Yeltsin’s demand to prepare an operation plan for the deployment of troops within two weeks. Grachev could not refuse the president.
On November 29, the second meeting of the Security Council was held in the Kremlin, at which Grachev presented his plan, and the decision to send troops was finally made. Why the decision was made in such a hurry is not known for certain. According to one version, Yeltsin personally wanted to solve the problem of Chechnya before the new year and thus raise his extremely low rating. According to another, a member of the international committee of the State Duma, Andrei Kozyrev, had information that if the Russian Federation solves the problem of Chechnya in the near future and in a short period of time, this will not cause any particular negative reaction from the US administration.
One way or another, the deployment of troops took place in extreme haste, which led to the fact that five generals, to whom Grachev proposed to lead the operation, refused this and only in mid-December did Anatoly Kvashnin agree to this. There were less than two weeks left before the New Year's assault on Grozny...
The history of Chechnya as an independent state began quite unexpectedly. In the summer of 1991, the whole world suddenly learned that some part of Checheno-Ingushetia had decided to secede from the RSFSR and the USSR, and declared itself a new independent state called the Chechen Republic. A step towards this was the decision made at the National Congress of the Chechen People, which also determined the governing body of the new state - the executive committee headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev.
The decision began to immediately turn into reality. In September 1991, Dudayev's armed guards seized the buildings of the Council of Ministers, the radio and television center. On September 6, the building of the Supreme Council of Chechnya was stormed. Thus, a coup d'etat actually took place there, the Supreme Council was dissolved and on October 27 elections were held for the first president of the Chechen Republic.
By 1993, while Dudayev’s government was in power, the republic had turned into the most criminal zone in the territory of the former Union. The complete collapse of the police, prosecutor's office and courts contributed to the endless growth of crime. Thus, in 1992-1993, about 600 murders were committed annually in Chechnya, which was 7 times higher than in 1990. In 1993, there were 559 attacks on trains traveling through Chechnya, and more than 4,000 carriages were looted. Losses from these crimes amounted to tens of billions of rubles.
Gradually, the hotbed of crime began to grow. As of December 1, 1994, 1,900 people from Chechnya were put on the federal wanted list for committing crimes of varying severity. In addition, irreparable damage to the Russian economy was caused by a scam involving fake Chechen advice notes. Its essence was that criminals received cash using false payment orders from Chechen banks. Before the criminal network was uncovered, damage to the state amounted to 5 trillion rubles.
The production of counterfeit money also flourished here. The absence of police and the subsequent rampant banditry led to the violation of almost all human rights. There was no work or salary, no pensions or benefits were paid. During the three years that Dudayev was in power, more than 200 thousand people fled from the republic, that’s 20 percent of the entire population. At the same time, the number of Russians who left Chechnya at that time reached half.
At the same time, Dudayev actually kept the situation under control only in Grozny itself and its outskirts. The entire remaining territory of the republic was ruled by clans, which did whatever they wanted to the Russian population. After the declaration of independence on October 15, massacres began. And after November 26 - real repressions, pogroms, mass deportations, robberies and murders. The situation began to threaten the Russia that remained after the collapse of the USSR. Taking advantage of the chaos that reigned in the country due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dudayev declared independence and began to implement the secession of Chechnya from Russia.
The federal authorities tried to resolve the situation peacefully. However, in general, the steps were indecisive, and the legislative acts adopted in this regard were more persuasive than mandatory.
As a result, a military-police operation was announced to eliminate the Dudayev regime, disarm numerous armed groups and restore constitutional order in the region. However, it quickly escalated into war. At the same time, it turned out to be a big surprise for the Russian leadership that Dudayev had a well-trained and armed army. Thus, according to FSK data, there were no more than 250 armed bandits in Chechnya at that time.
However, they greatly miscalculated. The Chechen armed forces, including the army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, state security units, militia, and self-defense units, had about 13 thousand people at the beginning of hostilities. There were also about 2,500 mercenaries and volunteers from various regions of Russia and the CIS countries. Due to the fault of military officials, a large number of serviceable weapons, small arms, and armored vehicles were left in the republic.
Another big surprise was that the residents of Chechnya began to oppose the introduction of Russian troops into the republic. Most of them perceived this move as an invasion of hostile forces seeking to conquer the freedom-loving people. As a result of this, all those who had been fighting against him all this time as part of the opposition also went over to Dudayev’s side.
