Combat maps of Operation Seydlitz. Small-scale history close-up. Without God's help

	July 1942
	Smolensk and Kalinin regions
	Wehrmacht victory
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
I. I. Maslennikov	G. von Kluge
S. V. Sokolov	G. von Vietinghoff
Strengths of the parties
About 60,000 people	Unknown
4,386 killed, 47,072 missing (data varies)	1819 killed, 6853 wounded, 253 missing combat losses of the 9th Army for July

(July 2 - 23, 1942; German. Unternehmen "Seydlitz"; in domestic historical science - “Defensive operation in the area of ​​the city of Bely”, “Defensive operation near Kholm-Zhirkovsky”, Kholm-Zhirkovskaya defensive operation) - offensive operation of the 9th German Army of Army Group Center, part of the Battle of Rzhev. Operation Seydlitz was the last of a series of operations to eliminate the wedges formed as a result of the Red Army offensive in the winter of 1941-1942. The main goal of the operation was the defeat of the 39th Army of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov and the 11th Cavalry Corps of Colonel S.V. Sokolov, who occupied the front sector in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area.

Position of the parties

The 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps were stationed in an area on the border of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions, which was replete with forests, swamps and rivers. This area was close to the highway and railways Smolensk - Vyazma and Rzhev - Sychevka, which played an important role in supplying Army Group Center. For this reason, the Soviet group, which the Germans estimated numbered 60 thousand people, worried the Wehrmacht command. Beginning in the spring of 1942, he developed an operation to eliminate the Kholm-Zhirkovsky salient, which received the code name “Seydlitz.”

As a result of the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation of 1942, Soviet troops of the 39th Army (21st Guards Rifle, 252nd, 256th, 357th, 373rd and 381st Rifle Divisions, artillery regiment, three divisions of Guards mortars , a tank battalion, two engineering battalions (commander - Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov)) and the 11th Cavalry Corps (18th, 24th, 46th and 82nd Cavalry Divisions (commander - Colonel S. V. Sokolov)) of the Kalinin Front (commander - Colonel General I. S. Konev) occupied a vast salient in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area. This ledge was, in turn, on the western front of the German Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge in close proximity to the enemy’s main communications (highway and railway

Smolensk - Vyazma, Rzhev - Sychevka railway). The total number of Soviet troops in the ledge was estimated by the Germans at 60 thousand people. Soviet troops experienced an acute shortage of ammunition. Attaching great importance to its Rzhev-Vyazma grouping, the German command could not ignore such a threat and immediately after the end of the spring battles in the area of ​​Vyazma and Rzhev began preparing an operation to destroy the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The disposition of the troops favored the German plan to conduct an encirclement operation: a huge ledge (with an area of ​​up to 5,000 square kilometers) was connected to the main forces of the Kalinin Front through a narrow “corridor” (maximum width - 28 kilometers) in the Nelidovo area. The Soviet-held territory inside the bulge was a rugged, wooded and swampy area with numerous rivers but few dirt roads. Along the edges of the corridor, German troops held the cities of Olenino and Bely, which were turned into exceptionally strong defensive areas. The management of the Soviet troops was very unsuccessful: the forces inside the salient were not united under a single leadership, and the most vulnerable lines - the borders of the “corridor” were defended by other armies (the northern border - the 22nd Army under the command of General V. A. Yushkevich, the southern border - 41 -I Army under the command of Major General G. F. Tarasov).

According to the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Konev, the greatest concern for the fate of our troops in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge was shown by I.V. Stalin, who at one of the meetings proposed to withdraw the troops from there themselves. I. S. Konev spoke out against it, citing the attraction of a significant number of German troops to the salient and the fear that after the evacuation they would be withdrawn to reserve to form new strike groups. G.K. Zhukov supported him, and I.V. Stalin withdrew his proposal. Further development of the situation showed that I.V. Stalin in this situation assessed the situation more realistically than his generals.

The operation was planned by the commander of the 9th German Army, Colonel General W. Model. However, on May 23, he was wounded by Soviet anti-aircraft fire while flying to the troops and was in the hospital. The duties of the army commander were performed by the commander of the 46th Panzer Corps, General of the Panzer Forces G. von Vietinghof. To carry out Operation Seydlitz, significant forces were deployed and quantitative and qualitative superiority over Soviet troops was ensured. Ten infantry and four tank divisions took part in the operation (321 tanks, not counting tanks and self-propelled guns in infantry units). A separate cavalry brigade was also formed, consisting of 3 regiments with 14 tanks (commanded by Colonel Karl von der Meden).

The Soviet command received intelligence information about the concentration of German troops and, on the whole, correctly assessed the enemy’s plans, but failed to organize proper counteraction.

Start of operation

On July 2, 1942, at 3:00, after a short artillery and air preparation, the German offensive began with two attack groups: the 23rd Army Corps of General of Infantry A. Schubert (2 tank divisions, 2 infantry divisions, cavalry brigade) was advancing from the north from the Olenino area. A separate group of Ezebeka (tank and infantry divisions) was advancing from the south from the Bely area. In the first days of the operation, Soviet troops put up stubborn resistance, and only a deep detour along the forest roads of the German cavalry brigade with access to the rear of the defending troops allowed the enemy to achieve success.

Only on July 5, German tank divisions from the northern and southern groupings met in the area of ​​​​the village of Pushkari, cutting off the Bely - Olenino highway. The encirclement ring around the Soviet troops closed. It included the full strength of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps, as well as two rifle divisions and a tank brigade from the 41st Army, a full rifle division and separate units of two divisions of the 22nd Army.

The Germans understood that in the vast territory of the “cauldron” with airfields located inside, the encircled Soviet units had the ability to defend themselves for a long time and successfully (as Soviet troops had already demonstrated in the Rzhev-Vyazma operation in the spring of 1942. Therefore, without waiting for the encirclement to be completed, on July 4 from the eastern front Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge, the third strike group (1 tank and 2 infantry divisions) delivered a deep cutting blow in the western direction. Having received information about this, on July 5, front commander I. S. Konev realized the hopelessness of resistance inside the ledge and gave the order to break through all encircled forces from the encirclement ring, but the enemy did not allow this: on July 6, the encirclement ring was cut in two and two encircled groups were formed.Moving to the breakthrough lines along poor dirt roads (due to the rains, off-road movement became impossible), Soviet troops were constantly exposed to German air attacks and suffered heavy losses.

A large amount of military equipment was abandoned due to the impossibility of transporting it. Communication between the front command and the headquarters of the 39th Army was lost for several days.

Unlike the battles of 1941, Soviet troops showed significant stability and controllability in critical situations. By July 9, almost all units of the 41st Army, which were located closest to the rest of the front troops (severely thinned two divisions and a tank brigade without tanks, over three thousand people), had escaped from the encirclement. To the north, units and entire units from five divisions at once also successfully broke through. To prevent the Soviet troops from leaving the encirclement, the German command was forced to bring into battle in the area of ​​the former “corridor” the last remaining reserves being prepared for this operation. Nevertheless, on July 11, a group of more than one thousand people, led by the commander of the 381st Infantry Division, broke through, and on July 13, a group of 300 soldiers led by the commander of a cavalry regiment. Breakout attempts by smaller groups continued, and Soviet soldiers suffered significant losses.

On July 12, the command of the 9th German Army reported the completion of Operation Seydlitz. An official message from the German command dated July 13, 1942 reported the complete destruction of the entire encircled group, the capture of over 30 thousand prisoners, the capture and destruction of 218 tanks, 591 guns, 1,301 machine guns and mortars.

In fact, the organized resistance of the encircled Soviet troops and their breakthrough attempts continued. By July 17, a group of about 1,500 people was fighting in the northern “cauldron” under the leadership of the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General P. S. Ivanov, in the southern “cauldron” the headquarters of the 39th Army and about eight thousand people. On the night of July 19, U-2 aircraft took out part of the command of the 39th Army and its slightly wounded commander, Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov. The deputy commander of the 39th Army, Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov, remained in command of the troops, who organized the exit of his troops from the encirclement: on the evening of July 21, counter strikes were launched from inside and outside (185th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army). On the night of July 21, 7,362 people broke through in an organized manner, while about 460 soldiers died in a brutal, bloody battle and 172 were captured. Among the dead were the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General P. S. Ivanov, and the deputy commander of the 22nd Army, Major General A. D. Berezin. Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov himself walked in the attacking chain and broke through to his own, but already in the depths of the defense of the 22nd Army he was mortally wounded during artillery shelling, taken by plane to the hospital in the city of Bely and died there on July 24, 1942.

Resistance inside the encirclement finally ceased on July 23, 1942. In total, up to 20 thousand people broke out of the encirclement.

Results of the operation

During Operation Seydlitz, the Soviet troops of the Kalinin Front suffered a major defeat. An important and advantageous bridgehead in the depths of the enemy’s Rzhev-Vyazma grouping was lost, which increased its stability in defense. The enemy restored traffic along the shortest roads from Smolensk to Olenino, significantly improving the supply of his 9th Army.

In Soviet historical science, this unsuccessful operation was hardly mentioned or studied.

Losses

USSR

On the issue of determining the level of losses, the limited information available from Russian and Western historians differs significantly from each other. Thus, A.V. Isaev provides the following data in his work: the total losses of the 22nd, 39th, 41st armies and the 11th cavalry corps amounted to 61,722 people, of which 4,386 were killed and 47,072 were missing. lead. Among the dead were Lieutenant General I.A. Bogdanov, Major Generals P.S. Ivanov, A. D. Berezin, P. P. Miroshnichenko (chief of staff of the 39th Army), brigade commissar Yusim (member of the Military Council of the 39th Army). The tank brigade lost all 43 tanks. All the Katyushas were blown up. Similar data are provided by S. A. Gerasimova.

According to German data, during the operation up to 50 thousand prisoners were captured, 230 tanks, 58 aircraft, 760 guns of all types were destroyed or captured.

According to official data presented by G.F. Krivosheev, the total losses in this operation were determined to be 20,360 people, of which irrevocable - 7,432 people, sanitary - 12,928 people. Given the nature of the battle, these data are considered to be clearly underestimated.

Germany

The losses of the German side are unknown and are not published even in the works of German historians. It is assumed that they were much less than the losses of Soviet troops, but at the same time quite significant, since this did not allow Army Group Center to take part in the Wehrmacht summer offensive of 1942. All units of the 9th German Army withdrawn to reserve remained in the Rzhev salient and were involved in the Rzhev-Sychevsky operation.