Section: War |
During the armed conflict in the North Caucasus during the week from November 17 to 23, 2014, at least eight people were injured, six of them were killed and two were injured. Also this week, it became known about the earlier death of another person. Among the dead were six suspected of participating in the activities of the armed underground - two in Dagestan and four in Chechnya. It also became known about the death of a civilian in Chechnya a week earlier.
Section: War | Section: War | Section: War |Opinions and ratings
Section: Opinions and ratings |Crimes in war
Section: News | Section: News | NTV story about abductions and torture of people in Chechnya taken off the airSection: voinenet-inform | Presentation of the book "The Diary of Polina Zherebtsova"
The presentation took place on October 21 at the Museum and Community Center. Andrei Sakharov in Moscow. The book tells about the events of 1999-2002 in Grozny, during the second Russian-Chechen war. Polina Zherebtsova kept a diary as a wounded teenager: dreams, poems and drawings of explosions that looked like flowers helped her not go crazy in this hell. The author participated in the presentation. Polina Zherebtsova spoke about herself, about the history of the publication of the book, read poems from the war years and fragments of her diary.
Watch our video report.
Opinions and ratings
Section: Opinions and ratings | North Caucasus: slavery of the word
Crimes in war
Section: Crimes in war | Section: War |Crimes in war
Section: Crimes in war |Opinions and ratings
Section: Opinions and ratings | About the "Shalin Raid" Section: War |Opinions and ratings
Section: Opinions and ratings |Opinions and ratings
Section: Opinions and ratings |Opinions and ratings
Section: Opinions and ratings |Opinions and ratings
Section: Opinions and ratings |Opinions and ratings
Section: Opinions and ratings | The son of Aslan Maskhadov published the book “My Father is the Chechen President”Opinions and ratings
Section: Opinions and ratings |We are publishing an appeal from Anzor Maskhadov in connection with his new project dedicated to the genocide of the Chechen people in the 20th-21st centuries.
Work is underway on a project dedicated to the genocide of the Chechen people. The goal of the project is to collect, analyze and disseminate information about crimes against our people in the 20th-21st centuries. Unfortunately, the world knows nothing or almost nothing about the tragedy of our people. Our duty is to bring this information to the world for the sake of restoring historical justice, in the name of the memory of those killed and in the name of future generations. Only the widest possible publicity can guarantee that something like this will not happen again.
Here you can leave your signature on an appeal to the President of the Russian Federation with a request to release the body of Aslan Maskhadov to relatives.
The leader of the Chechen separatists, former president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Aslan Maskhadov was killed on March 8, 2005 in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt.
His body was refused to be released to his relatives for burial. He was secretly buried in an unknown location.
First Chechen War |
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Chechnya, also partially Ingushetia, Dagestan, Stavropol Territory |
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Khasavyurt agreements, withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya. |
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Territorial changes: |
De facto independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. |
Opponents |
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Russian Armed Forces |
Chechen separatists |
Internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia |
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Commanders |
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Boris Yeltsin |
Dzhokhar Dudayev † |
Strengths of the parties |
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95,000 troops (February 1995) |
3,000 (Republican Guard), 27,000 (regulars and militia) |
Military losses |
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About 5,500 dead and missing (according to official figures) |
17,391 dead and prisoners (Russian data) |
First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian government forces (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991. Often called the “first Chechen war,” although the conflict was officially called “measures to maintain constitutional order.” The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of genocide of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.
Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the defeat and withdrawal of federal troops, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya until the second Chechen conflict and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.
Background to the conflict
With the beginning of “perestroika” in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People, created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev.
"Chechen Revolution" 1991
On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.
During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House.
More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.
On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation.
On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree introducing a state of emergency in Checheno-Ingushetia. After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted and the withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began from the republic, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses. Dudayev's forces got a lot of weapons: 2 missile launchers of the ground forces, 4 tanks, 3 infantry fighting vehicles, 1 armored personnel carrier, 14 lightly armored tractors, 6 aircraft, 60 thousand units of small automatic weapons and a lot of ammunition. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.
Collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1991-1992)
The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.
The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not been determined to this day (2010). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.
Period of de facto independence (1991-1994)
As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.
In reality, the state system of the ChRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994.
In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994.
A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.
Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.
The period of Dudayev's rule is characterized by ethnic cleansing against the entire non-Chechen population. In 1991-1994, the non-Chechen (primarily Russian) population of Chechnya was subjected to murders, attacks and threats from Chechens. Many were forced to leave Chechnya, being driven out of their homes, abandoning them or selling their apartments to Chechens at low prices. In 1992 alone, according to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny, and 300 went missing. The morgues were filled with unidentified corpses. Widespread anti-Russian propaganda was fueled by relevant literature, direct insults and calls from government platforms, and desecration of Russian cemeteries.
1993 political crisis
In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. The constitution adopted last year was amended and a regime of Dudayev's personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament.
Formation of the anti-Dudaev opposition (1993-1994)
After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).
Beginning of the Civil War (1994)
Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between government troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.
The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.
In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, Dudayev’s supporters lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI A. Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, B. Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander R. Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.
On November 26, the opposition unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.
Progress of the war
Deployment of troops (December 1994)
Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, 1994, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure law, order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.”
On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides - from the west (from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), northwest (from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya) and east (from the territory of Dagestan).
The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.
Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.
A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Division blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.
Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.
Assault on Grozny (December 1994 - March 1995)
Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops did not even have maps of the city or normal communications.
The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade and the 81st Petrakuv motorized rifle regiment, under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. There they were surrounded and defeated - the losses of the Maykop brigade amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.
The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.
On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.
Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.
Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.
Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the border of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.
In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.
Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.
A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.
As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.
Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)
After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.
The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.
Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya) and entered into battle with the militant forces. It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). The losses of the militants amounted to more than 100 people, the Russians - 13-16 people killed, 50-52 wounded. During the battle for Samashki, many civilians died and this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.
On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budennovsk and resumed in February 1996.
By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.
Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)
From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.
The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.
Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.
Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times.
Terrorist attack in Budennovsk (June 14 - 19, 1995)
On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory (Russian Federation) in trucks and stopped in the city of Budennovsk.
The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.
Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.
After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.
The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded.
The situation in the republic in June - December 1995
After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.
From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.
Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.
On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.
In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to be in accordance with previously reached agreements.
On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made against the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.
On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.
The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the former head of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Dokka Zavgaev.
On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.
On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.
Terrorist attack in Kizlyar (January 9-18, 1996)
On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar (Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation). The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.
The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.
Militant attack on Grozny (March 6-8, 1996)
On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.
Battle near the village of Yaryshmardy (April 16, 1996)
On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoi, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses.
Liquidation of Dzhokhar Dudayev (April 21, 1996)
From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.
On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.
By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.
Negotiations with the separatists (May-July 1996)
Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.
On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.
On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist groups, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.
The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.
On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.
On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.
Operation Jihad (6-22 August 1996)
On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.
Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).
According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.
Khasavyurt Agreements (August 31, 1996)
On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Republic of Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.
Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations
On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev”). . “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.
On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,
According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “due to his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.”
In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya.”
As part of the “Kovalyov mission”, representatives of various non-governmental organizations, deputies, and journalists traveled to the conflict zone. The mission collected information about what was happening in the Chechen war, searched for missing persons and prisoners, and contributed to the release of Russian military personnel captured by Chechen militants. For example, the Kommersant newspaper reported that during the siege of the village of Bamut by Russian troops, the commander of the militant detachments, Khaikharoev, promised to execute five prisoners after each shelling of the village by Russian troops, but under the influence of Sergei Kovalev, who participated in negotiations with the field commanders , Khaikharoev abandoned these intentions.
Since the beginning of the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched an extensive relief program, providing more than 250,000 displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance.
In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for residents of the North Caucasus.
In Grozny and other cities of Chechnya, free canteens were opened for the most vulnerable segments of the population, in which 7,000 people were provided with hot food every day. More than 70,000 schoolchildren in Chechnya received books and school supplies from the ICRC.
During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to assist those affected by the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, and provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages shelters.
In the fall of 1996, in the village of Novye Atagi, the ICRC equipped and opened a hospital for war victims. During the three months of operation, the hospital received more than 320 people, 1,700 people received outpatient care, and almost six hundred surgical operations were performed. On December 17, 1996, an armed attack was carried out on a hospital in Novye Atagi, as a result of which six of its foreign employees were killed. After this, the ICRC was forced to withdraw foreign staff from Chechnya.
In April 1995, American humanitarian specialist Frederick Cuney, together with two Russian doctors from the Russian Red Cross Society and a translator, was organizing humanitarian aid in Chechnya. Cuney was trying to negotiate a truce when he went missing. There is reason to believe that Cuney and his Russian associates were captured by Chechen militants and executed on the orders of Rezvan Elbiev, one of the heads of counterintelligence of Dzhokhar Dudayev, because they were mistaken for Russian agents. There is a version that this was the result of a provocation by the Russian special services, who thus dealt with Cuney at the hands of the Chechens.