USSR, Smolensk and Kalinin regions

The last operation to eliminate the wedges formed as a result of the winter offensive of the Red Army was Operation Seydlitz. The operation was carried out by Army Group Center in July 1942. The target of the operation was the troops of the 39th Army of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov and the 11th Cavalry Corps of Colonel S.V. Sokolov, who occupied a vast area in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area . Back on February 12, 1942, the “Order on the conduct of combat operations on the Eastern Front at the end of the winter period” was issued to restore a continuous front line, which specifically stated:

“When choosing the boundaries where the front line will pass, ensuring the safety of supply routes for front-line units and important line communications (railroads and highways) from enemy influence, as well as from various kinds of sabotage, is of decisive importance” (Dashichev V.I. Decree. cit., p.317).

The troops of I.I. Maslennikov and S.V. Sokolov were dangerously close to several important communications: the highway and the Smolensk-Vyazma railway and the Rzhev-Sychevka railway. By the beginning of the summer of 1942, Soviet troops occupied an area replete with forests, swamps, rivers and streams at the junction of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions with an area of ​​almost 5 thousand square kilometers. On June 2, the 39th Army included the 21st Guards Rifle Division, 252nd, 256th, 357th, 373rd and 381st Rifle Divisions. The 11th Cavalry Corps included the 18th, 24th, 36th and 82nd Cavalry Divisions. The cavalry corps occupied defense on a wide front on the southern face of the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge.

The position of the army of I.I. Maslennikov and the cavalry corps of S.V. Sokolov was in many ways similar to the position of the 2nd Shock Army in the Lyuban ledge. The counteroffensive of Model's 9th Army in the winter of 1942 interrupted the main communications of the 39th Army. However, the successful offensive of the 4th Shock Army on Toropets allowed the 39th Army to be supplied through the Nelidov area in the corridor between the German-held towns of Olenino and Bely. At its narrowest point, the width of the corridor was 27-28 km. Just as in the case of the 2nd Shock Army, the commanders of two different armies were responsible for the communications of the troops of Maslennikov and Sokolov. The northern and southern “walls” of the corridor were defended by the 22nd and 41st armies of the Kalinin Front, respectively. The first is already well known to us, it has participated in battles since July 1941. The second was new to the summer battles of 1942. The 41st Army was formed on May 15 according to the directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters on the basis of the operational groups of Major General G.F. Tarasov and General -Major Berzarin. The army was led by the commander of the 249th Infantry Division, G.F. Tarasov, who had proven himself well in the Toropetsk-Kholm operation of the 4th Shock Army.

Maintaining the penetration perimeter of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps required the allocation of significant forces from the 9th Army. The German command estimated the number of Soviet troops in the rear of Army Group Center at 60 thousand people. Such a large group, occupying a bridgehead in close proximity to the main communications of the army group, could not but cause concern to the German command. Since the spring of 1942, development of a large-scale operation to clear the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge has been underway. The operation was codenamed Seydlitz.

However, Operation Seydlitz was not destined to tarnish Walter Model's reputation as a "defensive genius" with a successful offensive on a large scale. On May 23, 1942, during another flight to troops in the Belyi area, his Fisiler “Storch” was fired from the ground, and the commander of the 9th Army was wounded in the lung. The Storch pilot was also injured, but was able to land the plane. Model reported the plan for Operation Seydlitz to the commander of Army Group Center in the Smolensk hospital. On June 2, Panzer General von Fittinghof temporarily took command of the 9th Army. Later, the commander of the XLVI Panzer Corps, General Scheel, took command of the 9th Army at the direction of General von Fittinghoff.

Despite the relatively small width of the corridor between Olenin and Bely, insignificant by the standards of a maneuverable “blitzkrieg,” the operation did not promise to be easy. The northern “wall” of the corridor ran along the river valley surrounded by dense forests. Luchesa. Anticipating battles in wooded areas with poor roads, the command of the 9th Army organized a special unit - the von der Meden cavalry brigade. Colonel Karl Friedrich von der Meden was an old cavalryman who joined the tank forces in the mid-30s. During the period of the events described, he commanded a motorized infantry regiment of the 1st Tank Division. In 1942, he had to remember his youth and lead the formation, officially called Kavallerie Brigade zbV beim Armeeoberkommando 9 (special purpose cavalry brigade of the 9th Army command). The brigade consisted of three regiments of four to five squadrons each. The squadrons were of mixed composition: out of thirteen squadrons, six were on bicycles, and the rest were on horses. The brigade was saturated with automatic weapons: in three regiments there were more than 30 heavy and 72 light machine guns, the rank and file were armed with submachine guns in the maximum possible quantities. The rear of the brigade was motorized, sappers rode bicycles, and communications units were partially motorized. Each regiment was assigned six light field howitzers. The regiments were trained for four to six weeks and at the end of June 1942 they concentrated south of Olenin in the Luchesa Valley area. The cavalry brigade was also assigned 14 tanks.

In addition to the cavalry brigade, ten infantry and four tank divisions (1st, 2nd, 5th and 20th) were involved in Operation Seydlitz. The tank regiments of three of these four divisions (1st, 2nd and 20th) remained in single-battalion composition, since the first tank battalions were withdrawn from them to strengthen the tank and motorized divisions involved in the summer offensive of 1942. In the 2nd Panzer Division on June 20 there were 22 Pz.II, 33 Pz.38(t), 20 Pz.III, 5 Pz.IV and 2 command tanks, in the 20th on June 30 - 8 Pz.II, 39 Pz.38(t ), 20 Pz.III, 13 Pz.IV and 7 command tanks. For the 1st Panzer Division there are data as of July 15: 2 Pz.II, 10 Pz.38(t), 26 Pz.III, 7 Pz.IV and 4 command tanks. The only tank division with two tank battalions in a tank regiment was the 5th Tank Division, which on June 25 consisted of 26 Pz.II, 55 Pz.III, 13 Pz.IV and 9 command tanks. All Pz.III and Pz.IV tanks in these four divisions were of old types; they did not receive a single tank of these types with long-barreled guns.

The thoroughness of the preparation of the operation is evidenced by the fact that German reconnaissance planes carried out aerial photography of an area of ​​3,300 square meters. km. The command post of the 9th Army was moved to Olenino, closer to the site of the upcoming battle.

It cannot be said that the German offensive was a complete surprise for the command of the Kalinin Front. Back on June 29 and 30, in a direct conversation with I.I. Maslennikov and S.V. Sokolov, front commander I.S. Konev indicated that “it is possible in the coming days that the enemy will attack from the Bely region in the northern and northeastern direction "(VIA, No. 8(23), p. 26). The commander of the 39th Army said:

“I am preparing to fight in the most unfavorable conditions, that is, to fight surrounded by without the right to withdraw the army. For this you only need ammunition and food” (ibid., pp. 26-27).

With such samurai sentiments, the Soviet command of the 39th Army greeted the beginning of Seydlitz.

The German offensive began at 3.00 on July 2, 1942, after a short artillery preparation and an air strike by Ju-87 bombers. From the north, from the Olenino region, the XXIII Army Corps of General Schubert was advancing in two groups. The western group consisted of units of the 1st Panzer, 110 and 102nd Infantry Divisions, the eastern group - the 5th Panzer Division and von der Meden's cavalry brigade. They were opposed by units of the 185th and 380th Rifle Divisions of the 22nd Army and the 21st Guards Rifle Division of the 39th Army. From the Bely area, the Ezebek group, consisting of the 2nd tank and 246th infantry divisions, began an offensive to the east. In the future they. were to turn north towards the XXIII Corps. Opposed to two German divisions was the 17th Guards Rifle Division of the 41st Army.

The greatest resistance was encountered by the 1st Tank Division in the area of ​​the village of Starukhi on the banks of the Luchesa. To assist it, the 102nd Infantry Division was ordered to attack the Soviet forces from the flank. From the reserve of the 9th Army, a regiment of the 14th motorized division also advanced to this direction. The 5th Tank Division moved rather slowly along the Olenino-Bely road. The choice of this highway as the axis of attack was quite predictable, and Soviet troops erected anti-tank obstacles and concrete fortifications. While in the northern sector of the offensive the German troops met stubborn defense, in the Bely area the maneuver with a strike first to the east followed by a turn to the north initially brought success. However, here Soviet troops quickly moved to actively counter the attackers. Already in the evening of the first day of the operation, a counterattack followed with the participation of the 21st Tank Brigade against the flank of the 2nd Tank Division. The repulsion of the counterattack continued on July 3.

Von der Meden's cavalry played an important role in the success of Seydlitz. Advancing parallel to the 5th Panzer Division through the forests, the cavalry brigade on July 3 reached the rear of the units of the 256th Infantry Division defending on the highway. The front in this direction was broken through, and the 5th Panzer Division reached the village of Shizderevo on the river. Obsha. Reinforced by the 102nd Infantry Division and receiving air support, the 1st Panzer Division also began to push forward more confidently. Heavy fighting gradually exhausted the strength of the defenders. For example, by July 4, the 355th Infantry Division, defending the front to the north, had up to 40% losses in personnel and was forced to withdraw. The final success of the German offensive was achieved on Sunday, July 5, 1942, when the 1st and 2nd tank divisions met near the village of Pushkari on the Bely - Olenino highway. All units and formations of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps were encircled, as well as formations of the 41st (17th Guards Rifle Division, 135th Rifle Division, 21st Tank Brigade) and 22nd (355th -I, units of the 380th and 185th rifle divisions) armies.

Here we should once again note the weakness of Soviet military transport aviation, which did not allow organizing effective air supply of even a relatively small group of troops. The external and internal fronts of the encirclement of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps were separated by a narrow strip of enemy-occupied territory along the Bely - Smolensk railway. The territory occupied by Soviet troops in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky salient was large enough to organize several landing sites. If an “air bridge” was organized, I.I. Maslennikov’s army could hold out until the start of the Pogorelo-Gorodishchensk operation in August 1942, which gave a chance to relieve the blockade with a strike from the east. Without air supply, those surrounded were quickly left without ammunition and food, and the “cauldron” lost the ability to provide organized resistance.

Simultaneously with the closure of the encirclement along the Olenino-Bely highway, the Germans launched a blow cutting the “cauldron” in half from the eastern front of the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge. On July 4 at 1.45, the XLVI Panzer Corps, with the forces of the 20th Panzer, 328th and 86th Infantry Divisions, launched an offensive in a western direction. On July 5, the command of the 39th Army made a decision to withdraw troops from the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge. This decision was already hopelessly late. Literally within two days, the “cauldron” was cut into northern and southern parts, each of which could fight its way out of the encirclement through a narrow section of the Olenino-Bely highway. The situation was aggravated by the muddy roads after heavy rains, which slowed down the marches of the troops of I.I. Maslennikov and S.V. Sokolov. The divisions retreating to the neck of the salient were also forced to abandon and destroy stuck equipment. The troops removed from their positions and stretched along the roads turned into an excellent target for enemy aircraft. On July 8, the 11th Cavalry Corps was subordinated to the 39th Army. The retreat and air strikes led to the loss of communications. Late in the evening of July 8, the radio stations of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps stopped answering calls from front headquarters. The front headquarters delegates sent by plane did not return. Communication was restored only a few days later.

One of the participants in the events, liaison officer of the 17th Guards Rifle Division V. Polyakov, described the situation of those days as follows:

“An atmosphere of calm doom reigned at the headquarters. It was felt that people had done everything possible that was in their power, and now, out of inertia, out of an ingrained habit of duty, they were carrying out their burden to the end, until their last strength was exhausted...”

During July 7-9, units of the 41st Army broke through from the encirclement. About 1,000 people came out of the 135th Rifle Division, 1,759 people from the 17th Guards Division, and the 21st Tank Brigade (without tanks). During the same period, individuals and units of the 24th and 46th cavalry divisions, 357th, 355th and 262nd rifle divisions emerged.

Successful breakthrough attempts and increasing external pressure forced the German command to pull all reserves to the captured corridor. The exit from the southern "pocket" is blocked by the 427th Regiment of the 129th Infantry Division, which is immediately attacked by coordinated attacks from inside and outside the "pocket".

July 12 is considered by the Germans to be the official completion date of Seydlitz. The official message from the German command on July 13, 1942 read:

“The broad offensive of German units, which began on July 2 southwest of Rzhev, effectively supported by aviation units, led, after breaking through the system of enemy positions in heavy forest battles, to the encirclement and destruction of several rifle and cavalry divisions, as well as one tank brigade. In this 11-day battle, over 30 thousand prisoners of war were taken, 218 tanks, 591 guns, 1,301 machine guns and mortars, as well as a large number of other weapons and military equipment of all types were captured or destroyed. The enemy's losses are serious. The number of prisoners of war and trophies continues to grow."

However, organized resistance and breakthrough attempts did not end on July 12. By July 17, a group of about 1,500 people had gathered in the northern “cauldron” under the leadership of the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General P.S. Ivanov. Approximately 8,000 people gathered in the southern pocket, led by the headquarters of the 39th Army. Member of the Military Council of the Army, Brigade Commissar Yusim and Chief of Staff, Major General P.P. Miroshnichenko died.

On the night of July 18-19, nine U-2 aircraft landed in the “cauldron”, which were supposed to take command of the 39th Army. The slightly wounded commander of the 39th Army, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov, flew away on one of these planes, and the deputy commander, Lieutenant General I.A. Bogdanov, remained with the troops. Sometimes this episode is reproached to I.I. Maslennikov. However, as mentioned above, the general in this case is not the master of his own destiny. He is a person in public service, and he is obliged to take advantage of the planes sent after him. Staying with your troops until the end is an understandable, but not always advisable decision from a long-term perspective. In the same way, for example, K.K. Rokossovsky could have remained with the command of the 16th Army in the Vyazma “cauldron” in October 1941 instead of organizing defense in the Volokolamsk direction.

The last major attempt to relieve the encircled 39th Army was made on the evening of July 21. A group of troops of the 39th Army under the command of I.A. Bogdanov was attacked by the 185th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army. Already by 23.00 on June 21, 3,500 people in the division’s sector had left the encirclement. During the battles to provide a corridor for the troops to exit, General Bogdanov was wounded and taken by plane to the hospital, where he died on July 24, 1942. On the battlefield on the evening of July 21, the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, P.S. Ivanov, died on July 22 buried by the Germans with military honors. Deputy Commander of the 22nd Army A.D. Berezin died trying to break out of encirclement.

On July 23, 1942, reports about the condition of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps disappeared from the combat log of the Kalinin Front. This day can be considered the actual date of completion of Operation Seydlitz to eliminate the penetration of Soviet troops in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area. At the beginning of August 1942, the 11th Cavalry Corps was disbanded. The remnants of the 373rd, 381st, 256th and 252nd rifle divisions that had retained their battle flags were withdrawn for reorganization. The 39th Army was re-formed by renaming the 58th Army Directorate created in June 1942. The army was headed by Lieutenant General A.I. Zygin.

During Operation Seydlitz, a major defeat was inflicted on the troops of the Kalinin Front. Formed as a result of the Rzhev-Vyazma operation in the winter of 1942, the wedge of Soviet troops in the area north of Vyazma was surrounded and destroyed. Thus, a profitable bridgehead for an offensive against Army Group Center was eliminated, the front line was shortened and traffic along the highway from Smolensk to Olenino was restored, which improved the supply of the 9th Army as a whole.

The encirclement of the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps was carried out according to a pattern typical of the Wehrmacht's spring-summer counteroffensive on the Eastern Front. The strongholds at the base of the Soviet breakthrough, held during the winter battles, did not allow the breakthrough to expand and made it vulnerable to attacks in converging directions. The city of Bely and the Olenino region became such “schwerpunkts” in addition to the 9th Army. Even the strong defense of the walls of the “corridor”, along which the Soviet troops that penetrated into the depths of the enemy’s defenses were supplied, did not ensure the successful retention of communications.

Operation “Seydlitz” July 2 - 23, 1942 (in the domestic historical science “Defensive operation in the area of ​​​​the city of Bely”, “Defensive operation near Kholm-Zhirkovsky”, Kholm-Zhirkovsky defensive operation) - offensive operation of the 9th German army of the army group “ Center", part of the Battle of Rzhev. Seydlitz was the last of a series of operations to eliminate wedges formed as a result of the Red Army offensive in the winter of 1941-1942. The main goal of the operation was the defeat of the 39th Army of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov and the 11th Cavalry Corps of Colonel S.V. Sokolov, who occupied the front sector in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky area.

At 3:00 on July 2, 1942, after a short artillery and air preparation, the German offensive began with two attack groups: the 23rd Army Corps of General of Infantry Albrecht Schubert (2 tank divisions, 2 infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade) was advancing from the north from the Olenino area. A separate group of Ezebeka (tank and infantry divisions) was advancing from the south from the Bely area. In the first days of the operation, Soviet troops put up stubborn resistance, and only a deep detour along the forest roads of the German cavalry brigade with access to the rear of the defending troops allowed the enemy to achieve success.

During Operation Seydlitz, the Soviet troops of the Kalinin Front suffered a major defeat. An important and advantageous bridgehead in the depths of the enemy’s Rzhev-Vyazemsk group was lost, which increased its stability in defense. The enemy restored traffic along the shortest roads from Smolensk to Olenino, significantly improving the supply of his 9th Army.

The losses in people and equipment were very great. However, on this issue, the limited information available from Russian and Western historians differs significantly from each other. Thus, A.V. Isaev provides the following data in his work: the total losses of the 22nd, 39th, 41st armies and the 11th cavalry corps amounted to 61,722 people, of which 4,386 were killed and 47,072 missing . Among the dead were Lieutenant General I. A. Bogdanov, Major Generals P. S. Ivanov, A. D. Berezin, P. P. Miroshnichenko (chief of staff of the 39th Army), Brigade Commissar Yusim (member of the Military Council of the 39th Army) th army). The tank brigade lost all 43 tanks. All the Katyushas were blown up. Similar data are provided by S. A. Gerasimova.
According to German data, during the operation up to 50,000 prisoners were captured, 230 tanks, 58 aircraft, and 760 guns of all types were destroyed or captured.

According to official domestic data, the total losses in this operation are determined to be 20,360 people, of which irrevocable - 7,432 people, sanitary - 12,928 people (Military Historical Journal No. 2, 1999, G. F. Krivosheev). Given the nature of the battle, these data are considered to be clearly underestimated.

The losses of the German side are unknown and are not published even in the works of German historians. Of course, they are much less than the losses of Soviet troops. But most likely, they were quite significant, and this did not allow Army Group Center to take part in the Wehrmacht's summer offensive of 1942. All units of the 9th German Army withdrawn to reserve remained in the Rzhev ledge and were involved in the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation.

In Soviet historical science, this unsuccessful operation was hardly mentioned or studied.

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The material was first published in No. 6 and No. 7 of the magazine in 2016. The version of the essay presented here about the actions of the 11th Cavalry Corps by Colonel Sokolov in January-April 1942 contains expanded information compared to the version that was published in the magazine. In particular, the diaries of the political instructor of the corps veterinary hospital of the 24th CD Andrei Vysotin, photographic materials and maps have been added.

Part 4. After March 23, 1942

last try

Units of the 24th CD received the task on the night of March 23-24 to begin offensive operations in the Izyalovo-Leontyevo sector. Firmly defending the line of Makarovo, Nikulino, Ulyanovo, Trofimovo, mark 203.5, Kuleshovo, Yufanovo, the division was supposed to conduct an offensive battle with one regiment to capture the village of Izyalovo with the development of success in Leontyevo and Serezhan. All attacks during the day on Izyalovo were met with heavy machine gun and mortar fire and were repulsed. The neighbor on the right, the 97th Cavalry Regiment of the 18th CD, fought in the Kulikovo area to take possession of the highway. On the left, the 2nd GMSD fought in the area of ​​a school 1 km northeast of Yakushkino. The weather was clear, which allowed German reconnaissance aircraft to fly over the divisional areas.

March 25, Thursday, the 11th Cavalry Corps, with the forces of the 18th Cavalry Division, reached the Minsk highway at the crossroads northeast of the village of Vysotskoye and consolidated on the occupied line; The 24th Cavalry Division advanced on Izyalovo, Leontyevo; 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division in two detachments - to Yakushkino, Pletushovo. On this day, Leontyevo was stormed by the 70th and 46th cavalry regiments and two squadrons of the 18th CP. Due to deep snow, the squadrons reached the edge of the forest southwest of Leontyevo by 7.00, after which they launched an attack on the western and southwestern outskirts of the village. The enemy met the advancing units with strong machine-gun fire from Zheludkov, Serezhan, Leontyev, and mortar and artillery fire from Serezhan. Progress was difficult. Digging into the snow, the squadrons stubbornly moved forward. It was possible to take Leontyevo only on the second attempt, in the evening at 21.15.