Various women's movements ("Soldiers' Mothers", "White Shawl", "Women of the Don" and others) worked with military personnel - participants in combat operations, released prisoners of war, wounded, and other categories of victims during military operations.
Results
The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).
Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% from the contract amount. Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.
Losses
According to data released by the OGV headquarters, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, and 19,794 wounded. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen). However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the militants’ losses did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.
Commanders
Commanders of the United Group of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic
- Mityukhin, Alexey Nikolaevich (December 1994)
- Kvashnin, Anatoly Vasilievich (December 1994 - February 1995)
- Kulikov, Anatoly Sergeevich (February - July 1995)
- Romanov, Anatoly Alexandrovich (July - October 1995)
- Shkirko, Anatoly Afanasyevich (October - December 1995)
- Tikhomirov, Vyacheslav Valentinovich (January - October 1996)
- Pulikovsky, Konstantin Borisovich (acting July - August 1996)
In art
Movies
- “Cursed and Forgotten” (1997) is a feature-journalistic film by Sergei Govorukhin.
- “60 Hours of the Maikop Brigade” (1995) - a documentary film by Mikhail Polunin about the “New Year’s” assault on Grozny.
- “Blockpost” (1998) is a feature film by Alexander Rogozhkin.
- “Purgatory” (1997) is a naturalistic feature film by Alexander Nevzorov.
- “Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1996) is a feature film by Sergei Bodrov.
- DDT in Chechnya (1996): part 1, part 2
Music
- "Dead city. Christmas" - a song about Yuri Shevchuk's "New Year's" assault on Grozny.
- Yuri Shevchuk’s song “The boys were dying” is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
- The songs “Lube” are dedicated to the first Chechen war: “Batyanya Battalion Commander” (1995), “Soon demobilization” (1996), “Step March” (1996), “Ment” (1997).
- Timur Mutsuraev - Almost all of his work is dedicated to the First Chechen War.
- Songs about the First Chechen War occupy a significant part of the work of the Chechen bard Imam Alimsultanov.
- The song of the group Dead Dolphins - Dead City is dedicated to the first Chechen war.
- Blue berets - “New Year”, “Reflections of an officer at the hotline”, “Two turntables on Mozdok”.
Books
- “Prisoner of the Caucasus” (1994) - story (story) by Vladimir Makanin
- “Chechen Blues” (1998) - novel by Alexander Prokhanov.
- May Day (2000) - story by Albert Zaripov. The story of the storming of the village of Pervomayskoye in the Republic of Dagestan in January 1996.
- “Pathologies” (novel) (2004) - novel by Zakhar Prilepin.
- I was in this war (2001) - novel by Vyacheslav Mironov. The plot of the novel is built around the storming of Grozny by federal troops in the winter of 1994/95.
Any war gives rise to aggression, anger, violence, hatred and does not lead to anything good. This is evidenced by the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Great Patriotic War of 1941. Therefore, as the proverb says, “a bad peace is better than a good quarrel.”
With the coming to power of Dzhakhar Dudayev, everything in Chechnya changed radically.
Yeltsin, the first president of Russia, helped him come to power. Zavgaev, then first secretary of the regional committee, in response to Yeltsin’s question: “Are you with me?” -answered vaguely - “I don’t know, I’ll think about it!”
Yeltsin did not forgive mistakes. Zavgaev's power was overthrown. Ordinary people hoped for a better life and therefore blindly followed Dudayev.
Maybe Dudayev really wanted to lead the Chechen people to a better life? But, one way or another, it didn’t work out for him. Who started the war? Maybe the wrong people were with him? Maybe he was given a choice? But the war brought devastation to Chechnya and scattered Chechens to all corners of the world. Russia also lost tens of thousands of “unfledged” soldiers who barely completed their service.
It still remains a mystery: who needed the war in Chechnya? But one thing is clear: ordinary people, the bulk of the people, did not need it.
In 1995, a rumor spread through the village of Kenkhi that in a week there would be militants in the village. And, indeed, a week later the militants arrived in the village. There were two hundred of them. They brought weapons and food with them. Residents were dumbfounded. The militants scattered throughout the forest and along the mountain tops. In search of militants, Shark helicopters flew in and began shelling the houses of civilians. They took a school, a club, and an administration office to house their people at night, and during the day they went into the forest. One thing surprised the residents: helicopters flew in, people died, civilians, but the militants remained safe and sound. So, the mother of seven children, Magomedova Zalpay, went in the afternoon to fetch water with a jug. Suddenly helicopters flew in, bombed her anywhere, and she was killed to death by a shell fragment. For what? The children asked her. How will we live without our beloved mother? What have we done? There was confusion on the faces of her children.
And the residents of the entire village were forced to hide in rocks, sheds, and caves so that they would not be killed by a shell fragment. Many began to suffer from nervous illnesses. Two teenage boys, Gadzhiev Khazho and Kadimagomaev Magomed, were traveling from Grozny to their home in a truck. There were many posts along the way. They stopped us everywhere and checked our documents. At a checkpoint near the village of Dachu-Borzoya, their documents were checked, and when the car passed, someone threw a grenade after them, the car caught fire and exploded, the driver and five passengers managed to run away into the forest, and shooting began behind them. Two boys, teenagers, died. The body of one was found not far from the car, and the other a month later in the forest.
“For what?” asked the residents.
At the same time, the war began in Chechnya. The war was terrible. Shark helicopters flew in, shot, mostly killed residents and blew up their houses. But the militants remained safe and sound. This outraged the people. Why were young, newly drafted soldiers thrown into the war with those trained abroad and clandestinely in Russia?
Soldiers died, were captured, it was a terrible time for parents whose children served and ended up in the thick of the war. They lost because they did not know the area well, had primitive weapons and were poorly trained, although they were not lacking in courage. None of the mothers wanted their son to end up in Chechnya. Having learned that their son was sent to Chechnya, the parents were on pins and needles: they were worried, afraid for the life of their own child. But, nevertheless, many Russian soldiers died.
...Petya left to serve in the Army from the Moscow region. With him were thirty other colleagues from different areas of the Moscow region. They were all eighteen, recently graduated from high school.
He remembered how his mother saw him off. She had one. Her eyes are swollen from tears. How his girlfriend, Tatyana, looked into his eyes, how the church minister crossed them all at parting, how he barely had time to kiss Tanya, his bride.
“I’ll be back,” he thought, I’ll definitely be back... Peter was a tall, slender guy, strong build, with curly black hair and gray eyes. The unit that Peter ended up in was located in the Shatoi region. The high mountains, covered with dense forest on one side and bare rocky ones, shimmering blue on the other, surprised with their unusualness. Behind them more mountains were visible, behind those more and more, so endlessly, thought Peter.
- No matter how beautiful these mountains and landscape are, it’s still better here. Quiet, calm river, colorful meadows, black soil everywhere. Birch trees flaunt around, their tops smoothly pointing upward.
“When will this war end?” he thought.
In the morning, fog thickly covered the rocky mountains and wooded hills of the Shatoi region. At first it appeared in the lowlands of the mountains, and then rose higher and higher, filling all the space around.
My heart sank and seemed to be enveloped in fog, it became sad and melancholy, the blues set in, I wanted everything around to clear up, because my soul was languishing from such weather.
The militants walked heavily loaded along a forest path. They needed to take the high ground. They knew the area well, so they decided to hide weapons and food in order to hold out until the agreed time.
The detachment commander, Khanukaev, from the village of Starye Atagi, led a detachment of three hundred militants. Its task was to destroy Russian soldiers thrown into the Shatoi region. The militants had difficulty reaching their destination. Tired of the heavy burden, they enjoyed their rest: they looked at the nature that surrounded them. The trees on one side densely covered the mountains, gorges, and hills, on the other side they were burned out by Russian “Shark” helicopters so that militants would not hide in the forest.
The trees, swaying slightly from the wind, tilted their green, fluffy branches towards them, as if surprised by what was happening around them and warning against trouble. The blue sky and sun rays seemed to echo the forest.
Many militants had families at home, some were killed. And revenge moved forward.
The Russian soldiers did not know that there were militants nearby, that they had hidden weapons and ammunition, that they were preparing to take the height guarded by Russian soldiers at night.
They left the guards, everyone was tired and went to bed. Many dreamed of their native land. So to Drozdov
I dreamed of my mother, with her hands outstretched to him. She shouted: “Son, take care of yourself!”
Then he dreamed of a girl who asked: “Will you come back?”