Leontyevo, April 2016

Immediately after the capture of Leontyev, the units went over to a stubborn defense, fortifying themselves in dugouts and trenches dug in the snow. Snigirev's squadron received the task of cutting the route west of Zheludkov, where it set off. The defense of Leontyev was personally led by the chief of staff of the 70th CP, Major Gulkov.

Very young local boys, including Ivan Vladimirov from the village of Ulyanovo, who had recently joined the ranks of the 11th CC, took part in the attack on Leontyevo. From the memoirs of Ivan Vladimirovich Vladimirov:

“On March 25 we advanced on the village of Leontyevo. In the afternoon we reached our starting positions at the edge of the forest. There was a German in Leontyevo, and we were on the edge of the forest. The entire forest was occupied by ours. They took us to the starting line, and we lay in the snow for the day. It was March 25th, and the snow was very deep. In the evening it got dark, we began to advance on the village. I wasn’t the only one, there were hundreds of boys like me: fully dressed, among real soldiers. We took the village. True, a lot of ours were killed.

We took the village, and the Germans began to attack us at night. In fact, Germans rarely fought at night. It was about two o'clock in the morning. From Zheludkovo and from Serezhan, where the broken church now stands, he attacked us from both sides. The battle lasted two hours. The battle was terrible. We had both wounded and killed.

Every house in Leontyevo had two-tier bunks - built by the Germans. Trenches the size of a man were dug throughout the village. I couldn't reach the top of the trench to shoot. The roofs of the huts in the village were thatched. The German set fire to three huts. I don’t know what set it on fire, I didn’t understand it then. I saw some kind of fireball flying and the house was on fire. As the huts caught fire, I saw the Germans crawling towards the village. They were already three or four hundred meters away from us.

I crawled out of the trench under a tree. Our guys were in the trench next to me. One, I remember, was Pertsov, Novoduginsky - a kid like me. I don't remember the other name. There were three of us as liaison officers for the political instructor and the squadron commander. I spent maybe half an hour under the tree. I fired from my rifle, something hit me in the hand - “kick”. In battle you don’t notice the pain... Look, the fingers of my left hand are broken off! The explosive bullet probably hit. The guys shout to me: “We told you, don’t climb there! "".

After being wounded, Ivan Vladimirov first reached his home village of Ulyanovo, where a medical battalion was located right in his house, and then was sent to the rear through the city of Andriapol with other lightly wounded soldiers. Sergei Pertsov died on March 29 near the village of Ulyanovo (Ivan Vladimirovich was mistaken in his memories - he was not from Novodugin, but from the village of Koshkino, Kholm-Zhirkovsky district). His name is among those reburied in mass grave No. 6 in the village of Alferovo. He was born in 1924.

On March 25 at 3.00, reinforcements arrived in the 24th CD unit - 6 marching squadrons, with a total number of 650 people, who were distributed into units. The reinforcements were armed with rifles, well equipped, but poorly prepared. The command staff was fully staffed, but the command staff was young - after 6 months of school, they were at the front for the first time.

Active military operations for the capture of the highway at the line of Golochelovo, Izyalovo, Khozhaevo, Serezhan, Kuleshovo, Yakushkino, Pletushovo continued for the next four days. During the night of March 26, the Germans launched 4 attacks on Leontyevo from Zheludkovo, Serezhan and Izyalov. At 19.30 the German offensive began with a force of up to 500 people. The first attack was repulsed. Having regrouped forces and received new reinforcements, at 21.00 the enemy, with a total number of up to 700 people with machine guns and machine guns, launched a second attack on Leontyevo, knocking out parts of the cavalry corps, which with the fight retreated to the southwest, taking up defense at the edge of the forest. The regiment's losses amounted to 100 people killed and wounded (this data is not available in the Memorial ODB). At this time, the 18th CP was fighting to capture Izyalovo. The attacks were repulsed by rifle and machine gun fire from the enemy, who did not allow the attackers closer than 150 meters to the outskirts of the village.

For the soldiers of the 11th Cavalry Corps, war has already become a familiar job. After the battle, Red Army soldier Eskin collected 3,000 incendiary cartridges and used them from captured machine guns against the enemy, while teaching other soldiers how to use them.

Communication between the regiments was telephone and worked flawlessly throughout the battles, despite the fact that the line was often broken by exploding mines and artillery shells. The credit for this went to the telephone operators under the direct supervision of the chief of communications, Major Kolodezhnov and senior lieutenant Vdovenko.

Meanwhile, the squadron of Nikolai Ivanovich Snigirev (now a senior lieutenant) carried out the task of blocking the Moscow-Minsk highway. For four days he held the Moscow-Minsk highway near the village of Zheludkovo. In front of the front of the 24th division on the highway there was an enemy of up to a company with four tanks, in Zheludkovo there were up to 700 people with mortars and cannons, Leontyevo and Izyalovo were defended by two enemy battalions. Tanks continuously cruised along the highway in the Yakushkino, Vysotskoye sector and systematically fired at Snigirev’s dug-in squadron, preventing the task of mining the highway. Red Army soldier Kazakov shot down an enemy transport plane over the highway with a PTR rifle.

For the operation to successfully block the highway, Snigirev was again presented with the Order of Lenin by the commander of the 24th CD, Lieutenant Colonel Gagua, but the award of the second Order of the Red Banner was approved.

“Squadron comrade. Snigirev was allocated to a separate group, on March 27, 1942 at 23:00 the squadron commander, Comrade. Snigirev received the task of riding the Moscow-Minsk highway 28 kilometers west of the mountains. Vyaz, fortify yourself on it and stop the movement of enemy vehicles along the highway. Using the darkness of the night, the squadron of Senior Lieutenant Snigirev, camouflaged, bypassed the village unnoticed by the enemy. Zheludkovo along the western outskirts of the forest edge and by 9.00, having knocked down the enemy's military outpost, entered the highway and immediately began digging trenches without revealing himself. The next night, the sappers, together with a group of scouts under the direct leadership of Comrade. Snigirev mined the route, while at the same time repelling enemy attacks with fire from heavy machine guns and PTR rifles, they covered the work of the sappers. At dawn on March 29, 1942, the route was intercepted and traffic along it was interrupted. The enemy tried with all his might to restore movement and push Comrade’s squadron off the route. Snigireva. Tanks were used up to the infantry battalion. For four days, the squadron comrade. Snigireva fought stubbornly, repelling enemy attacks and holding the highway. Having lost hope of knocking the squadron off the road with blows, the enemy decided to bypass it from the rear and encircle it. On the night of March 31, 1942, having surrounded the squadron from the flanks, the enemy threw a group of 100 people with the task of outflanking and hitting the squadron from the rear. This maneuver was discovered by the scouts of Comrade. Snigirev, setting up an ambush and throwing out light machine gunners and machine gunners to cut off the enemy’s retreat, Comrade. Snigirev allowed the enemy to go around from the rear, close and destroyed 60 people with heavy machine gun fire, the rest began to retreat to Zheludkovo in panic, but were met with fire from light machine gunners and machine gunners. Only a small part of this enemy group remained alive. Being in continuous battle, cut off from the rear, the squadron of comrade. Snigireva completed the task with honor. The soldiers carried the anti-tank gun onto the road in their hands through the deep snow, dismantling it into pieces. During the period of fighting, holding the highway for four days, the squadron of comrade. Snigirev destroyed 14 vehicles with infantry and military cargo, two passenger vehicles with officers, one armored vehicle on the highway, two tanks were hit by 45-mm anti-tank fire, and one enemy transport aircraft was shot down. Up to 200 German soldiers and officers were destroyed. Trophies were captured: two mortars, two machine guns, up to 50 rifles, a large amount of ammunition, valuable documents and orders from the German headquarters were captured.”

The actions of Snigirev’s detachment are described in detail in the combat log of the 24th CD. When two groups of Germans of 30 people each tried to cut off Snigirev’s detachment, they were completely destroyed by machine-gun and machine gun fire from Snigirev’s fighters who bypassed them. The ZhBD records:

“Platoon commander Fedor Makarovich Kalinin always puts machine gunners first, he knows the machine gun well, teaches this art, his machine guns work flawlessly in battle in any frost, in any weather, and this time the machine gun did not let him down. Having cut off the Germans’ escape route, Comrade Kalinin himself lay down behind a machine gun and destroyed 45 Germans with fire from it; in the same battle, Kazakov’s team distinguished themselves with PTR rifles. Kazakov himself, a brave and skillful intelligence officer, with Red Army soldier Obukhov and three other Red Army soldiers continued to actively operate on the highway, firing point-blank from anti-tank guns at tanks and vehicles throwing up enemy infantry. In this operation, two trucks carrying enemy infantry and cargo were set on fire. Bogatkin, a Red Army soldier, distinguished himself in this battle, shooting 7 Germans at point-blank range and taking 2 prisoners. Red Army soldier Mitrokhin, a brave scout, leading a group of sappers, mined the route under fire, placing 15 anti-tank mines, which took a lot of work, since the route has a stone surface, it was necessary to hollow it out under enemy fire, without having any available tools. Despite all the difficulties, Mitrokhin completed his combat mission with honor. The commander of the anti-tank missile defense, Red Army soldier Yamygin, bravely acted with his crew: he carried the gun, disassembled in parts, through deep snow, installing it right next to the highway, destroying vehicles with fire and repelling enemy tank attacks. Fire from enemy tanks and machine guns rained down on the anti-tank gun. Skillfully changing the OP, being under hurricane fire, the combat crew under the command of Yamygin did not stop firing. Anti-tank fire destroyed 5 vehicles and knocked out one enemy tank. Orderly - Red Army soldier Nikolai Ivanovich Sovetnikov, during two days of fighting in the area of ​​the highway, carried 24 wounded from the battlefield, provided them with first aid and sent them to the PPM. Operating under fire, risking his life, Sovetnikov saved the lives of his wounded comrades. The squadron's cook, Red Army soldier Denisenko, despite being 42 years old, gave all his strength to feed the squadron hot food. He uninterruptedly delivered hot food on time, carrying thermoses under enemy fire, crawling across open spaces.”

At this time, the neighbor of the 24th CD on the right - the 97th CP of the 18th CD, was fighting with opponents in the area of ​​​​the highway (in the Kulikovo area, at mark 18), and the neighbor on the left - units of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division - were fighting 1 km north of Yakushkino and repelled enemy counterattacks in the Pletushovo area.

The area, 1 km north of Yakushkino, where the 2nd MRR of the 2nd GMSD launched an attack on Yakushkino and Serezhan from the Vyazma River

According to the order of the corps headquarters, the 2nd GMSD was supposed to capture Yakushkino and Pletushovo on March 24. Having taken up their initial positions along the eastern bank of the Kitayka stream, by 12.00 they went on the offensive - the 2nd SME through the school on Yakushkino (on the map the letters “ShK” indicated the manor house on the Ershino estate, which belonged to the Mezentsov family before the revolution), and the 120th SME - through height 242.3 to Pletushovo. The attackers were forced to stop at the edges of the groves, without reaching the goal, as they were met with strong machine-gun fire from the direction of Serezhan (a German machine gun was installed on the bell tower of the Serezhan church), from the bushes southeast of Serezhan, from the school and from height 242.3. In addition, a group of enemy infantry advanced from Pletushovo and launched a counterattack.

Attempts to occupy Yakushkino and Pletushovo continued until March 28. The 2nd SME carried out the task with 40 people, and the 120th SME - 46 people. On March 26, 1942, division commander Chanchibadze signed order No. OP/07, in which he criticized the activities of units of the 2nd GMSD, pointing out the indecisive actions of commanders of all levels and the inept fight against tanks:

The battles that took place over the course of two days to capture the highway revealed a number of major shortcomings in the combat activities of the formation’s units.

The following shortcomings:

1. Indecision in the actions of commanders of all levels. An easy-going attitude towards implementing combat orders from both senior commanders and one’s own.
2. Disorganization of the work of headquarters (2 SMEs), unsatisfactory management of battle processes.
3. Poor reconnaissance of the enemy's fire system, exaggeration of his combat power, fear of fire (120 SMEs).
4. Inability to block individual fortified areas. The desire to push out rather than destroy the enemy, as a result of which the latter leaves blocked points with impunity (2 SMEs).
5. Poor organization of the destruction of firing points. There is no direct escort of artillery, its direct fire is not used (120 SMEs), and hand grenades are not used at all (143 TP).
6. Fear of tanks, instead of the bold and organized use of means to combat them (anti-tank missiles, anti-tank guns, anti-tank guns, anti-tank guns, anti-tank guns, grenade clusters) – 2 SMEs. Anti-tank guns are used to destroy manpower, which shows illiteracy in their use.
7. Instead of truthful information, which makes it possible to correctly navigate and react flexibly to the course of hostilities, there are criminal lies, incorrect reports as a cover for one’s ignorance, inactivity and helplessness (especially 2 SMEs).

Chanchibadze believed that there were enough opportunities to complete the task assigned to the division, and it was obliged to complete it. His opinion about the inept and disorganized actions of the fighters of the 2nd GMSD does not fit well with the description of their exploits in the award lists. Only personal courage could counter the enemy's numerical superiority. So, on March 26, when columns of Germans began to move along the highway, gunner Razboinikov (2nd MRR) pulled his cannon into an open position and began shooting them with direct fire. The Germans opened heavy fire on his gun. 4 tanks, a mortar battery and several heavy and light machine guns took part in the suppression. Mines and shells exploded around Razboinikov's gun, showering the crew with shrapnel, but he continued to work until he knocked out three vehicles and forced the rest of the column to turn back. Gunner Vasily Egorovich Razboinikov had already distinguished himself in battles for the Moscow-Minsk highway. On March 4, an award sheet was signed recommending Razboinikov to the Order of the Red Banner for disrupting the Nazi offensive by opening rapid fire from his anti-tank gun at an enemy tank and knocking it out.

Noteworthy is the fact that Chanchibadze’s order No. OP/07 is close in spirit and content to Konev’s order of January 16, 1942, which was sent to the commander of the 29th Army, General Shvetsov. In particular, it stated:

All these shortcomings occur only because:

1. The commanders of units and battalions themselves still have not understood the great strategic importance of the task that we were ordered to solve and which we must solve through thick and thin.
2. Ignoring the enormous combat experience we gained during 9 months of war, the result of all this is shameful marking time, having in front of him as an opponent a rabble of various parts and connections, most of them are not organized and not trained.

I categorically demand that commanders, commissars and chiefs of staff and units take the most serious attitude towards carrying out combat orders, organizing the battle and leading it to the end. To explain to the political apparatus of the units and the entire command staff the special importance of the task we are performing and that this task is quite feasible for us.

The political apparatus and command staff moved from threats and exhortations to repressive actions. On March 27, near the village of Pletushovo, a deserter, a soldier of the 2nd MRR, who left combat positions without orders, was sentenced to capital punishment and shot. He was from the village of Bukhvalovo, Yartsevo district. Apparently, it was an encirclement, newly mobilized by the 11th Cavalry Corps. Finally, overcoming strong enemy fire resistance, on March 28, a detachment of the 120th Motorized Rifle Regiment managed to reach the line 250-300 meters north of Pletushovo and take strong control of the highway. On this day, above-ice water appeared on the Vyazma River, which meant the need to take additional measures to strengthen the ice in order to be able to transport people and material from strongholds in Kozulino and Artyomovo to the battlefields. Sappers from the 99th Engineer Battalion managed to mine a section of the highway on March 29. In the morning, German cars traveling along the highway were blown up. The artillerymen fired along the highway, destroying cars and carts with cargo, and machine gunners shot at the Germans following the carts. But more could not be achieved.

As of March 30, the combat log of the 2nd GMSD recorded a comparison of the combat strength of the enemy and the division. Opposite the three regiments of this division were seven enemy regiments. 512 soldiers of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division were opposed 1280 Germans. At the same time, the German units had: 28 mortars, 1 rocket launcher, 21 guns and 4 tanks. The 2nd GMSD had 17 mortars (there were no rocket launchers), 11 guns and not a single tank, but there were 5 anti-tank rifles.

On March 31, units of the 24th CD continued to firmly defend the occupied line, blocking the enemy in Izyalovo, Leontyevo from the north and north-west, in Zheludkovo from the north-west and west, in Khozhaevo from the east and north-east. Snigirev’s detachment held the highway under fire, defending at the edge of the forest at level 234.8. On this day, the enemy began active operations. From 10.00 to 12.30, German artillery and mortars fired heavily at the battle formations of the corps units. The artillery of the armored train fired intensely at Trofimovo, Ulyanovo and the edge of the forest at level 203.5, two planes fired and bombed the 18th and 70th checkpoints from 10.30 to 11.30. The neighbor on the right of the 97th CP was knocked out by the enemy from Kulikovo and fought 0.5 km south of the intersection of the Kulikovo and Golochelovo roads. On April 1, the 97th Cavalry Regiment moved to the defense of the Ulyanovo-Ostashkovo line.

Villages of Ulyanovo and Trofimovo, April 2016

Restoring the status quo by the Germans

In the enemy’s tactics in battles in the last days of March, one began to feel the desire to deeply cover the entire group of troops of the 11th Cavalry Corps. Since the end of January, the Germans tried by all means to push back parts of the 11th Cavalry Corps from the highway further to the north, but in winter conditions they were not able to launch an offensive along the entire sector of the front. Therefore, they looked for weak points in the defense, felt for the joints between parts of the hull. On the part of the German units, the sequence of events looked like this:

“The Russian 1st Guards Cavalry Corps (Belov), after crossing the highway west of Yukhnov in late January, turned northwest and reached the Smolensk-Vyazma highway, about 50 kilometers west of Vyazma. There the corps acted hand in hand with partisans and airborne troops (parts of the 1st and 8th Airborne Brigades) already entrenched in the area. He also established radio contact with Sokolov's cavalry corps, which had broken through from the north of Rzhev and established a foothold northwest of Vyazma. Their joint attack on Vyazma was organized. At this time, the German 4th Panzer Army began to systematically clear its communications zone. V Corps received this task on 6 February. For this purpose, several divisions (5th Panzer Division, 3rd Motorized Division, and later the 106th Infantry Division, 15th Infantry Division and parts of the 23rd Infantry Division) were assigned to V Corps. Russian forces in deep forested areas were gradually squeezed into separate pockets by these German troops. The bags were of different sizes (some of them included 60 villages). V Corps then attempted to attack one sack after another and restore the status quo. Deep snow drifts, which required every road to be cleared before even the tanks could move forward, were delayed by these measures and increased the difficulties involved. However, by the end of March the first large bag west of Vyazma had been cleared. Under this pressure, Belov's cavalry corps again retreated south and, apparently, tried to establish contact with the airborne corps."

March 31 - April 3, the Germans, having concentrated up to two infantry divisions and over a battalion of tanks, launched an operation to encircle and destroy parts of the corps. In the area of ​​​​Zhukovka, Gorodishche, 150 vehicles with infantry and 30 enemy tanks were concentrated. In order to remove units of the 11th CC from attack, the corps commander, Colonel Sokolov, gave the order to abandon the occupied lines and organize a new defense center.

Units of the 18th and 24th CDs withdrew from the battle during April 1st. Covering the exit of the 18th CD units from the battle, Red Army soldier Shalom distinguished himself. Seeing that the detachment of the 97th CP under the command of Lieutenant Prim was surrounded, the Red Army soldier of the 3rd squadron of the 18th CP Shalom, camouflaged, made his way close to the Germans and, point-blank, machine gun fire suddenly fell on the back of the head of the Germans, who fled in panic, throwing killed and wounded. Meanwhile, part of Lieutenant Prim, by active action, pushed back the advancing enemy and left the encirclement. Comrade Prima returned to his unit with a note:

“To the commander of the 18th command post, commander of the 3rd squadron, Lieutenant Shurupov. To present the Red Army soldier Shalom for a government award, I kissed him. He brought me out of a difficult environment, saved the lives of more than 100 people, 6 heavy machine guns, 4 RP. Sorry I kept him up. Lieutenant 97 CP Prima. 1.4.42 "

In the Memorial ODB it was not possible to find documents on the awarding of the Red Army soldier Shalom.

The Germans directed the main attack against the defense of the 211th CP, throwing here up to three full-strength battalions and 8 tanks. The 211th Cavalry Regiment had up to 250 active soldiers in this sector and held back the enemy for three days, waging fierce battles. The squadron under the command of senior lieutenant Nikolai Yegorovich Zhukov repelled repeated attacks on the village of Voeykovo for 10 hours on March 31. The Germans managed to push back units of the 82nd CD, which covered the left flank of the 2nd GMSD, and occupied Rozhnovo, Voeykovo, Naryshevo. On April 1, they launched an offensive from Voeikovo and Rozhnovo in the direction of Strukovo, Godunovo, and captured Chizhovo. The garrison defending in Strukovo was completely destroyed. In addition, by the end of the day they had finally occupied Leontyevo.