It was two o'clock in the morning. Terrible explosions thundered. The soldiers, fast asleep,
They jumped up and under Drozdov’s command: “Forward, attack!” Let's run out!"
A terrible barrage of fire began. No one understood, and there was no time to understand, how the militants got here.
Every second made a difference. It was very dark, only volleys of guns illuminated everything around.
Several militants trained abroad moved forward, their task was to neutralize the sentries and suddenly attack the sleeping detachment of Pyotr Drozdov.
But the militants met desperate resistance, not for life, but for death.
Pyotr Drozdov’s detachment resisted steadfastly, although it was much inferior in training and in the availability of weapons to the militants. “Unfledged youngsters” bravely rushed at the militants.
They fought to the death. Strength of spirit and unprecedented courage helped hold out until the morning. Half of the soldiers of Drozdov’s detachment were destroyed by the militants.
the militants also suffered considerable losses, because the soldiers fought with frenzy
with militants: knives, fists, all the power of revenge for the Motherland, the unity of Russia, for separation from loved ones were used,
for them - relatives. The militants did not expect such resistance. How? Shame on them that they
with such weapons, with such foreign-trained thugs, they could not cope with the soldiers until the morning. “Forward!” Drozdov shouted.
“We have nothing to lose, we’ll die anyway if help doesn’t arrive!”
-Let’s show them, let’s drive them where Makar didn’t drive the calves.
The soldiers seemed to have gone berserk, going berserk, rushing at the militants: they snatched machine guns and knives from the militants, and when they couldn’t handle the weapons, they rushed at the militants, biting them out of anger, and using various fighting techniques.
In the morning, help did not come, as promised from above; twenty-nine soldiers remained, whom the militants, led by Drozdov, took prisoner.
Tired, broken guys were captured. They were taken towards the Shatoi district, a village. There they were placed in a barn and locked with a large padlock. They were all tightly tied. The soldiers’ souls were heavy from the misfortune that had befallen them. They did not know what would happen to them, how they would get out of captivity, and would they even get out at all? Behind these thoughts they fell asleep. At dawn they were awakened by someone's kicks:
“Oh, you beasts, here you go!” blows from boots and sticks rained down on them. Then no one came in for half a day.
In the evening the door of the barn opened, a man in camouflage uniform put a piece of bread and a bucket of water in front of each of them. At this time, two guards entered with a machine gun in their hands and untied the prisoners’ hands, allowed them to go to relieve themselves, drink water and eat a piece of bread.
Many of the soldiers were bruised, tired after everything that had happened, they fell into a heavy sleep. Many of them dreamed of home and peaceful life. Early in the morning they were awakened by a loud knock on the door. The same man in camouflage uniform, having given me a meager ration of food, said that work awaited them, cleaning the barn from manure, which had not been cleaned for several years.
So the soldiers were forced to clean out the entire barn, the size of a farm. Life in captivity was absolute hell. They wanted a large ransom for the soldiers, which none of them could give.
They were threatened with death if they tried to escape or resist. They showed a large dagger with which they would slaughter any of the disobedient ones like a ram.
The militants filmed the prisoners, showing how they abused the captured soldiers in order to send them abroad for reporting, where they received money from.
The postman brought Drozdov's mother Petra a letter from the command of the military unit,
that her son died a heroic death.
On TV, the Vesti program reported that Pyotr Drozdov’s detachment was suddenly attacked by militants, and the entire detachment was killed under a barrage of fire and bomb explosions.
What the parents and relatives of the soldiers were going through, only God knows, they cursed
war, power, everything in the world.
-We need to destroy Chechnya! Revenge, hatred of Chechens and people of Caucasian nationality motivated them.
Drozdov’s mother kept dreaming about her son, as if he was alive, but could not approach her.
She secretly hoped that a miracle would happen and her son would return to her. Maybe he didn’t die, maybe he’s alive, she thought. How she suffered, how bored she was without her son and couldn’t find a place for herself.
In the evenings, she met with her son’s daughter-in-law, both cried and worried.
Drozdova Maria, that was the name of Pavel’s mother, wrote a letter to the headquarters of the military unit where her son served. In the letter, she asked if there were witnesses who could confirm that her son was not alive, and asked to write in more detail the name of the area, the place where the fighting took place. Soon she received an answer from headquarters that when reinforcements arrived, no one was alive, the corpses of all the servicemen were not found, maybe they were blown up, or maybe they were captured, but the unit did not have any information yet.