On April 2, the Germans tried to capture Artyomovo from the Proletarsky direction. Artyomovo was defended by a group of the 143rd tank regiment of 52 people, armed with 2 heavy machine guns, 8 light machine guns, 13 machine guns, 28 rifles. The attack was repulsed.

I.S.Konev

Simultaneously with the attack on Artyomovo, the Germans attacked Kostino from the direction of Lysovo. By 18.00 on April 2, they occupied Naryshevo, Fedorovka, Orlyanka, Bogoroditskoye, Martyukhi, Lepyoshkino and continued to move to the northwest, pushing back parts of the 82nd CD.

The 2nd GMSD, in accordance with the order of the corps commander, on the night of April 3 withdrew to the Mitino, Yamnovo, Stepankovo, Lopatkino line. The left flank of the division remained in place in the area of ​​​​Kievo, Bukhonovo, Lomakino, serving as a barrier for the Germans, and was subjected to fierce attacks from them. Having completed their task, these garrisons also withdrew in an orderly manner.

On the night of April 4 (Saturday), the 11th Cavalry Corps regrouped and took up defense in the areas of Barkovo, Staroe Selo, Zyablovo, Lavrovo, Barsuki, Khmelita, Pokhodino. The enemy, continuing to develop a decisive offensive, came to the front: Yufanovo, Chashchevka, Lomy and advanced along the Vyazma-Bely highway.

Finally, the higher command recognized the futility of attempts to cut the Moscow-Minsk highway. In a report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction, Colonel General I.S. Konev noted that:

For two and a half months, the 11th Cavalry Corps waged continuous fierce battles to capture the highway, attracting units of three enemy divisions. In the last battles alone, the corps destroyed up to 3 thousand German soldiers and officers, 150 vehicles with cargo, etc. However, all attempts by the corps to cut the highway were unsuccessful, and it operates almost normally. In recent days, the Germans, having brought up to one fresh division with tanks, with the support of powerful artillery and aviation, launched a decisive offensive from Vyazma, trying to cover the flanks of the corps and push it back from the highway to the north.

The corps is in dire need of urgent replenishment with people, horses and material resources... Food is supplied intermittently. The horse population is small and extremely depleted.

In order to preserve the cavalry corps and use it to the greatest benefit, I consider it advisable: a) withdraw the cavalry corps to the line of the river. Dnieper, cut the highway in the Novo-Ivanovskoye, Gorodok section (60–64 km west of Vyazma) and take up defense in separate units on the western bank of the river. Dnieper to the mouth of the river. Vyazma (33 km north of the highway). Have the main forces of the corps in Vadino (62 km west of Vyazma) to organize raids to disrupt enemy communications; b) in the interests of the front, it is desirable to withdraw the cavalry corps to the line Volochek, Andreevskoye (now Dneprovskoye, 28 km southwest of Sychevka) in order to connect with the right flank of the 39th Army and secure it.”

On April 4, Saturday, the 2nd MRR fought a fierce battle in Zyablovo. And again, the artistic inspiration that visited the officer who was filling out the combat log of the 2nd GMSD on this day gives us the opportunity to clearly see the past:

“Having taken Zyablovo and the surrounding areas in a semi-circle, the Germans launched an offensive with a force of 650-700 people with 12 tanks. Hurricane fire brought down the enemy on the 2nd battalion, which numbered about 80 people in the ranks. Mines and shells dug up all the snow around, tanks fired cannons and machine guns, moved towards the village in iron formation, machine gunners followed the tanks and fired, pouring lead on the battalion’s positions, the enemy’s light and heavy machine guns worked continuously. In general, the Germans used everything to frighten the defenders, deprive them of their will and resistance, but our people remained in their places, now faithful to the tradition of the guards not to retreat. The tanks were the first to be encountered. The anti-tank gunners worked calmly and clearly... the fascist tank broke the bushes, throwing up clouds of snow dust, burst into firing positions... a shot, another, and the heavy machine stopped. The smoke is barely noticeable at first, then emerges stronger and stronger from under the blinds. Tank is on fire. Another shot. Mines are exploding all around. The gun crews are showered with shrapnel. The gunner was wounded, the castle guard was wounded. The chief of artillery, Ivanenko, appears at the gun. He loads and fires at German tanks himself. Here's another one of them, clanging its tracks, bursting into artillery positions. Point-blank shot. The tank, helplessly rushing to the side, stops, but the other tanks, met by the fire of our guns, come in from the flanks and rear. They are nearby and fall with all their weight on our guns. Iron clangs. Gaps min. Smoke from a burning tank. It becomes impenetrable above the battlefield. Our soldiers are still fighting ahead. They let the tanks through and cut off the infantry. Here is junior lieutenant Shutaev at the machine gun; he has pressed the German chains to the ground with fire and is shooting them calmly and methodically. Our machine gunners and riflemen are helping him. The tanks, having destroyed the artillery, felt safe; they burst into the village, destroying everything in their path. The flanks of the German infantry are closing, forming a ring around a handful of our fighters. Only at the last minute, having gathered into a fist, they break out of this ring and leave, carrying the wounded, to a new line of defense. The fight is over. It lasted 4 hours. After this, the regiment withdrew to Lavrovo.”

Without God's help

Sunday 5 April was the holiday of Holy Easter. For the first time, the Moscow military commandant's office allowed walking around the city throughout the Easter night, although on ordinary days it was forbidden to walk around the city without special passes from 24.00 to 5.00. Masses of believers went to worship. Up to 75 thousand people gathered in thirty operating Moscow churches, and up to 85 thousand in 124 churches in the Moscow region. This day coincided with the historical date of the victory of Prince Alexander Nevsky over the German knights in the Battle of the Ice in 1242, which gave special solemnity to Easter Day.

The road from Serezhanskaya Church to Izyalovo, April 2016.

While Easter 1942 acquired special significance for Muscovites, for former parishioners of the Serezhanskaya Church this day was full of grief and sadness. As soon as the Germans managed to push back parts of the cavalry corps from the highway and re-occupy the villages of Leontyevo and Izyalovo (this was February 11), they kicked all the residents out of their houses and drove them to the destroyed church. It was winter, it was cold, and there was a lot of snow.

Winter road to Serezhanskaya Church from Izyalov and Leontyev

Women, children and old people were driven along the road to the church, and dead and wounded Red Army soldiers lay around. The children walking past them under escort remembered the terrible pictures for the rest of their lives: some of the wounded had pink blood coming from their mouth and throat, and someone was waving his hand in the field, begging for help... But there was nowhere for them to expect a miracle and salvation in this a place where the bells had long since ceased ringing. The residents themselves did not know where and why the Germans were driving them. They feared the worst. Having driven to the church, the people were lined up. Then they brought a tank. Among those awaiting death was the wife of the headman of the village of Izyalovo, Nikolai Nikolaevich Kozlov, who was shot by the NKVD authorities, with her six orphaned children. The youngest was 3 years old. She told the children: “Move closer to me, now they will all shoot at us.” The Germans hurried to pull off the felt boots from the elder son of the headman (he was seventeen years old), obviously disdainful to then remove things from the dead and fearing that they would be spoiled by blood. He was left standing barefoot in the snow. The headman's wife took a large scarf from her head, tore it and twisted her son's legs.

Road to Serezhanskaya Church, April 2016

It is unknown how long the residents stood like this. It is unknown why the Germans sent everyone home. It can be assumed that there was no longer a need for a human shield, since German troops were able to leave the highway behind them, then repulsing the 11th Cavalry Corps two kilometers inland from the highway beyond Izyalovo. Ulyanovo remained with the corps units until March 29. The battles were very close, they were bombing, artillery was hitting the village. In February, the Germans needed the residents more alive in order to later clean the roads and remove the corpses. When everyone returned to their villages, they discovered that new guests had already settled in their houses - German soldiers who were in search of food. Cast iron with still-not-cooled horse meat was taken out of the ovens, which was cooked for themselves by the cavalrymen of the 24th Cavalry Division who surrendered these positions. They say that those who do not want to feed their army will feed someone else's. This thesis did not work in relation to the residents of the Smolensk region. They had to feed both armies, and in turns.

For several years after its closure in 1938, the Serezhansk Church celebrated the day of Holy Easter alone, without people and church hymns. But this year without faith was the most terrible - amidst a battlefield strewn with uncleaned corpses. Corps losses for the period from March 31 to April 5 in killed and wounded amounted to 2 thousand people.

Those who didn't become heroes

The boldly launched large-scale operation was inexorably moving towards its conclusion. In fact, already April 17 The operation undertaken by the Germans to defeat the group of Lieutenant General Efremov was completed, and the western group of the 33rd Army ceased to exist. The 11th Cavalry Corps at that time occupied positions much north of the Minsk highway. On the battlefields near the villages of Izyalovo and Ulyanovo, the corpses of his soldiers remained lying, while the Germans buried their dead right away. From the story of Praskovya Nikolaevna Semyonova (daughter of Nikolai Nikolaevich Kozlov, who was executed by the NKVD):

“The field near the village of Izyalovo was filled with our beaten soldiers. The Germans fired them with machine guns. Our partisans were advancing from the forest, and the Germans from our village of Izyalovo were shooting at them. Spring came, the stench began, the corpses began to decompose. It was necessary to bury them. My elder brother removed these corpses. There were trenches dug there. They took scoops - a tool that was used to remove manure, hooked it to an overcoat and dragged the corpses into the water, into trenches. Then we rode this field with bulls: either a piece of the overcoat was pulled out, or the belt got caught on the harrow... They were not reburied, so they remained in these ditches. When the corpses were removed, they found tablets, bloody money (they laundered it later), notebooks with poems - there were young people... Then all this burned down when the Germans burned our village. My dad’s brother even collected and kept posthumous medallions—like tubes. He said that as soon as the war was over, he would write to his relatives. But everything was burned, nothing was preserved..."

Around the same time, the removal of corpses began in the fields near Bogoroditsky and Martyukhov, which had been lying there since October 1941. There were so many dead here that the cleanup took about a month.

But still not everyone was removed. Already in December 1942, Viktor Filippovich Sergeev had a chance to spend the night in a barn on the banks of the Vyazma River. This barn was called Gruzdov barn. The name Sergeev was among seven young boys from the village of Azarovo, prepared to be sent to Germany. All of them were warned in time by the teacher who worked as a translator for the Germans. At night, she led them to the partisans across the Vyazma River towards Kochetov, where units of the 11th Cavalry Corps had recently fought. Viktor Filippovich recalled:

“My legs were frostbitten. I had German boots - they had very tight insteps, my feet were chafed. I couldn't walk, my legs hurt. They left me in the Gruzdovo barn. There was harvested flax in the barn. The rest moved to Kochetovo, where the partisans were. I spent the night alone in the barn. I tossed and turned - it was cold, I was in pain and pain... It turned out that there were two corpses under me - the soldiers were our dead. And when the partisans came for me in the morning, they looked and there were two corpses under the flax...”

What else do you need to know about war to understand: war is grief, horror, death, stench and human meanness?!

Among those killed on the battlefields, those who, at the cost of their lives, covered the retreat of the 11th Cavalry Corps in early April, remained lying, allowing the rest to escape and retreat in a northwestern direction. Some of the fighters, seasoned in previous battles, managed to hold back the advancing Germans for some time and then catch up with their units, while others stayed here forever. Many, as follows from archival documents, were nominated for government awards, including the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Award sheet of Senior Lieutenant Nikolai Egorovich Zhukov on nomination for the title Hero of the Soviet Union

Documents for awarding this high rank were filled out for senior lieutenant Nikolai Egorovich Zhukov(commander of the bullet squadron of the 211th command post of the 82nd CD, who held back the Germans near the village of Voeykovo for 10 hours), junior lieutenant Kirill Vasilievich Feoktistov(commander of the 1st squadron of the 206th command post of the 82nd CD, who on April 3 as part of the regiment held back enemy forces five times superior to the village of Bukhonovo for 3 hours), senior sergeant Andrey Ivanovich Tomilov(platoon commander of the 3rd squadron of the 211th CP of the 82nd CD, who died near the village of Rozhnovo), senior sergeant Nikifor Ivanovich Tarasov(commander of the bullet platoon of the 211th CP of the 82nd CD, who died on March 27 in a battle in the village of Vyrykino) and deputy. political instructor Pyotr Artemovich Los(platoon commander of the 2nd squadron of the 135th command post of the 18th CD, who died on April 1 near the village of Prigolovki, holding back with a handful of fighters the onslaught of a numerically superior enemy).

Award sheet of junior lieutenant Kirill Vasilievich Feoktistov on nomination for the title Hero of the Soviet Union

Award sheet of senior sergeant Andrei Ivanovich Tomilov on nomination for the title Hero of the Soviet Union

Award sheet of senior sergeant Nikifor Ivanovich Tarasov on nomination for the title Hero of the Soviet Union

Award sheet from deputy political instructor Pyotr Artyomovich Los on nomination for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, filled out on German form (he was awarded posthumously the Order of the Red Banner)

For none of them the application for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was granted. All award documents were revised by the command in August 1942, when the 11th Cavalry Corps was already disbanded. Apparently, their heroic deeds in the memories of the comrades who owed their lives to them have already faded against the background of what the corps soldiers had to endure in July 1942, when they were surrounded during the German Operation Seydlitz. In addition, some of those nominated for awards were captured by the Germans, such as senior lieutenant Zhukov, who ended up in Stalag IX A (he managed to survive until the end of the war).

Operation Seydlitz

The 11th Cavalry Corps, fighting semi-encircled, continued fighting behind enemy lines until July 1942, holding the ledge, which is sometimes called Kholm-Zhirkovsky. Communication with the front, replenishment and ammunition were delivered to them through the “corridor” between the cities of Nelidovo and Bely (it was through this “corridor” that Ivan Vladimirov, after being wounded near the village of Leontyevo, went to the city of Andriapol with other lightly wounded soldiers). In this territory north of Kholm-Zhirkovsky at the junction of the Kalinin and Smolensk regions there were huge tracts of swampy dense forests, swamps, peat bogs, many rivers and streams.

The beginning of the end of the 11th Cavalry Corps was marked by the active development by the German command of a large-scale operation called Seydlitz. Its goal was to eliminate wedges formed as a result of the winter offensive of the Red Army. In May, when units of the 11th Cavalry Corps were still fighting in the area of ​​Kholm-Suminsky, Khanyutin and Ordylev, careful preparations for the operation were already actively underway. It was directed against the troops of the 39th Army of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov and the 11th Cavalry Corps S.V. Sokolova.

Early in the morning of July 2, 1942, German troops launched an offensive in the narrowest part of the “corridor” - between Bely and Olenino. For the commander of the Kalinin Front, Colonel General Ivan Stepanovich Konev, the German offensive was not a surprise. It is known that Maslennikov, the commander of the 39th Army, told him, as a commander should have said: “I am preparing for a fight in the most unfavorable conditions, that is, for battles surrounded without the right to withdraw the army. For this you only need ammunition and food." But it was precisely with ammunition and food that Konev was unable to provide either the now encircled troops or the 11th Cavalry Corps, which had previously fought for the Moscow-Minsk highway. And history repeated itself: the troops again found themselves in a “cauldron,” although not as large-scale as in October 1941, when the Western Front under the command of Zhukov and Konev suffered one of the heaviest defeats of the entire war in the Vyazemskaya disaster. Then the losses of the front troops only in those captured amounted to 673 thousand people. And since the ranks of the 11th Cavalry Corps were replenished by the surviving encirclement from the “Vyazemsky Cauldron,” the same people had to visit both “cauldrons” created under the command of Konev. Among them were the teacher of the Golochelovskaya school, Pavel Mikhailovich Erastov, and the cook, a native of the village of Yakushkino, Fyodor Yakovlevich Semyonov. Both survived, but their fates turned out differently.

P.S. Ivanov

The German offensive began on July 2, and on July 12, an official message from the German command followed that several Russian rifle and cavalry divisions were surrounded and destroyed, over 30 thousand prisoners of war were taken, and a large amount of military equipment of all types was captured or destroyed. After heavy rains, the dirt roads along which troops fought their way out of encirclement became soggy, and the weak Soviet military transport aviation was unable to organize effective air supply. Those surrounded were quickly left without ammunition and food. However, organized attempts to break through continued. By July 17, a group of about 1,500 people had gathered under the leadership of the commander of the 18th Cavalry Division, Major General P.S. Ivanova. There is information that he died on July 21 on the battlefield and was buried by the Germans with military honors. The slightly wounded commander of the 39th Army, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov flew off on the night of July 18-19 on one of the nine U-2 aircraft that landed in the “cauldron” to take command. Back on July 5, Maslennikov, despite his initial determination to fight “surrounded without the right to withdraw the army,” made a hopelessly belated decision to withdraw troops from the Kholm-Zhirkovsky ledge, but after the start of “Seydlitz” it could no longer change anything in the fates of those who were surrounded, just like in October 1941 near Vyazma.

At the beginning of August 1942, the 11th Cavalry Corps was disbanded.

Such different destinies

Semenov Fedor Yakovlevich

The cook of the 97th cavalry regiment of the 18th cavalry division failed to escape from another encirclement Fedor Yakovlevich Semenov . He was held captive in Germany until April 1945. It is unknown what trials he suffered before and after his release from German captivity. Ultimately, he ended up in the Sverdlovsk region, where he started a family and worked as a dairy factory foreman. It can be assumed that Fyodor Yakovlevich acquired his specialty as a dairy factory foreman while working before the war at a dairy factory opened in the former premises of the Serezhanskaya Church. Fyodor Yakovlevich avoided the topic of war all his life, did not tell his children anything about being in captivity, never returned to his homeland in Yakushkino and Staroe Selo, and did not communicate with relatives. Only the military ID kept by his grandchildren is documentary evidence of that period of his life.

Former chemistry teacher at Golochelovskaya school Pavel Mikhailovich Erastov , apparently, also avoided memories of his period of service in the 11th Cavalry Corps, where he was received as a former encirclement and employee of the German commandant’s office. And, as is clear from the documents, the special department of the NKVD of the 11th Cavalry Corps performed its duties especially zealously. How he managed to escape from yet another encirclement remains unknown. Since 1944, Erastov served as chief of intelligence of the 3rd division of the 57th artillery regiment of the 95th Infantry Verkhnedneprovskaya Red Banner Order of Suvorov Division, which was part of the 49th Army. On January 14, 1945, on the second day of the start of the East Prussian operation, in which the 49th Army participated, he was seriously wounded. Since 1945, Pavel Mikhailovich worked as a chemistry teacher at Moscow school No. 212 (now a department of the State Budget Educational Institution “Gymnasium No. 1576”), and in the 1950s. became the director of this school.

Award lists of Anatoly Yakovlev from Golochelov

They did not die, but continued to take revenge on the Germans until the end of the war as part of the active army, two students of Pavel Mikhailovich, who voluntarily joined the ranks of the 11th Cavalry Corps and became real soldiers: a native of the village of Ulyanovo Ivan Vladimirov And Anatoly Yakovlev from the village of Golochelovo. Both were promoted to rank: Yakovlev became a junior sergeant, and Vladimirov became a senior sergeant. Anatoly Yakovlev's combat path remained associated with cavalrymen until the end of the war - he finished it as part of the 8th Guards Cavalry Division in Slovakia, acting as commander of the reconnaissance department of the 16th separate guards air defense division. He fought bravely and decisively, for which he was awarded more than once, including the Order of the Red Star. After being wounded, Ivan Vladimirov returned to the front near Sychevka, became a mortarman - the commander of a mortar crew, then his unit was transferred to Kharkov. Here he was wounded again, as a result of which he almost died and, in an unconscious state, again found himself in German-occupied territory. Vladimirov managed to return to his unit, fought for Kyiv, crossed the Dniester, passed through Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and reached Lake Balaton. He finished the war in the Romanian city of Cluj at a school for officers.

Having been surrounded, the assistant chief of the operations department of the headquarters of the 24th CD went missing on July 7, 1942 senior lieutenant Vladimir Nikolaevich Nochevkin , who kept the combat log of the 24th CD. Political instructor of the 24th CD Andrey Vysotin managed to get out of the encirclement. From his diary entries, which he continued to keep while making his way to his own, one can understand the difficult situation the surrounded units found themselves in:

June 29. Intelligence reports a large gathering of Nazis. Clashes began. The Nazis are trying to encircle us. An order was received to withdraw in an orderly manner.

3 July. Head of the political department comrade. Premilov sent me to the 70th Cavalry Regiment, which was tasked with covering the withdrawal of units of the cavalry corps. We made a short push (20 km) and took up defensive positions near the village of Stepankovo. We are fighting. The artillerymen are performing well.

4th of July. The enemy's advance has been stopped. All attacks have been repulsed, the village is in our hands. I walk through the units that have taken up defensive positions in hastily dug trenches. In quiet moments I talk with the soldiers. I will arrange the delivery of ammunition.

5'th of July. An order was received to retreat to the village of Krapivnoye, where to take up defense. The regiment is removed squadron by squadron and departs. The enemy is firing from artillery and bombing from airplanes. But the losses are insignificant. The regiment headquarters stopped in the village of Yegorye. Message received: Krapivnoe is occupied by the enemy. The passage is closed. We are surrounded. We held a meeting with the command staff. We took up a perimeter defense. We work in departments. The mood of the people is not bad.

July 6. We are holding defenses in the area of ​​three villages. Enemy aircraft are hanging in the air, bombing, firing machine guns. Artillery and mortars are firing. Tanks appeared. We are unraveling the Nazis’ plan: they want to cut us off from the forest. The artillerymen entered into single combat with enemy tanks. We will organize a retreat to the forest. We saved all the material. Much of the credit for this goes to the regimental staff member, Senior Lieutenant Troynikov.

July 7. They took up a perimeter defense in the forest. The scouts distinguished themselves. Sergeant Nochevkin, leading a group of fighters, destroyed an enemy anti-aircraft battery. Fascist machine gunners are combing the forest. We are fighting.

July 8. At night they tried to break through the Bely - Nelidovo road.The Nazis met with heavy fire. I had to go into the forest.

July 9. We are standing in the forest. We bring the regiment into order. Some suggest staying in the rear and switching to guerrilla methods of struggle. We conduct conversations in departments.

July 10. Food supplies are out. We have to kill horses for meat. The Nazis are shelling the forest. We are fighting with machine gunners.

July 11. I'm organizing an amateur concert. I sing “Letter to Moscow” with a guitar. Captain Saprykin sings ditties. A great thing is a song. The fighters are in a fighting mood.

July, 12. All day long we fought with machine gunners who were trying to close the ring. They are bombarded with mines. We have losses. I met a school friend from Krasnoyarsk Sasha Gupalov. He is a pilot. Arrived for the wounded general.

July 13. There is no connection. The regiment commander decided to leave the encirclement in groups.

the 14 th of July. A group of 18 people formed around me, including two commanders - senior lieutenant Shevchenko, wounded in the arm, and veterinary paramedic Kattyubeyev, a fellow countryman, who served together in the veterinary hospital. We go deeper into the forest. How disgusting horse meat is without salt: grass and grass.

July 15. The deputy regiment commander, Captain Bagryantsev, joined our group. He says that Commissioner Stankevich died.

July 16. The Nazis surrounded the entire forest area. We decide to infiltrate into another forest, which is obviously not blocked. Damp, mosquitoes, midges. You can’t make a fire, there’s water in your boots. Severe abdominal pain: horse meat makes itself felt without bread and salt. We are moving east.

July 17th. They walked through the night. In the morning we reached a country road. The fascists are wandering, the cars are coming. You can’t cross during the day, we’re waiting for night. We lie with Kattyubeyev, watching the Nazis.

July 18. At night we crossed the road. We do not encounter any enemy machine gunners. People are getting weaker. Circles of blueberries and wild strawberries fall in - pasture. He climbed the pine tree and looked around. I'm getting weaker too. I lost weight like I did after typhus. Anosov is feeling very bad. Such a big guy and weakened.

July 19. We are moving in the direction of the Bely - Rzhev highway. The people around us are walking along with us and towards us. Information about exit routes is contradictory. Fighting can be heard in the west.

July 20. We can hear the hum of cars ahead, obviously we are approaching the highway. I'm sending Brichkin on reconnaissance. A trickle came in. Everyone washed up. The meat spoils. Light a fire and fry it.

21 July. At least I could run into partisans. It's a shame, someone is fighting, and we... We went out to the highway. A continuous stream of German vehicles and tanks towards Bely. With the onset of darkness we crossed the highway.

July 22. The last horse was slaughtered. We shared the meat with a group of infantrymen. They were coming towards us. They say that there is a large concentration of Nazis along our route. Where are they not? Anosov is completely weak and cannot walk. Veterinary assistant Kattyubeyev decided to take the fighter to the nearest village free of Germans: he shouldn’t leave the guy in the forest. We can't carry it in our arms.

July 23. We left the surrounded forest. We crossed the Luchesa River and crossed an open field. We went deeper into another forest area, through which we were supposed to get to our own people. Cook the meat. We are preparing for a responsible transition. But ahead are two highways and the Bereza River.

July 24. We crossed the Bely - Olenino highway. Huge grass. Dew. Wet to the skin. Let's dry ourselves.

July 25. The meat is running out. Mushrooms, berries, sorrel are included. We passed a clearing where the enemy camp was set up. Fresh tracks. There is some road ahead, guarded by the enemy. We were noticed. Shot at. We climbed into the swamp. We spent the day up to our necks in a quagmire. The Nazis combed the forest, but did not find us.

26 July. We went out to the edge of the forest. A village is visible. I met a woman. She was carrying bread from somewhere. The hungry guys looked at the bag greedily. A small piece would be enough for everyone...

We came across three soldiers lying under a pine tree. They can’t walk, they’re completely weak. They preferred to die of starvation rather than surrender...

July 27. Hard day. At night we left the forest. When it dawned, we saw that we were in a small pit. There is open space all around, German speech can be heard. They lay down and prepared for battle. We will not give our life for nothing. Not far from us, mines and shells are exploding, machine gun and machine gun shots are heard. Apparently ours are close. As if they didn’t cover their own with fire. At dusk we got out of the pit.

July 28th. We've eaten all the meat, we haven't eaten anything for the second day. We lay down by the road. We study the movement of the Germans. Two people came to us - a commander and a fighter. They reported that they were ours at the Bereza River. The commander is coughing. This is dangerous: the Nazis are nearby all the time, they can discover...

July 29. We retreated into the depths of the forest. We collected some mushrooms and caught a hedgehog. We cooked mushrooms and hedgehog in a pot. A piece of hedgehog meat resembles pork fat. It's disgusting without salt, but you have to eat. I'm going on reconnaissance. I scouted out at 500-1000 meters and am coming back for the guys. All wet. Legs and arms cramp. And the guys ask: “You know how to walk through the forest, you move like a cat, you can’t hear the crunch of twigs. Drive on, there’s not much left.”

July 30. All day they poked around in all directions, the Nazis were all around. In the evening they came to the German battery. I had to join the fight. Several fascists were killed, the rest fled. Well, now they'll squeeze us. We must break through at any cost!

July 31st. At night we crawled across the road and the forest blockage. Apparently a line of defense. Russian speech can be heard. Our defense or prisoners?

Individuals and units of the 24th Cavalry Division fought their way out of encirclement and out of the pocket. Among those who escaped the encirclement was the commander of the 24th Cavalry Division, Lieutenant Colonel, and then Colonel Vasily Georgievich Gagua . He died at the very end of the war: he reached Czechoslovakia, commanding the 9th Guards Cavalry Division, was wounded on April 19, 1945 and died the next day in hospital. He was buried in the city of Nitra in Slovakia in the city square.

S.V.Sokolov

To the commander of the 11th Cavalry Corps Colonel Sokolov managed to break through to join his troops in the area of ​​​​the city of Nelidovo, for which he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and received the rank of major general. He finished the war in Czechoslovakia with the rank of lieutenant general, then continued to serve in the army, retiring in 1959. He wrote memoirs, but they were not published.

Joseph Grigorievich Factor , the author of memoirs about a five-month raid deep behind the enemy’s 1st Guards Cavalry Corps under General Belov, ended the war in Berlin. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner and many medals. His boss, commander of the 41st Cavalry Division, Colonel Mikhail Iosifovich Glinsky, together with Factor, safely emerged from the raid to his own, then successfully led the cavalry units until the end of the war, had many awards, including the Order of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner and the Order Suvorov II degree. He died in 1991 in Moscow.

Junior Lieutenant Snigirev also remained in service until the end of the war. In January 1945, with the rank of major, he commanded a regiment in the battles for the Polish cities of Krakow and Wieliczka. In the year of the 40th anniversary of the Victory, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.

Monument at the grave of P.G. Chanchibadze at the Novodevichy cemetery

Colonel Porfiry Georgievich Chanchibadze continued to command the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division, which before the start of the battles for Rzhev on July 25, 1942 was part of the 30th Army of the Kalinin Front. Unsuccessfully storming the village of Galakhovo (apparently, in the same way as the earlier village of Pletushovo), she suffered huge losses, almost ceasing to exist. In the last days of August and early September, she fought for Rzhev, and in October she was withdrawn for completion. Chanchibadze served until the end of the war, received the rank of lieutenant general, and commanded the army during the assault on Koenigsberg. In April 1945, Lieutenant General Porfiry Georgievich Chanchibadze was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for skillful command and control of troops during the defeat of the Zemland enemy group. On June 24, 1945, Lieutenant General Chanchibadze participated in the Victory Parade in Moscow. He died in 1950 and was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery.

Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is always an orphan. It so happened that the area east and north of the Serezhan Church became the scene of two major defeats of the Red Army in the first and most tragic year of the war. First, it found itself on the retreat route of the armies that found themselves in the “Vyazemsky Cauldron” in October 1941, and then grandiosely conceived but unsuccessful battles for the Moscow-Minsk highway unfolded here. The desire to overpower and defeat the enemy “at any cost” was very great. But it was not the effort that was evaluated, but the result. The commanders of the units fighting for the highway, who lived to see victory and became generals, did not take active steps to ensure that the fighting in January-April 1942 of the 11th Cavalry Corps became a widely known page of the Great Patriotic War. The actions of the heroes were forgotten, and their names were facelessly lost among other names on memorial plaques or did not appear there at all. For local residents, these were terrible memories that could not be forgotten, but it was unbearable to return to them. After all, mothers had to look for their dead sons in the fields among the killed soldiers of the cavalry corps and bury them themselves. That is why the sad ruins of the Serezhan Church have stood forlorn and lonely for more than 70 years, not being a place of worship for those who fell here in fierce battles. And only a small homemade stone slab, lost in the tall grass, on the site of the no longer existing village of Ulyanovo, persistently appeals to the memory of descendants, testifying to the events that took place here. With great difficulty you can read on it:

“Here the Limonovs, Ivan Mikhailovich, born in 1928, were born and died during the battle on March 25, 1942. and Alexey Mikhailovich born in 1936 Their father Mikhail Andreevich Limonov died near the city of Rzhev.”

Memorial plaque at the site of the death of children in the village of Ulyanovo

War is a huge tragedy that is woven from millions of small tragedies.